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Through four case studies of technological systems – optical tracking of satellites, 
sounding rockets, instructional television through a geosynchronous satellite, and a launch 
vehicle--I explore the origins and development of the Indian space program from 1955 through 
1976, a period critical in shaping the program’s identity and its relationship to the state. 
Institutionalized, and constructed in different geographic regions of India, these systems were 
embedded in the broader political, economic, and social life of the country and served as nodes 
around which existing and new scientific and technological communities were formed. These 
organic, highly networked communities in turn negotiated and developed a space program to meet 
the social and strategic demands of a new modernizing nation state. That modernizing program 
was, in turn, embedded in a broader set of scientific, technological and political relationships with 
industrialized countries, above all the United States. 
The United States’ cooperation with India began with the establishment of tracking 
stations for plotting the orbits of artificial satellites. Cognizant of the contributions made by 
Indian scientists in the field of astronomy and meteorology, a scientific tradition that stretched 
back several decades, the officials and the scientific community at NASA, along with their Indian 
counterparts outlined a cooperative program that focused on the mutual exploration of the tropical 
space for scientific data. This initial collaboration gradually expanded and more advanced space 
application projects brought the two democratic countries, in spite of some misgivings, closer 
together in the common cause of using space sciences and technologies for developing India. In 
the process India and the United States ended up coproducing a space program that responded to 
the ambitions of the postcolonial scientific and political elite of India. The global Cold War and 
the ambiguities, desires and tensions of a postcolonial nation-state vying for leadership among the 





the trajectory of India’s space program. Without this political context and the construction of a 
transnational web of relationships, it is highly unlikely that the Indian scientific and technological 
elite, along with their industrial and political partners, would have succeeded in putting India on 





Chapter I: Introduction 
 
Few today contest the significance of India’s rapid economic expansion, or 
question the growing importance of India in world affairs. As an emerging global power 
its nuclear and space ambitions have grown by leaps and bounds. Starting as a space 
science enterprise in the late nineteen fifties with meager resources India now looks 
towards an ambitious space program, including human space flight, in the coming 
decades. Undoubtedly, the Indian space program is one of the success stories of modern 
India. Many countries made contributions at different stages of its evolution to make 
India a global player in space. Among these countries, the United States by far played a 
key role in institutionalizing and establishing a space program for India.  
The United States’ cooperation with India began with the establishment of 
tracking stations for plotting the orbits of artificial satellites. Cognizant of the 
contributions made by Indian scientists in the field of astronomy and meteorology, a 
scientific tradition that stretched back several decades, the officials and the scientific 
community at NASA, along with their Indian counterparts outlined a cooperative 
program that focused on mutual exploration of the tropical space for scientific data.  The 
cooperation started in the early 1960s with the loan of sounding rockets, launchers and 
the training of Indian scientists and engineers at selected NASA facilities. This initial 
collaboration gradually expanded and more advanced space application projects brought 
the two democratic countries, in spite of some misgivings, closer together in the common 
cause of using space sciences and technologies for developing and modernizing India. In 
the process India and the United States ended up coproducing a space program that 





Conversely, the experience with India imparted a new meaning and architecture of what a 
space program should be in developing countries in Asia and Latin America. The global 
Cold War and the ambiguities, desires and tensions of a postcolonial nation-state vying 
for leadership among the newly decolonized states in the Afro-Asian region forms the 
essential backdrop for understanding the origins and trajectory of India’s space program.  
The development of a space program in India is contextualized here in the 
framework of the United States’ relations with India beginning in nineteen fifties. Two 
interconnected themes frame the dissertation. First, the history and discourse of 
modernization and development will be used to situate U.S.-India foreign relations in the 
postwar period. In the wake of the Bandung conference (1955) leaders of newly 
decolonized states hoped to construct a third, ‘non-aligned’ force in the international 
arena that was independent of the competing ideologies of progress that defined Cold 
War rivalry. Bandung also became a platform for developing nations to embrace the 
mantra of rapid modernization and self reliance to leapfrog into modernity. This 
movement was not always welcomed by the U.S. government which remained at arms 
length from India until its defeat in a border war with China (1962) and the Chinese 
nuclear test (1964).  The Chinese threat was given a global dimension: the PRC would 
become the model for newly-liberated countries in the ‘Third World.’  To counter this 
threat the United States – and this is the second main theme -- hoped both to accelerate 
India’s emergence as a major regional power and to use its technological advantage to 
divert India’s nuclear and missile ambitions into civilian space projects.  US-India 
cooperation in space based technologies was seen as a prestigious and useful alternative 





evolving non-proliferation regime orchestrated by the US, sought to ‘indigenously’ 
develop their own space technologies by creating new institutions domestically and 
through the transnational traffic of experts, systems and software. These two themes are 
the scaffolding for understanding the evolution of United States-India relations in space 
science and technology.  
There is a limited non-academic and academic literature on the Indian case.  
Gopal Raj’s popular Reach for the Stars is a good account of how India developed its 
launch vehicle capability.
1
 Angathevar Baskaran has published key journal length articles 
focusing on policy aspects of space applications and technology.
2
 Amrita Shah’s recent 
work on Vikram Sarabhai
3
 and the economic history of the Indian space program by U. 
Sankar 
4
 offer new insights into the history of India’s space program. These works, 
however, rely mostly on sources published by the Indian government and newspaper 
reports and do not bring to light the early stages of cooperation in any detail nor do they 
tie developments with broader domestic and international political realities.  
This work has intellectual moorings in John Krige’s studies on science, 
technology and international affairs.
5
 His efforts at integrating the history of technology 
                                                 
1
 Gopal Raj, Reach for the Stars: The Evolution of India's Rocket Programme (New Delhi: Viking, 2000).  
2
 Angathevar Baskaran, "Competence Building in Complex Systems in the Developing 
Countries: The Case of Satellite Building in India," Technovation 21, no. 2 (2001): 109-21; 
Angathevar Baskaran, "Technology Accumulation in the Ground Systems of India's Space 
Program: The Contribution of Foreign and Indigenous Inputs," Technology in Society 23, no. 2 
(2001): 195-216; Angathevar Baskaran, "From Science to Commerce: The Evolution of Space 
Development Policy and Technology Accumulation in India," Technology in Society 27, no. 2 
(2005): 155-79. 
3
 Amrita Shah, Vikram Sarabhai, a Life (New Delhi: Penguin, 2007). 
4
 U. Sankar, The Economics of India's Space Programme: An Exploratory Analysis (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 2007). 
5
 John Krige and Kai-Henrik Barth, Global Power Knowledge: Science and Technology 
in International Affairs, Osiris, Volume 21, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006; 





literature with international affairs have opened new vistas to explore the use of science 
and technology as instruments of United States foreign policy.  The study also draws 
inspiration from the scholarly work of Raman Srinivasan who first attempted to connect 
the history of India’s space program, particularly the origins and development of the 
Indian National Satellite (INSAT), with the greater currents of the Cold War and to 
deeper Indian intellectual and cultural traditions.
6
  Recent work by space historian Asif 




In this introduction I will provide the international and domestic context for 
situating and understanding the microevolution of India’s space developments. I will do 
this by giving a background to US-India foreign relations and describing the origins of a 
national space agenda and its rationale in the eyes of key members of Indian national 
elites, mainly Jawaharlal Nehru, Homi J. Bhabha and Vikram Sarabhai – namely as an 
instrument of modernization. In a climate of Indian leaders’ outspoken “neutrality” and 
penchant for rapid modernization through the application of science and technology, the 
United States government, through different agencies and institutions, levered its 
technological preeminence to forge an alliance with the Western trained indigenous elite 
and to channel India toward a liberal democratic and capitalist system.  The Indian elite, 
however, mindful of their newly won sovereignty had to walk a tight rope not to get 
                                                                                                                                                 
(MIT Press, November 2006, (cloth), MIT Press, September 2008; John Krige, “NASA 
as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy,” in Societal Impact of Spaceflight Steven J. Dick 
and Roger D. Launius, eds., (Washington DC: NASA SP-2007-4801), pp. 207-18. 
6
 Raman Srinivasan, “No Free Launch: Designing the Indian National Satellite”, in 
Beyond The Ionosphere: Fifty Years of Satellite Communication, Andrew J. Butrica, ed., 
(Washington, D.C.: NASA SP-4217, 1997).  
7
 Asif Siddiqi, “Competing Technologies, National(ist) Narratives, and Universal Claims: Toward a 





entangled in East-West conflict while at the same time being selectively porous to ideas 
of governance and socio-economic planning, and scientific and technological aid aimed 
at development. This inbuilt tension in relations between two unequal powers in the 
climate of global Cold War and the destination, albeit different, desired by them shaped 
the trajectory of the Indian space program.  
US-India Foreign Relations  
 
Scholars who have studied the history of Indo-US relations over the last five 
decades have almost exhausted the English vocabulary to describe the tensions that 
prevailed between the two largest democracies.
8
 In the Cold War that ensued between the 
U.S. and the USSR soon after the independence of India and Pakistan from British rule in 
1947, the U.S. favored an alliance with Pakistan owing to its strategic location - 
bordering the USSR, China and the Middle Eastern countries. The ensuing partnership 
was intended to counter any communist expansion from China or the USSR into the 
South Asian region. While India espoused the policy of non-alignment, Pakistan sided 
with the United States, joined the Baghdad Pact and the Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO), and received extensive military supplies. This close alliance 
between the United Sates and Pakistan resulted in increased alienation between US and 
India and in the words of Dennis Kux, former Foreign Service South Asia specialist, the 
relations were “uneven -- on occasion friendly, sometimes hostile, but, more often, just 
                                                 
8
 Dennis Kux, Estranged Democracies: India and the United States, 1941-1991 (New Delhi:  Thousand 
Oaks: Sage Publications, 1994); Gary K. Bertsch,, Seema Gahlaut, and Anupam Srivastava, Engaging 
India: US Strategic Relations with the World's Largest Democracy (New York: Routledge, 1999); H.W. 
Brands, India and the United States: The Cold Peace (Boston: Twayne Publishers, c1990); Andrew J. 
Rotter, Comrades at Odds : the United States and India, 1947-1964 (Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University 
Press, 2000); Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery : the United States, India, and Pakistan 







 India’s openly declared “neutrality” at the Bandung conference was the 
starting point for this estrangement.  
Bandung  
Martinique scholar, Vijay Prashad in his book The Darker Nations: A People's 
History of the Third World reminds us that “Third World” was not a place but a project. 
The project was aimed at designing a “third” better world, at a time when competing 
systems, capitalist and communist, vied for supremacy with the backdrop of a possible 
nuclear annihilation. This short lived “project” was initiated by leaders of Africa, Asia 
and Latin America when they met in 1955 at Bandung -- a densely populated city located 
on Western Java in Indonesia, to give hope and to fulfill the aspirations of the “wretched 
of the earth” living in those regions ravished by centuries of colonial domination and 
grinding poverty.  The representatives who met at Bandung all shared the historical 
commonality of colonial domination and were determined for a “joint struggle against the 
forces of imperialism.” They saw the new emerging pacts during global Cold War like 
the Manila Pact, and the Baghdad Pact as conduits for major powers to exercise their 
influence into their newly gained sovereignty.
10
  
Jawaharlal Nehru, one of the towering figures at the conference and who was 
looked upon as the leader of the “Third World” stated,  
So far as I am concerned, it does not matter what war takes place: we will 
not take part in it unless we have to defend ourselves. If I join any of these big 
groups I lose my identity; I have no identity left, I have no view left….if all the 
world were to be divided up between these two big blocs what would be the 
result? The inevitable result would be war. Therefore every step that takes place 
in reducing that area in the world which may be called the “unaligned area” is a 
                                                 
9
 Kux, Estranged Democracies, p. 447.  
10






dangerous step and leads to war. It reduces objectivity, that balance, that outlook 




The conference itself was instrumental in the further decolonization of countries 
and the formation the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).  
John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State during Eisenhower’s presidency declared 
that neutralism was an “immoral and short sighted conception” and MacArthur reasoned 
that it would create imbalance in the current world order and might pull Japan, an ally of 
US, toward that sphere. 
12
 To check the influence of communism in the newly 
decolonized states and to keep an American presence, Dulles insisted on pacts, alliances 
and treaties.
 
Eisenhower saw it as a “move toward the left among the neutral countries.” 
In this tense political climate Dulles even proposed an idea of a “reverse Bandung 
conference, in which the Western oriented ‘Third World’ countries would have the upper 
hand.”
13
 In the ensuing drama at Bandung, India was seen as a “great villain” and all the 




In this geopolitical context, though the relations between United States and India 
seemed “estranged” on the surface during most of Cold War, it is rather intriguing to see 
                                                 
11
 Speech in the closed session of the Asian-African conference, Bandung, 22
nd
 April 
1955, quoted from Nehru, selected works, second series, vol. XXVIII, p. 108, cited in 
Westad, Global Cold War, p. 101.   
12
 Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World (New York: 
New Press, 2007); http://www.bandungspirit.org/spip.php?article4 (accessed on March 
11, 2011); for a scholarly account of United States and its reaction to the Bandung 
conference and the policy of non-alignment see H.W. Brands, The Specter of Neutralism: 
The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947-1960 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1989).  
13
 Odd A Westad,. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 103. 
14
 Gabriel Kolko, Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1980 (New York: 





underneath this “cold peace” the extensive role the United States played through different 
government institutions and agencies to modernize India and to establish this new nation 
state as a capitalist model and a bulwark against the communist model adopted by the 
Soviet Union and China. Since India was sandwiched between a number of newly 
decolonized Afro-Asian countries, the United States felt that it was imperative to stabilize 
and develop it along capitalist and democratic ideals so as to win the hearts and minds of 
millions of people in the Afro-Asian region. This is evident through the massive 
economic aid India received from the United States during the first two decades of 
India’s independence and the constant traffic of experts -- from science and technology to 
cultural, linguistic and economic fields--, between the “metropolis” and “periphery.”
15
  
Technology and Modernization  
The beginning of American efforts to modernize, a term that received traction 
only after WWII, newly decolonized regions can be traced to President Truman’s 
inaugural address delivered on January 20, 1949. In the Point IV of the inaugural address, 
he called on the United States “to embark on a bold new program for making the benefits 
of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and 
growth of underdeveloped areas.”
16
 The timing of the Truman’s speech was a response to 
the emerging Cold War and the wave of decolonization that was altering the global 
                                                 
15
 For a detailed analysis of modernization efforts by the United States in developing countries see George 
Rosen, Western Economists and Eastern Societies: Agents of Change in South Asia, 1950-1970 (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985); Michael E. Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social 
Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2000); Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004); David C. Engerman, “West Meets East: The Center for 
International Studies and Indian Economic Development” in Staging Growth: Modernization, 
Development, and the Global Cold War, David C. Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele, and Michael 
E. Latham, eds., (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), 199-223;  Nicole Sackley, “Passage 
to Modernity: American Social Scientists, India, and the Pursuit of Development, 1945-1961,” Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Princeton University, 2004.  
16
 Point Four: Cooperative Program for Aid in the Development of Economically Underdeveloped Areas 





landscape. The fall of China to Chairman Mao in 1949, and the Korean War that ensued 
only hastened the need to provide structural solutions for leading the new nation states 
toward liberal capitalist directions to achieve “progress.” 
For providing structural solutions a new breed of experts commonly referred to as 
“modernizers” emerged on the international scene. This group was composed of an 
eclectic mix of social scientists and economists who crossed the academy to take 
government positions to spearhead policies aimed at improving developing nations. One 
of the chief architects of modernization theory Walt Whitman Rostow, housed at the 
Center for International Studies (CENIS) at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
proposed a systematic formula for leading developing countries toward economic 
development. In his book The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto he 
observed distinct stages of socio-economic progress – of how a society progresses from 
its tradition and passes through various stages before it attains maturity preconditions for 
take-off, the drive to maturity, and lastly the age of high mass consumption.
17
 Central to 
Rostow’s manifesto for the march of modernity into developing countries was the 
“importance of the rise of scientific thinking” and the humans competence to “manipulate 
the environment.”
18
 His writings became influential among native elites in developing 
regions who selectively appropriated the development discourse to articulate their own 
meanings to develop their country.  
                                                 
17
 W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto 
(Cambridge, Eng.: University Press, 1960).  
18
 Michael Adas, Modernization Theory and American Revival of The Scientific and 
Technological Standards of Social Achievement and Human Worth,” in David C 
Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele and Michael E. Latham, eds., Staging Growth: 
Modernization, Development and the  Global Cold War (Amherst: University of 






The modernizers in general, viewed all societies around the world to be in a 
continuum progressing toward a telos. At the end of this continuum was the United States 
which had already “arrived.” The newly decolonized states were seen to be at different 
points or ‘stages’ along the path. Given the time and economic and technical assistance – 
a key variable in the modernization project; and planning, the modernizers believed that 
any region of the globe could become “developed.” For offering structural solutions to 
endemic problems, the modernizers looked at their own countries’ history and extract 
solutions for overcoming the hurdles developing countries were facing. For example, the 
modernizers often invoked the model of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to show 
how a poor region in the US was converted into a flourishing growth area, emphasizing 
that it could form a prototype for instituting development projects in poor regions across 
the globe. “TVA presented itself as a technical solution to social, political, and economic 
problems and hence a counter model to Communism.”
19
  The promise offered by science 
and technology to help achieve modernity attracted the leaders of developing countries.  
There was a surge from western trained postcolonial elite India who embraced science 
and technology as instruments for building an independent national agenda.  
Seen through the grid of technology and modernization -- early nuclear 
cooperation, the origin and development of the Indian space program through NASA, 
artificial rainmaking experiments, population control, hybrid seeds and green revolution 
experiments funded by the American private and academic foundations  -- all of these 
technological projects during the fifties and sixties can be seen as a part of the renewed 
attempt by the U.S. to develop India and to make it a laboratory to pull the Indian elite 
                                                 
19





into the Western sphere of influence. India was locked into a global strategic position and 
the United States had a vested interest in keeping it there.  
India’s humiliating defeat in the border war with China in 1962 briefly brought 
the United States and India closer together. The defeat by China was a “Sputnik shock” 
for the Indians that led to a rapid rise in defense budgets.  Renewed importance was given 
to science and technology for defense purposes. John F. Kennedy‘s administration made 
use of this opportunity to promote India as a democratic counterweight to China. 
Kennedy’s policy toward developing countries, India in particular, showed a striking 
difference compared to previous administrations. While Dulles divided countries into pro 
and anti communists, Kennedy and his advisers were sensitive to the needs of new 
postcolonial states and gave room for the expression of independent foreign polices by 
different countries in the developing world. He aimed to stall the expanding communist 
ideology in Afro-Asian countries through economic aid and modernization. He believed 
that economic stability would bring prosperity and political stability which in turn would 
be a bulwark against expanding communism.  However, ongoing distrust of India’s 
neutrality colored Kennedy’s perception of the country and stifled his innovative 
approaches to improve bilateral relations. Indo-American relations during Lyndon Baines 
Johnson’s administration were anything but cordial. The Indo-Pakistan war in 1965, 
India’s public criticism of Johnson’s policy in Vietnam, and Johnsons’ use of Public Law 
480 -- through which India received food grains, to force India’s support of US policy in 
Vietnam, all increased tensions. This short tether policy during a time of severe famine in 
1965-67 eroded years of good will and left scars. President Nixon’s decision to support 





(formerly East Pakistan) in 1971 brought US-India relations to its nadir. Nixon cancelled 




Viewed through this geopolitical contextual grid, significant US-India cooperative 
endeavors in space science and technology were not uniform but ebbed and flowed and 
were constantly shaped by this larger bilateral foreign policy framework. Significant 
punctuation points that altered, for good and for worse, US-India relations in space were: 
India’s border war with China - 1962; the Chinese nuclear test - 1964; Indo-Pakistan war 
of 1965, the Chinese launch of a satellite 1970; the Indo-Pakistan War - 1971; India’s 
first Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) - 1974; the successful orbiting of India’s satellite 
Rohini through an indigenously built Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV-3) in 1980; the start 
of the Integrated Guided Missile Development program (IGMDP) in India -1983; the 
impact of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) - 1987; the Pokhran II 
nuclear weapons tests - 1998 and the closer diplomatic relations that ensued after the 9/11 
terrorists attacks on the United States.  This dissertation mainly focuses on the early 
stages of cooperation (1955-1976) -- from the establishment of optical tracking of 
artificial satellites through the Smithsonian Institution during the International 
Geophysical Year (IGY) to the execution of a one-year experimental television project in 
1975-1976. The two-decade timeline marks the beginning and waning of the first phase 
                                                 
20
 Also in the early seventies there was a strong feeling that aid was not supporting 
modernization efforts in India. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who was sent to India as an 
ambassador to improve relations with Indira Gandhi after the 1971 war stated that “it is 
no longer possible to believe that the aid programs of the 1960s are workable. It costs too 
much to give India money. For one thing they hate you for it; for another we do not have 
the economic or political resources to mount a significant aid program.” Daniel P. 
Moynihan and Steven R. Weisman, Daniel Patrick Moynihan: A Portrait in Letters of an 






of close interaction between United States and India in the realms of space science and 
technology.  
Vikram A. Sarabhai and Homi J. Bhabha 
The origin of the Indian space story often begins with the visionary scientist and 
technocrat Vikram Sarabhai, who is credited as being the father of India’s space program. 
But the early phase owes as much to the pioneering efforts of Homi Bhabha who was 
instrumental in the establishment of scientific institutions for the growth of science and 
technology in modern India.
21
 By the late fifties, when initiatives were taken to pursue 
space research at a systematic level in India using scientific balloons and miniature 
rockets, Bhabha had already established the scientific ethos and the rationale for the 
pursuit of cutting edge technologies in the nuclear and space domains, and had launched 
a major nuclear program.
22
  The duo, however, were not new to the field of space 
sciences, they had established their niche in cosmic ray physics even before they thought 
about huge scientific projects for the emerging nation state.
23
 In particular, Sarabhai was 
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aware of the research opportunities, made possible by space technology, to study the 
upper atmosphere. Together they initiated early interactions with NASA for possible 
cooperative space projects.  
Vikram Ambala Sarabhai was born in Ahmedabad, India on 12 August, 1919 to a 
wealthy family of industrialists.
24
 After finishing his early education in Ahmedabad he 
moved to St. John’s College, Cambridge, UK in 1937 where he took his Tripos with 
Physics and Mathematics in 1940 and continued his postgraduate work in nuclear 
physics. He returned to India after the outbreak of WWII and continued his professional 
training as a research scholar under Nobel Laureate C.V. Raman at the Indian Institute of 
Science (IISC) Bangalore. It was at IISC that he nurtured a friendship with Homi Bhbaha 
who was also researching on cosmic rays, and who established a research unit for this 
purpose at IISC. 
25
 
Sarabhai returned to Cambridge after the war in 1945 and his extensive fieldwork 
carried out in Bangalore and Apharwat in the Kashmir region of the Himalayas enabled 
him to receive his Ph.D in 1947 for his doctoral thesis, Cosmic Ray Investigation in 
Tropical Latitudes. After getting his degree he soon returned to a new India that became 
independent in 1947 after centuries of British colonial rule. Jawaharlal Nehru became the 
first prime minister of India. Trained in Harrow and Cambridge, Nehru believed science 
to be a panacea for the innumerable problems faced by humanity.  As he put it, “it is 
science alone that can solve the problem of hunger and poverty, of insanitation and 
illiteracy, of superstition and deadening custom and tradition, of vast resources running to 
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waste of a rich country inhabited by starving people. Who indeed can afford to ignore 
science today? At every turn we have to seek its aid. The future belongs to science and to 
those who make friends with science.”
26
  There was an air of optimism and vibrancy, and 
the trio –Nehru, Bhabha and Sarabhai -- with patronage from the government and private 
industrial enterprises like the Tata trust -- the Medici’s of India, and Sarabhai’s own 
family business conglomerate, would become potent actors to wield science and 
technology to cement the new nation-state.
27
  
Vikram Sarabhai started a laboratory for the study of cosmic rays in Ahmedabad, 
which was later institutionalized by the setting up of the Physical Research Laboratory 
(PRL) in 1954.
28
 Thanks to the business enterprise his family had established, he became 
in Thomas Hughes’ phrase, a heterogeneous engineer with a multitude of portfolios.
29
 
Popular writings portray him as an institution builder, a visionary, a pragmatist and a 
Gandhian. Sarabhai viewed the development of a nation to be intimately linked with the 
understanding and application of science and technology by its people. He did not believe 
in direct development through the application of sophisticated technologies, but rather in 
understanding the science behind how technology functions. He saw the new emerging 
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field of space sciences not purely as basic scientific research -- science for pure 
knowledge’s sake, but as obligatory passage points for embarking on development 
programs. He stated that “…pursuit of cosmic rays and space research does not require an 
apology in a developing nation provided the activities are within a total scheme of 
priorities in the allocation of national resources.” He viewed engaging with pure sciences 
as a logical step toward strengthening the “organization and conduct of education,” and 
creating infrastructural facilities for the development of electronics and chemicals. He 
further stated that “I am actively interested in the application of science for the 




Vikram Sarabhai was also known in international circles as an apostle for world 
peace and disarmament. He was a member of Continuing Committee of Pugwash, and 
participated in Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs and set up the Indian 
Pugwash Society. He was also interested in integrating India with the global community. 
His familiarity and high esteem at international meetings was recognized and he was 
elected president of the 14
th
 general Conference of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) in 1970.
31
 The sense of isolation that India experienced under colonial 
rule served as a major impetus for building a domestic program, to engage with scientific 
institutions around the world as an equal partner, and to create avenues for technology 
and idea sharing.   
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Sarabhai, when speaking for the development of India, argued “what applies to 
the economy of India applies to the economy of most of the countries in the Indian Ocean 
region. Space meteorology, which permits the acquisition of valuable data from satellites 
as well as with the use of sounding rockets, has, therefore, a special significance for us.” 
His international position is very important for looking at US-India relations in space 
because in the late 1960s Sarabhai became the scientific Chairman of the UN Committee 
on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and so became a vector, as it were, to publicize the 
benefits of space for the newly formed developing nation states. At the same time, while 
advocating for space sciences, he was vocal against the needless craving for prestige that 
might accrue when a developing nation embarked on a space program.  
U.S. officials were captivated by the unusual combination of industrialist and 
physicist in one man. His participation in international conferences, his accomplishments 
in basic scientific research, his visiting faculty status at MIT, the list of committees, 
commissions and boards that he was a member of impressed the American embassy 
officials in India who wrote long reports to the U.S. State Department of his activities. 
These qualities played a crucial part when NASA was spreading its wings across the 
developing regions – here was a member of a native elite who could be a suitable 
ambassador for NASA’s peaceful programs in developing countries and not just in the 
region but across the world.  
 
 





For the newly independent country, eagerly desiring for leapfrogging into 
modernity, India was locked into transnational networks of knowledge circulation. To 
build a new modern nation state underpinned by technological strength required constant 
flow of knowledge and technology from other countries. As modernization became 
highly entrenched, the elites began to realize that its something they cannot do it on their 
own, therefore India was forced to do some strategic alliances with various western 
powers, above all the US, the leading technological power in the globe. The circulation of 
knowledge and technology that we see here is out of compulsion and is something not 
easily visible to the local. How do we understand the interdependence at the 
technological level? Classically, scholars have used George Basalla’s heuristic model 
explained in the “Spread of Western Science” for interrogating knowledge and 
technology flow.
32
 Though a lot of criticisms have been piled on the diffusion model, it 
forms a reference point for initiating a dialogue on circulation of knowledge across nation 
states. In the article Basalla describes the diffusion of Western science from the “center” 
– Western Europe, to the “periphery” – rest of the world; happening through three phases 
– exploration, dependence and culminating in the creation an independent scientific 
tradition or culture. Rather than from being hegemonic – from the “center” to 
“periphery,” what we see in reality is a genuine circulation of knowledge and 
interdependence. To understand the complex web of transnational relations one has to 
move beyond Basalla’s model to see the contours. In a recent article on the US-European 
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scientific relations,  John Krige explains that, though the relations were embedded in an 
asymmetric field of force – United States as “center” and Europe as “periphery,” the 
European scientific community were not denied agency.
33
 They were “characterized as 
‘selectively appropriating’ or even completely rejecting values, material  practices and 
research agendas to accommodate the stamina of local cultures.” In a similar vein Indian 
elite with all its divisions, was a highly trained articulate elite with their own agenda. 
They were determined to leave their footprint on how the space program would evolve in 
India. The tensions behind leaving its footprint and the determination of the US to leave 
its footprint is part of my story. This dynamic relation is best captured by the metaphor of 
“coproduction,” a term that has received traction among diplomatic historians, historians 
of technology and science studies. It is a valuable way of emphasizing the agency of both 
parties and the non-linear circulation of ideas and people back also to the United States. 
The ambivalence implied by this dyadic relation opens further room for investigating 
transnational networks and knowledge flows in high-technology – space and also nuclear; 
between “metropolis” and “periphery” and between “periphery” and “periphery.”   
John Krige extended this term in his book American Hegemony: Postwar 
Reconstruction of Europe, to characterize the emergence of the American empire as a 
“negotiated outcome of a complex process in which European partners selectively 
appropriated and adapted features of the U.S. agenda and ambitions for the Continent and 
made them their own.” Without the use of force, the United States levered its scientific 
technological preeminence, through the agency of a “transnational elite” to convince 
partners in Europe to align with the United States. Rather than being passive receivers, as 
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in consensual hegemony, the “United States gave Europeans room to leave their imprint 
on the hegemonic regime and this implies that empire building is a fluid process.”
34
 
Recently two historians of science and technology, Jennifer Von Vleck and Zuoyue 
Wang have appropriated this metaphor for their case studies on US aviation assistance to 
Afghanistan and for analyzing Chinese American scientists.
35
 Science studies scholars 
have used the term coproduction to denote the dynamic reciprocal evolution of science 
and politics. Shiela Jasanoff in her book States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of 
Science and Social Order, defines it as the “simultaneous production of knowledge and 
social order.”
36
 Seeing the increased plasticity of the term and its salience, I have 
appropriated it for framing the Indian space program as well. I use this metaphor to 
denote the mutual shaping of the Indian space program catered toward socio-economic 
benefits by native elite and foreign experts. What a space program should be in 
developing countries was contested during the course of Indian elites’ engagement with 
the evolving space technology. US experts wanted to channel the space program to 
address core issues of a developing nation state – population, literacy, national cohesion, 
agricultural improvement, rural upliftment, etc. The Indian space establishment however 
wanted to develop a full-fledged space program (a fleet of application satellites and 
launch vehicles) to cater to the socio-economic needs of a developing nation and also the 
strategic needs of a sovereign nation state. This tension gets manifested in the evolution 
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of the Indian space program. Secondly, India offered a virgin ground for testing 
sophisticated technologies – the satellite TV is a case in point. The planning and 
execution of the experiment offered vital data for NASA and business corporations to 
learn what shape a space program should take in other developing countries.  
Transnational Networks and Knowledge Flows  
This dissertation, while narrating the evolution of the Indian space program 
through the grid of US-India relations opens room to chart knowledge flows in science 
and technology during Cold War. While there is no dearth of analysis of US-India 
political relations, scholars are beginning to unravel the extensive engagement with India 
in the field of science and technology. The volume of aid in science and technology that 
India received during the fifties and sixties is quite startling. US ambassador to India 
Chester Bowles (1953-55; 1963-1969) in an article in Foreign Affairs states that:  
The United States has helped rebuild and modernize India’s railroads, 
contributed 60 percent of the capital for India’s power development, helped build 
and staff eight agricultural universities, provided nearly 40 million tons of food 
grains, printed millions of books for Indian schools, published four excellent 
magazines to help Indians better understand America, provided thousands of 
American technicians and made it possible for thousands of Indians to go to 
America for training and advanced education. The size of the US Peace Corps in 




Key Indian actors in scientific and technological establishments desired and 
sought technical aid from United States.  It was only when it was denied that the Indian 
elites turned to the Soviet Union or other partners in the international arena. The case 
studies dealt with in the dissertation also show that the dynamic knowledge flow was not 
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just between “center” to “periphery” – USA and into India; but also between “periphery” 
and “periphery.” By engaging with India, which the United States treated as a laboratory, 
experts were exposed to the realities of a developing country; their experiences in India, 
coupled with data collected through American foundations, educational institutions, the 
Peace Corps, the American Embassy and Consulates, and others, on disparate topics 
directly fed the “arsenal of knowledge.”
38
 The development of the Indian space story 
clearly shows the hidden transnational movements of systems and software and experts 
during the Cold War.  
Dissertation Chapters 
The case studies dealt here constitute the ‘civilian’ side of a space program along 
the three classic axis – science, application, and launchers.  As we move from science to 
launchers, we draw closer to the sensitivity of the technology. Just as the nuclear program 
has dual use – production of energy and for weaponry;  the space program also acquires 
dual use capability  as it moves from science to launchers -- commercial and military 
interests.  
Before we delve into the chapters, it is important to distinguish between 
cooperation and collaboration here because most of the transnational knowledge and 
technology flow was in the realms of cooperation. In collaboration, rather than pursuing 
an independent course of action, different partners are inclined to pool their resources and 
closely work together to achieve their goals.  However, collaboration is not the norm 
among competing partners who are pursuing scientific and technological knowledge, 
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often it is a “negotiated outcome,” wherein, “stakeholders balance the benefits of tapping 
into the resources that others have to offer against the costs of sharing what they have 
with their competitors.” Cooperation on the other hand does not involve a lot of 
investment in resources that collaboration demands. Often cooperation is sought, through 
formal conventions and procedures, for collecting massive amounts of data from different 
geographical regions. In cooperation transnational flow of sensitive technology is kept at 
a minimal level. Gathering data about the properties of ionosphere on the geomagnetic 
equator is a clear case of cooperation wherein the technology exchanges are kept minimal 
but the acquired data is made public for broader scientific community.
39
 
Baker Nunn and Nike Apache  
At the heart of the first chapter are two technological systems: a Baker Nunn 
camera for photographing artificial satellites and sounding rockets for studying various 
atmospheric phenomena. Both the systems were loaned to India by two different 
organizations – the Smithsonian Institution and the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), under the purview of the United States State Department. Given 
the traffic of experts between India and the United States during the early twentieth 
century for jointly studying the scientific properties of the atmosphere, it would be 
misleading to define a precise date and time to mark the beginning of collaborative 
endeavors. However, based on the level and nature of interaction, and the circulation of 
technology from the United States into India, one can temporally mark the beginning to 
the International Geophysical Year (IGY – July 1957-December 1958). Many scientific 
institutions in India, through close coordination with various committees formed during 
IGY, systematically collaborated in a number of scientific investigations. Among the 
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many programs that were planned and executed, the tracking of artificial satellites using 
sophisticated equipment sponsored by the United States clearly stands out in terms of the 
level of technology shared and the active participation of experts.  Two scientific 
institutions, the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory, based in Harvard, 
Massachusetts, USA and Uttar Pradesh State Observatory (UPSO), Nainital, India, began 
negotiations in the mid 1950s for operating a highly advanced telescopic camera called 
Baker Nunn. Experts from the United States migrated to India to collaborate with Indian 
counterparts for finding a location to establish an observatory for tracking satellites. 
However, the planning and operation of the observatory was not a smooth endeavor. The 
technology did not diffuse nor were the Indians were passive receivers. Echoes of 
Bandung reverberated in the foothills of the Himalayas during the global Cold War.  
With the onset of tracking by astronomers the scene shifted from the icy north, to the 
sultry south where a team of space scientists in collaboration with NASA located a place 
on the western seacoast to establish an international sounding rocket range. A nascent 
space program was kick started with the orange streak of sodium vapor clouds in the 
tropical skies. With a nuclear program (civilian and scientific) in parallel, which steadily 
gained momentum since India’s independence, India glowed, for a short time, as a 
scientific and technological leader among Afro-Asian states. The glory, however, was 
dispelled by the Chinese nuclear test explosion leaving the space and nuclear program to 
etch a Janus face: Gandhi and Yama (Lord of Death in Sanskrit language) -- A space 
program for rural welfare and a credible nuclear deterrent for annihilation.  
 





Chronologically moving ahead, the third chapter revolves around a satellite 
launch vehicle (SLV-3). The initial planning for developing a rocket began in the mid 
1960s soon after the Chinese nuclear test. Bhabha and Sarabhai contacted NASA for 
transferring Scout rocket technology to build a similar rocket in India. Being a dual use 
technology, capable of launching a satellite as well as delivering a bomb, the technology 
was refused.  However, Scout being an all solid propelled rocket the Indian experts felt 
confident that they could attempt and succeed by modeling their first rocket on Scout.  
The momentum for building a rocket began soon after the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war 
and the sudden death of Vikram Sarabhai. The scene progressively shifts from Thumba, 
located on the Western sea coast to Sriharikota on the Eastern sea coast. A new breed of 
western trained engineers and technologists began to head various units in the space 
establishment. To build the system, experts from India shopped for ideas and bought 
subsystems in the US, Japan, France, Germany and Australia. This chapter offers a 
window to capture the extent of transnational traffic of ideas, systems, software and 
experts. It also discusses the extent of “periphery-periphery” technological collaboration, 
hitherto not given much attention in space history.   
ATS-6 and Satellite Instructional Television Experiment  
I began my dissertation by first writing about a highly advanced, state of the art, 
communication satellite called the Application Technology Satellite (ATS-6).  The 
satellite was used to broadcast educational television programs directly to television sets 
placed in different rural clusters. The locus of action was Ahmadabad, in north-west 
India, where a team of experts orchestrated and designed augmented television sets, 





private foundations like Ford and Rockefeller, all contributed during planning, execution 
and evaluation stages. Coming soon after the Apollo moon landings this was an important 
project for NASA to “broadcast” the benefits of space technology for the common 
people.  
A Note on Archives  
 Anyone attempting to tell the story of India’s space program cannot do 
justice to the topic by merely relying on annual reports, internal publications periodically 
produced by the Department of Space and by oral histories. The history is intrinsically 
transnational. A variety of sources in different countries have been consulted to write this 
dissertation. The NASA History Office located at the NASA Headquarters Washington 
D.C. provided some background material and technical details about United States 
cooperation with India. Declassified State Department documents from the National 
Archives II, College Park, MD, and the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, 
Austin, Texas, provided correspondences and briefs between agencies and official letters 
by key personnel. News clippings from the Library of Congress came in handy to fill the 
gaps. Apart from these American sources, documents were also collected in India. 
Collecting documents and reports in India was challenging. The Indian Space Research 
Organization (ISRO) has not established a formal archival facility so far, and the 
documents – correspondence, reports, minutes etc.--, are trashed, burnt or, misplaced. 
However, a few scientists, engineers and government officials who were involved in the 
project shared their personal collections and the sources that I acquired are mainly 
through this channel. Oral histories were also conducted extensively with key actors who 












India Enters the Space Age: From Optical Tracking of Satellites to Sounding and 
Lighting the Tropical Space 
 
This chapter is an historical account of India’s relations with the United States in 
the field of space sciences, and narrates the progressive development of various 
institutions by the indigenous elite to establish a space program in India. The need for the 
synoptic investigation of geophysical phenomena in different regions across the globe 
during the International Geophysical Year (IGY) created the milieu for initiating space 
science collaboration with India. One of the scientific investigations during IGY was 
tracking artificial satellites. For this purpose the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory 
(SAO), located in Harvard, Massachusetts, loaned a highly specialized Baker Nunn 
camera, ancillary equipment, and expertise to Uttar Pradesh State Observatory (UPSO), 
in Naini Tal, India. It was one of the world’s twelve observatories that filled an important 
gap between Iran and Japan in the world network of tracking stations. Through these 
stations, the approximate positions of satellites (both Soviet Union and American) were 
obtained.
 
The camera was the first ‘large’ technological system to enter India in the 
realm of space science and technology from the United States. Though it was a small 
scale joint collaboration, the early UPSO-SAO nexus, would indicate the pattern of 
collaborative space endeavors that would soon emerge in the Indian subcontinent. From 
optical tracking in the foothills of the Himalayas in Northern India, space research would 
move to a tropical Southern region where, with the help of the National Aeronautics and 





INCOSPAR attached to Department of Atomic Energy; would eventually embark on  a 
space program by launching sounding rockets. In both cases, India received technological 
aid and American experts traveled to India for site selection and for planning and 
establishing facilities. Progressively the facilities that began for space sciences were 
expanded for the incremental development of a full-fledged space program – application 
satellites and launch vehicles. The chapter ends with the sudden death of Vikram 
Sarabhai in 1971 and the institutionalization and reorganization of a space program under 
a separate Department of Space (DOS) directly under the Government of India in 1972. 
The direction the Indian space program received under Vikram Sarabhai and the close 
cooperation that came from United States, mainly through NASA -- both technical and 
managerial and the geopolitical realities, and domestic political and socio-economic 
demands shaped the future trajectory of India’s space ambitions. 
Origins of the IGY and Indian Contributions  
The International Geophysical Year (July 1, 1957- December 31, 58) that 
succeeded two International Polar Years (1882-83 and 1932-33) was an important event 
that galvanized disparate scientific communities in different parts of the world, sixty 
seven countries in total, to study the physical environment of planet Earth (geophysical) 
and astronomical phenomena during the global Cold War.  Recently, its fiftieth 
anniversary was celebrated or remembered in many countries. The Smithsonian 
Institution, one of the premier institutions in the world, organized a seminar series by 
inviting scholars to present papers and also brought out a book entitled Globalizing Polar 
Science at the 2010 History of Science Society (HSS) Annual meeting in Montreal, 





hindsight, that the IGY was not only a seminal event for integrating scientific findings 
around the world for studying geophysical phenomenon on a truly global scale but it also 
laid the foundation for organizing civilian space programs in different countries including 
India.  
Sixty one years ago, the young Van Allen, just 36 years of age, took the initiative 
of organizing a dinner party at his residence when Sidney Chapman, almost twice his age, 
was visiting the Applied Physics Laboratory at John Hopkins University in Baltimore. 
The event on 5 April 1950 was more than a budding physicist exchanging pleasantries 
and catching up with a world renowned geophysicist. Van Allen also took the opportunity 
and invited other geophysicists, Lloyd Berkner, James Wallace Joyce, Ernest Vestine, 
and S. Fred Singer to join them. It was at this dinner party while enjoying a dessert – a 
chocolate layer cake baked by Abigail Van Allen-- that Chapman and Berkner developed 
the idea of another International Polar Year (IPY) for1957-58. An IPY, they thought, 
would end the “frustration of geophysicists” who wanted to understand the geophysics 
and astronomical phenomena of the planet in totality by investigating data collected 
simultaneously from many observatories. The time period was chosen because the solar 




From the living room of Van Allan’s residence the idea was given more shape at 
various conferences and it was finally proposed at the International Council of Scientific 
Unions (ICSU) which provided the administrative set up for this program in cooperation 
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with World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and other scientific bodies. As some 
scientists at the council preferred a global study than just the Polar Regions, Chapman 
readily agreed to a global geophysics study, and renamed the program as the IGY. 
Patronage for such a mammoth endeavor came from Union Radio-Scientifique 
Internationale, the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics, the International 
Astronomical Union and scientific members of ICSU. The whole program was 
institutionalized under a special Committee called Comite Special de l’Anne 
Geophysique Internaitonale (CSAGI) and it took responsibility for organizing periodic 
regional and annual meetings -- Brussels 1953; Rome 1954; Brussels 1955, Barcelona 
1956; Washington 1957, Moscow 1958, mainly for planning and organizing the event. 
41
 
At the initial meeting in Brussels, the CSAGI invited other nations to participate 
in the global endeavor through the establishment of observation stations in their 
respective countries. Every country that participated in the IGY had to establish its own 
National Committee. All the scientists and research organizations and government 
agencies, that wanted to participate in the IGY were channeled through their National 
Committees. The United States participated through the US National Committee (USNC) 
for the IGY. A total of 14 fields of investigations were chosen for the IGY and one of 
them was the launching of scientific satellites. Scientists from countries directly and 
indirectly using a variety of instruments mounted on ships, rockets, airplanes and 
balloons, produced large amounts of data for extending the knowledge of our planet and 
also toward safeguarding it. No region of the globe was untouched. All the data collected 
in participating countries were sent to IGY World Data Centers. The observation program 
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involved the establishment of special astronomical observatories in different geographic 
regions to look and study artificial satellites.
42
 
Though the IGY was initially planned for just 18 months, the program however, 
due to Soviet recommendation, and the overall enthusiasm shown by scientists, was 
extended beyond 1958 as the International Geophysical Cooperation (IGC). CSAGI was 
replaced by International Geophysical Committee to further geophysical research started 
during the IGY. The International Year of the Quiet Sun (IQSY) – (January 1, 1964 – 
December 31, 1965) was chosen by the committee as the next logical step after the IGY. 
The IQSY was a period of minimum solar activity and many investigations conducted 
during this period would complement the studies undertaken during the IGY. The IQSY 
was given the support of the United Nations. Scientists from 71 countries, India being 
one of them, participated in observations from 300 geographically distributed sites.  The 
wonderful way the whole program evolved and the enthusiasm shown by lot of scientists 
led to other international programs – the Upper Mantle Project, the International Indian 
Ocean Expedition (IIOE), the International Years of the Active Sun (IASY), the 
International Magnetosphere Study (IMS). 
The IGY brought many Indian scientists and institutions, old and new, together 
for the common cause of understanding the geophysics of the planet. It provided the 
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opportunity for many Indian scientists to cross the threshold from the national to the 
international scene. For participation in IGY an Indian National Committee was formed 
in 1955 with renowned scientist Kariamanikkam Srinivasa Krishnan as President and 
Ashesh Prasad Mitra as Secretary. K.S. Krishnan was then acting as the Director of the 
National Physical Laboratory,  (NPL -- 1947-1961) in New Delhi, and he also acted as 
the Vice Present of ICSU (1955-58) and like Vikram Sarabhai, he was the student of 
Nobel laureate C.V. Raman (Raman Effect). A.P. Mitra was the student of S.K. Mitra, the 
doyen of ionospheric research in India and who also participated in the IPY (1932-33).  
A.P. Mitra would contribute extensively during the IGY in upper atmospheric research 
and also during the IQSY. Even during the early stages, as early as 1953, representatives 




According to A.P. Mitra the IGY was a “poor man’s program,” by that he meant 
the scientific and technological requirements for conducting geophysical investigation 
did not demand a high degree of sophistication.  India could participate and contribute 
with its existing infrastructure.
44
 A plethora of geophysical measurements in the field of 
glaciology, meteorology, oceanography, seismology, geomagnetism, and cosmic rays 
was planned and executed during the IGY in India. The studies ranged from cloud cover 
studies in different cities, daily variations of magnetic elements in the geomagnetic 
equator, aurora and air glow measurements, ionospheric data for radio propagation, the 
variation of cosmic rays at different locations, solar activity, oceanography, seismology, 
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glaciology, meteorology and latitudes and longitudes. 
45
 The Indian Meteorological 
Department, Kodaikanal Observatory, Physical Research Laboratory, Survey of India, 
All India Radio, Universities and few other scientific institutions were involved in 
executing the experiments. Sarabhai’s contribution to cosmic ray studies – establishing 
monitoring stations, equipped with narrow-angle telescopes, in Kodaikanal, Trivandrum 
(now Thiruvananthapuram) and Gulmarg, for detecting cosmic rays from different 
directions --was also extended to become part of the Indian contribution to the IGY. 
During the planning stages of the IGY, he proposed a program of “world-wide study of 
cosmic ray variations with standardized equipment.”
46
 The Prime Minister of India, 
Jawaharlal Nehru, was personally interested in the total work of the IGY, including the 
optical tracking.
 47
 Harvard Astronomer Fred Whipple commented that “it seems to me 
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Gulmarg, Amristar, Delhi, Jodhpur, Mt. Abu  
Calcutta –Haringhata, Napur, Veraval, Bombay, 
Poona Waltair, Madras, Kodaikanal, Trivandrum, 
Port Blair  
 
Geomagnetism  Dehra Dun, Alibag, Kodaikanal  
Aurora and Airglow  Gulmarg, Mt. Abu, Calcutta – Haringhata, Dharwar, 
Poona. 
Ionosphere Delhi, Benaras, Ahmedabad, Haringhata (Calcutta), 
Bombay, Poona, Waltair, Madras, Tiruchirapalli, 
Kodaikanal, Trivandrum.  
Solar Activity  Hyderabad, Kodaikanal 
Cosmic Rays Gulmarg, Darjeeling, Ahmedabad, Calcutta, 
Kodaikanal, Trivandrum 




Optical Tracking of Artificial Satellites
50
  
As stated earlier, one of the important programs that was planed during the IGY 
was the launching of satellites by the then super powers.
 
A satellite that is placed in orbit 
needs to be tracked for understanding various geophysical phenomena -- upper 
atmosphere, celestial mechanics, earth’s gravity field, geometrical geodesy etc. There are 
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four ways of tracking an Earth satellite – radio, radar, optical and precision laser. 
51
There 
were two ways to track a satellite optically. First, through visual tracking by trained 
personnel, mostly amateurs, looking at satellites directly through their naked eye using 
small table top telescopes. This method of observing a satellite was called project 
Moonwatch.
52
 A second, more precise method involved a system composed of a 
telescopic wide angle camera and precision timing equipment specially housed in 
observatories. The pictures taken using this special equipment are further interpreted by 
experts to get data.  
Since a satellite in orbit is just like any other object in the universe the task of 
observing and studying them fell to the domain of astronomers. This new and challenging 
endeavor attracted the enterprising Harvard astronomer Fred L. Whipple, the new 
Director of the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory (SAO) located on the campus of 
Harvard College Observatory (HCO), Cambridge, Massachusetts.  
Originally the SAO was located in Washington D.C. under the directorship of L. 
B. Aldrich. After his retirement, the then secretary of the Smithsonian, Leonard 
Carmichael, appointed Whipple with an agenda of enlarging the research activities. The 
observatory was moved from Washington D.C. to HCO in 1955. Since its beginning 
HCO was the Mecca for budding astronomers. Manali Kallat Vainu Bappu from India 
would come here and get his PhD entitled The Problem of Wolf-Rayet Atmospheres in 
August 1, 1951, under the guidance of Astronomer Donald Howard Menzel, who was 
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also the Director of the observatory.
53
 At that time Whipple was the Chairman of the 
Department of Astronomy and also Bappu’s teacher.  Jawaharlal Nehru during this 
official visit to the United States in the early nineteen fifties, made a visit to HCO.  
Fred. L. Whipple was an academic, with extensive connections with the military 
and navy and had been involved in tracking rockets optically using photographic 
techniques, under the name the Harvard Meteor Program.
 54
 Due to his prior acquaintance 
he proposed to track the satellites that would be launched during IGY. In late 1955, the 
SAO was granted the responsibility of establishing a network of tracking stations across 
the globe by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the National Science 
Foundation (NSF) and the US National Committee for the IGY. The whole project was 
designated the Smithsonian Satellite Observing Program. It neatly dovetailed with 
Whipple’s interests in establishing networks all around the world and he believed that 




Whipple orchestrated the satellite tracking program with J. Allen Hynek, 
Associate Director in charge of the satellite tracking program. Karl G. Henize was made 
Senior Astronomer in charge of Photographic Tracking Stations. SAO took the 
responsibility of providing the camera and associated equipment on a loan basis. For the 
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computation of data, the International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) and 
Computations Laboratory at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) came in 
handy. Whipple noted that, without their help, it was “virtually impossible” to undertake 
this mission.   He and his team of astronomers had the “imagination and managerial skill” 
required to track the satellites in orbit. Support/patronage for such a mammoth endeavor 
of observing satellites in different geographic regions came from NAS and the US 
National Committee for the IGY.
 56
   
The next task for Whipple and his team was to contact astronomers in twelve 
countries for establishing observatories. Placing the observatories in other countries 
required extensive diplomatic negotiations. The team had to go through the US State 
Department to “ensure a maximum of cooperation from the local governments.”
57
 
Whipple contacted Indian scientists in the beginning of 1956 to see if they had any 
interest in the endeavor.
 
The Indian National Committee for the IGY quickly grasped the 
opportunity and assigned UPSO the task of collaborating with the SAO for undertaking 
three tasks: Photography of the moon with a Markowitz Camera, Optical Tracking of 
Artificial earth satellites and visual observations of aurorae.
58
 The Indian Committee for 
the IGY appointed M.K. Vainu Bappu, the then director of UPSO to be in charge of the 
Satellite-Tracking program in India in April 1957, and he was given the responsibility of 
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establishing the unit with the equipment provided by the SAO.  Before I talk about 
UPSO-SAO collaboration, I will give a brief history of UPSO.  
 
Figure 1. Sites of Baker Nunn Camera Stations. Source – Samuel Hayes, Trackers 
of the Skies 
UPSO  
A Hindu Brahmin, Babu Sampurnanadji – a teacher turned political leader, along 
with his mathematician friend, Avadhesh Narain Singh, out of sheer fascination for 
astronomy started planting seeds for establishing an observatory in Benaras (now 
Varanasi). A committee was formed in 1952 to foresee the planning and purchase of 
equipment. Decommissioned instruments -- a telescope and time unit, were purchased 
from Europe and established at Sarnath and the Government Sanskrit College, Benaras. 
By April 1954 the observatory was up and running with A.N Singh as the honorary 





as the Chief Astronomer.
59
 The observatory was called the Uttar Pradesh State 
Observatory (UPSO), under the ministry of Cultural Affairs and Scientific Research, 
Uttar Pradesh. It was customary for foreign trained scientists to revamp the existing 
facilities and make them “modern,” Bappu, began making changes. He wanted to relocate 
the observatory from the plains of Uttar Pradesh to the hills of Naini Tal at Manora Peak 
and equip it with more advanced scientific instruments, a full fledged library, and 
supporting equipment. In simple terms, he wanted to establish a “Harvardian” 
Astrophysical Observatory at Manora Peak (longitude 79 degrees 27’ E, 29 degrees, 22’ 
N, altitude 1951 m). The move to Naini Tal began in November 1955 and steps were 
taken to acquire the land at Manora Peak -- 48 hectares, to establish a world class 
observatory. It was during this time that the SAO approached India for establishing an 
optical tracking facility and established one before the establishment of the main 
observatory at Manora Peak. The project was finally completed on 20 November 1961. 
UPSO became a State Observatory, Naini Tal (SON) in November 2000 after the UP 
State was divided into two states. On March 2004, the State Observatory  became an 
autonomous institute under the Department of Science and Technology, Government of 




Establishing the Tracking Station  
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For establishing the facility in Manora Peak, Naini Tal, there was traffic of 
experts between the SAO and UPSO. During the early planning stages many requests 
were made by the SAO inquiring about weather, twilight conditions versus daylight or 
night conditions, difficulty of physical access, living conditions for an American 
observer, and other such information”
61
 Allan Hynek visited Naini Tal on June 2, 1957 
for selecting a station site in coordination with Vainu Bappu.  Elwyn C. Balch, 
Engineering Consultant, in charge of tracking station construction, went to India in 
December 1957 for station construction and for receiving, transporting and erecting the 
camera equipment. He also addressed problems with respect to power (in India the 
voltage is 240 whereas the equipment was designed to operate only on 110 v, 50 or 60 
cycle A.C., so the power had to be stepped down in order for the equipment to function), 




The SAO made plans to ship the satellite tracking camera, modified Norman 
Crystal clock and other ancillary equipment, such as the frequency control unit, the 
automatic transfer switch for emergency power, the 2.5 kw emergency power generator, a 
standard developing tank for developing images taken by the camera, and a special 
projector for viewing the film. For training the Indian astronomers in the use of the 
Baker-Nunn camera, a resident astronomer was sent to India. Bappu was also invited to 
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the US for training and instruction for 6 weeks. A conference in Moscow stopped him 
from going. 
63
   
Resident Observer in India  
For assisting the general SAO work, Whipple, Hynek, Henize and other members 
of the Smithsonian staff jointly selected observers. The selection committee mainly 
looked for people who had “eagerness, enthusiasm, a spirit of adventure and especially a 
sense of responsibility.” They would not only operate the Baker Nunn camera but also 
“drive nails,” and “work cooperatively and efficiently with scientists but also deal with 
strangers in strange lands.”
64
 Samuel Whidden, who had earlier experience in the Harvard 
Meteor Program, impressed the interview committee and he was the first observer to be 
selected. He was well trained in the operation of a Baker Nunn before he was sent to 
India to assist in its operation.  Just before leaving for India, he married Martha Holt, who 
was also of the satellite tracking project and they both ventured into an alien land. Marty 
would be his close companion and she typed all the correspondences to the SAO board 
regarding the status of the observatory. Whidden was also informed about Indian 
“neutrality” and given copies of speeches by John Foster Dulles -- the Goal of our 
Foreign Policy; Our Foreign Policies in Asia and others. 
65
 Upon arrival in January 1958, 
the couple would take residence at Edwinstone Cottage, in Naini Tal, India.  
His early enthusiasm for India quickly faded into despair. Though Whidden and 
Vainu Bappu were classmates at Harvard (1949-1951), they did not get along well. From 
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the beginning friction started to develop. It all began with who would control the SAO 
station in Naini-Tal. Coupled with that, he disliked the general living conditions, the slow 
pace of construction work at Manora Peak for establishing the facility, loss of equipment 
during shipping, the Indian attitude toward science and technology, the delay in starting 
observation at the facility (by March of 1958, 9 out of 12 were operational.).
66
  He would 
leave India on December 15, 1958, frustrated.  
Problems  of Jurisdiction  
Even before establishing the station in Naini Tal, the question of who would be in 
charge of the observatory was raised by Vainu Bappu. Although the issue of jurisdiction 
was not given much importance by the Americans initially, they soon realized that it 
became a sensitive and “touchy subject” for the Indian scientific establishment. The 
jurisdiction problem arose while discussing the prospect of a written agreement between 
the Indian Committee for the IGY and the SAO in the Fall of 1957. Extensive 
correspondence between Fred Whipple, Vainu Bappu, Samuel Whidden, Alan Hynek, 
E.C. Balch, is a clear testimony of how postcolonial India exerted her sovereignty.
67
  
The first appearance of a problem appears in Whidden’s correspondence to Allen 
Hynek on February 11, 1957. He said that, “unless we act immediately, we are in danger 
of losing our (emphasis mine) station.” Based on archival papers that I have consulted it 
appears that the SAO wanted to have control over the station at UPSO. However, when 
Whidden arrived in India, Bappu made it clear that UPSO would be an independent one 
like the one established in Japan and Australia. The station with its equipment and 
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operation were to be directly under the jurisdiction of the Uttar Pradesh State 
Government. Bappu reasoned that the UP Government and the Indian Council of 
Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) donated funds for operating the station and it 
would be difficult to justify to the Indian Parliament that the financial support from India 
would be going to a US observatory on Indian soil. The sum donated would not be 
accepted by parliament as a “gift” to the American Government. In addition to this, 
Bappu also pointed out that the tracking program did not complement the current work at 
the UPSO. Even the prestige value of having one of the 12 world satellite tracking 
stations apparently was lost if it was a Smithsonian rather than a UP station.  He would 
accept an American observer at this station only as a technical advisor without authority 
over operation or jurisdiction over equipment. He also stated that the UP observatory was 
not interested in retaining permanently any of  the equipment sent by the Smithsonian and 
after usage it would be sent back to SAO. 
68
 
 In addition to the jurisdiction problem, Bappu also showed serious concern  over 
the presence of American Army Map Service Personnel, Sgts. Jack D. Erskine ( who 
arrived in India on 7 Feb 1958) and Aubrey Simons (March 1958). They were sent by the 
SAO to operate Cine-Theodolites, as an interim measure before the arrival of the Baker 
Nunn camera, to observe satellites. The main concern for Bappu was that Naini Tal was 
in a restricted border area, all maps for that region were classified by the National 
Government, the mere presence of army personnel, Bappu believed, would jeopardize the 
operation of the station.
69
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The officials at the SAO discussed the jurisdiction problem and agreed to Bappu’s 
demands. “We are willing for the Indian Station to be operated in the same manner as 
that of Australia and Japan. This, of course, means that India bear the brunt of the 
administrative costs and some agreement be reached regarding ownership of 
equipment….We will certainly bend over backwards if necessary to insure smooth 
operation and international cooperation with India and the Uttar Pradesh State 
Observatory.”
70
 Regarding the question of the presence of military personnel, Bappu 
came to a compromise, he said they will be “removed only if the Government reaction 
against them is strong.”
71
   
However, because of the prevailing political situation and the general caution 
expressed by Bappu, Whidden stated that he and his team would direct their energy 
toward the Baker-Nunn camera, and he wanted to return the theodolite to where it 
belonged -- Patrick Air Force Base.
72
 Though the theodolites were never put to use, 
Whidden retained Erskine and Simons for installing the Baker Nunn camera, he said that 
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Figure 2: Baker Nunn Camera  









Figure 3. Baker Nunn Camera North side 
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Figure 4: Baker-Nunn Camera, Section North to South.  






The Baker-Nunn system has a telescopic 3-axis, 20 inch aperture, f/1 camera 
mounted on a mechanical platform. They can track satellites measuring 20 inches and 
above in diameter, at a distance of 2000 miles. They measured 12 feet long, and weighed 
roughly three tons.  The optical unit of the camera was specially designed by James G. 
Baker and the mechanical system for operating the camera was designed by Joseph Nunn.  
Hence the name Baker Nunn.  The optical and mechanical unit was manufactured by two 
firms --  Perkin-Elmer Corporation, Boller and Chivens, inc, both located in Pasadena, 
California. The system also included a Norman electronic time standard, which indicates 
the time of observation to 1/10,000 of a second to be photographed simultaneously with 
the satellite. The camera was capable of taking 60 photographs a minute. Each camera 
was valued around $ 100,000.The Military Air Transport Service (MATS), shipped the 
camera to New Delhi and it was taken to Naini Tal by rail and road. The camera reached 
Naini Tal on April 1958.  Samuel Whidden, Erskine and Simons with the help of Indian 
assistants installed it at the SAO facility in Manora Peak in August, and satellites were 
tracked regularly from September 1958 onwards. The photographs were taken, washed 
and developed and sent to SAO headquarters for further study. The data was transferred 
from Naini Tal to Cambridge through Radio Corporation of America (RCA) 
Communications, Inc. This was made possible through the Deputy Director General of 
India’s Overseas Communications Service at Bombay. By the end of 1958, the Naini Tal 
facility was making regular observations. Between April – May 1959 ,the worldwide 
network made 2, 902 observations, 300 of which came from the station in India.
 75
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While UPSO was involved in satellite tracking, other scientific institutions were 
also collaborating with the United States in the realm of space sciences and applications. 
At the National Physical Laboratory, New Delhi, “a model of earth’s atmosphere was 
developed using the U.S. satellite.” The India Metrological Department analyzed the data 
acquired through the Tiros meteorological satellite when it passed over India and 
arrangements were made for other geophysical observations like radiosonde, radio wind 
and cloud cover. At PRL, Ahmadabad cosmic ray studies were undertaken.
76
 
Fred Whipple, seeing the promises of growth of space sciences expressed to 
Arnold Frutkin, who would later become the Associate Director for international relations 
at NASA, that “I feel that the National Astronautics Agency can indeed cover many of 
the functions of the IGY, and….it seems to me that some of the research we are doing in 
the IGY should be continued in the space studies by our National Astronautics 
Agency.”
77
 Accordingly, NASA’s initial overtures in space sciences were an extension of 
the work conducted during the IGY.  
Following the launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union in 1957 the United States, 
through the newly formed NASA, made several overtures to lure emerging ‘third world’ 
countries to participate in the space program by experimenting with sounding rockets. 
Some countries, seeing the prestige associated with modern space technologies, 
immediately responded to the offers made by NASA to establish sounding rocket stations 
and develop nascent space programs at home. Working on space sciences offered the 
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newly decolonized states and developing countries the promise of a march toward 
modernity – the native elite viewed experimenting with rockets as a source of pride, 
prestige and a visibility among nation-states. However, very few countries that accepted 
the offers (tracking stations and sounding rocket facilities) actually sustained and built 
their own space programs for socioeconomic and strategic needs.  
Arnold W. Frutkin  
A graduate of Harvard College and Columbia University, Arnold W. Frutkin, 
joined NASA in 1959 and headed the Office of International Affairs for the next 18 
years. Before joining NASA he was the Deputy Executive Director of the U.S. National 
Committee for the International Geophysical Year (IGY) and he also served in the U.S. 
Navy in the Pacific during WWII. While at NASA he won numerous awards, notable 
ones being NASA Exceptional Service Medal in 1968 and NASA Distinguished Service 
Medal in 1973.  He is the author of an important book on NASA’s external relations 
entitled International Cooperation in Space and also numerous articles and conference 
presentations.
78
 He retired from Federal service on June 22, 1979 after serving very 
briefly as Deputy Associate and Associate Administrator for External Relations at 
NASA.  
Keeping the triune goals of maintaining American leadership in space, serving 
U.S. foreign policy objectives and finally advancing the frontiers of scientific knowledge 
and reaping the intellectual and technological benefits, Arnold Frutkin, through a distinct 
set of guidelines, coordinated many international cooperative space activities.  
Frutkin’s guidelines showed marked differences from other cooperative ventures, 
especially the “not so successful” attempt to foster international understanding through 
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Atoms for Peace derived from the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. “Great expectations had 
been raised but realization was slow and disappointing” he said. In most of the cases 
“cooperation simply meant bestowing U.S. – made reactors at U.S. expense, with U.S. 
technicians, in the hope that U.S. –trained nationals could someday take them over.”
79
  
Seeing how international cooperation evolved in the nuclear field, Frutkin opted for “new 
realism” to orchestrate international cooperation in space activity. The new realism 
manifested itself in the form of a set of guidelines which I list here verbatim:  “literal 
cooperation without the passing of dollars; solid rather than token program content; a 
project-by-project procedure; negotiation with central and authorized civilian agencies, 
on a direct technical, rather than indirect diplomatic basis; encouragement of foreign 
scientific interests rather than imposition of domestic concepts and stress upon the less 
sensitive, purely experimental areas, at least to begin with.”
80
 
Significant projects undertaken within these guidelines were the global networks 
of tracking stations for acquiring data from meteorological and earth resource satellites, 
launch by the US of other countries satellites, integration of foreign experiments on US 
spacecraft, numerous sounding rocket projects in different countries, training of 
personnel at select NASA facilities and also at the American Universities, analysis of 
lunar samples by fifty countries, the spectacular broadcast experiments using the 
Advanced Technology Satellites (ATS), the Apollo Soyuz mission and Space Lab.  
Vikram Sarabhai and NASA  
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The first recorded mention of Vikram Sarabhai expressing an interest in NASA’s 
international cooperative programs was in the Spring of 1961, while he was enrolled as a 
visiting professor at MIT. Following his previous discussions with world renowned 
physicists like Bruno Rossi at MIT, James Van Allen at Iowa, and, J. A  Simpson, and P. 
Mayer at Chicago, Sarabhai told NASA of  India’s plans to start a space science research 
program at select facilities: the Physical Research Laboratory (PRL),  Ahmadabad; the 
Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR),  Bombay and the Tata Institute of 
Nuclear Physics (TINP), Bombay.  He also described his plans to recruit trained Indian 
physicists in European countries and the U.S.  
During the meeting with NASA officials Sarabhai explored possible cooperative 
endeavors that could be mutually beneficial to both NASA and India such as: magnetic 
fields, solar radio astronomy, geo-magnetism, atmospheric studies from 30-150 
kilometers, trapped particles in radiation belts and electro jet studies. In furthering these 
fields of research he discussed the possibility of a cooperative sounding rocket program 
between India and NASA and also a telemetry receiving facility at the PRL, Ahmadabad. 
It was also in this meeting that Sarabhai learned about the work of atmospheric scientist 
Lawrence Cahill of the University of New Hampshire. Cahill would later visit India to 
conduct a number of sounding rocket experiments.
81
 Seeing the progress India was 
making towards this emerging field of space sciences, Arnold Frutkin explained to 
Sarabhai the policy guidelines for international cooperation just mentioned. The 
international cooperative program was to maintain a two-way channel for the flow of 
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ideas between gifted men and women in United States and abroad, in the framework of 
their own, or joint, space projects.82   
In July 1961, Frutkin sent a memorandum to Vikram Sarabhai for a working 
arrangement with his PRL situated in Ahmadabad, for the purpose of recording data from 
the Explorer Number XI Gamma Ray astronomy satellite. The memo gave details about 
NASA loaning critical equipment that was necessary for observing the satellite.  Upon 
hearing about Sarabhai’s willingness to enter into a cooperative relationship, the 
International Relations Office at NASA, after consultation with the U.S. Department of 
State, entered a working arrangement with PRL for the establishment of such a facility.
83
 
On 6 September, 1961, PRL received a tracking and telemetry receiving facility. It was 
the first instrument from NASA to enter India.
84
   
These tracking stations became the channel through which NASA began to extend 
its reach to include other nations for a worldwide data acquisition system for satellites 
launched by the United States. By 1963, twenty eight such stations in sixteen countries 
were established.
85
 They not only functioned as scientific instruments for disseminating 
data for the United States but also served as conduits for host countries to begin their own 
space programs. Milton C. Rewinkel, the U.S. Consul General, remarked that “It is a 
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matter of some pride to us, too, that by making America’s space knowledge experience 
and facilities available to foreign scientists, the United States has enabled several other 
countries to initiate their own space program and develop their own space technology.”
 86
 
It is also important to mention here that Arnold Frutkin, seeing the instruments 
going to a research facility -- PRL, informed Vikram Sarabhai his desire for an 
“exclusive space agency or committee” in India for cooperation purposes:  
Based upon our previous discussions, it is my understanding that India may 
establish a space research committee under Government sponsorship. It would be 
most desirable if the general program arrangements between us could be related 
appropriately to such a committee. In the interim, however, we understand from 
our State Department that your Ministry of External Affairs has approved our 
proposed cooperative effort in principle. The content of this letter has been 
provided to your Government at its request so that the necessary arrangements 
may be made within the appropriate Ministries of your Government. NASA will 
be pleased indeed to enter into this working arrangement with the Physical 
Research Laboratory on the Explorer Number XI experiment and hopes that this 




Seeing the emerging field of space science and technology, and the promise it offered, 
Homi Bhabha, the Secretary of Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), carved a niche 
within DAE in August 1961, for a rudimentary space science and research cell. Before 
the formation of this cell the Indian National Committee for the IGY has been asked to 
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serve provisionally as the National Space Committee for India adhering to COSPAR. The 
initial cooperative relations between NASA and India were primarily negotiated by the 
DAE through Bhabha and Sarabhai.  
 Homi Bhabha often dovetailed nuclear matters with space science and technology 
topics during his periodic visits to the United States. On one such visit to NASA 
Headquarters between November 9 and 15, 1961, he met with Frutkin and talked about 
possible cooperative programs between India and NASA.  He also hinted at the 
establishment of a “special committee” made up of Indian scientists already active in 
space related areas. He stated that the committee would be responsible for selecting 
appropriate programs for India, to train young people in the field of space sciences and 
technology and also would send representatives to participate in meetings organized by 
COSPAR. He also projected that the “committee” would become the principal point of 
contact with NASA. Because of India’s limited economic resources, Bhabha explained 
that it would not be practical for India to attempt to build rockets and that these would be 
procured from other countries. In this connection, Frutkin pointed out to Bhabha that 
many of the existing sounding rockets were under the control of the Department of 
Defense (DOD) and that some of them, though non-military in nature, were classified. 
Bhabha was asked to bear in mind that the question of availability must often be subject 
to security arrangements in force between the governments concerned.
88
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NASA at this early phase of cooperative endeavors with India was clearly looking 
for guidance form the State Department before initiating any discussions on collaborative 
space ventures with the Indians. The reason for consultation with the State Department 
even for space science research was due to the absence, unlike with Pakistan or Japan, of 
any security arrangement with India for the protection of sensitive or classified 
information. Also, the State Department papers indicate that the officials were aware of 
the presence of Soviet scientists and technicians, including a number of Soviet airmen, 
and the close cooperation that India sought with the USSR for cooperation covering 
peaceful uses of atomic energy, operation of nuclear power stations and the production 
and processing of uranium. The U.S. State Department officials generally viewed Bhabha 
in a different light -- as one expressing communist sentiments and also to be involved in 
“communist front activities.” The officials saw him as a potential technocrat who could 
“utilize contacts with both sides involved in the East-West struggle in order to achieve 
the most advantageous opportunities to advance his objectives.” As a result cautionary 
memos were sent to NASA officials suggesting that Homi Bhabha might use Indian 




Frutkin’s resultant reply to Bhabha after his visit contained the possible areas of 
cooperation. He saw the establishment of a sounding rocket range close to the 
geomagnetic equator to be “most desirable” for launching scientific payloads prepared by 
PRL and TIFR for detecting high energy neutrons emitted from the Sun during the 
periods of great solar activity. Frutkin’s motivation for cooperating in a sounding rocket 
                                                 
89
 T. Eliot Weil to Wreatham E. Gathright, “Proposed Visit of Dr. Homi J. Bhabha,” October 5, 1961, RG 





program with India was the perceived benefit of getting scientific data of the tropical 
atmosphere and also to create an international sounding rocket base for international 
cooperation under the auspices of the United Nations. NASA’s early space science 
programs neatly merged with India’s long scientific tradition of studying elusive cosmic 
rays and the sun’s ultra violet rays.  This work had been started by physicists like 
Megnad Saha, who was later followed by scientists like K.R. Ramanathan,
90
 Raman 
Pisharoty, Homi Bhabha, Vikram Sarabhai, and others.
91
 
Secondly, he suggested the launching of Indian sodium vapor payloads to 
investigate various properties of the upper atmosphere near the geomagnetic equator and 
the possible launchings of rockets during the International Quiet Sun Year (IQSY) as a 
part of a proposed large scale effort to make meteorological and ionospheric soundings 
on a synoptic basis.  
Thirdly, he stressed the importance of participation in low altitude meteorological 
rocket observations in conjunction with the International Indian Ocean Expedition 
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(IIOE). After stating the possible avenues of cooperative endeavors, Frutkin drafted a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), between India and NASA outlining the broad 




The Indian Committee on Space Research (INCOSPAR) 
 On February 1962, with recommendations from the Scientific Advisory 
Committee to the Cabinet, the Government of India, the Indian National Committee for 
Space Research (INCOSPAR) was formed within the Department of Atomic Energy 
(DAE) under the chairmanship of Vikram Sarabhai to manage all aspects of space 
research in the country. The first meeting of INCOSPAR was held on 22 February, 
1962.
93
 The establishment of this institution brought organization and coordination to 
isolated space activities that were carried out in different regions across India.  This new 
committee coordinated all space research activities, both national and international, until 
a separate Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) was formed in 1969. INCOSPAR, 
however, did not cease to exist;  it was reconstituted under the Indian National Academy 
of Science (INAS) and retained the responsibility for the promotion of international 
cooperation in space research and exploration and peaceful uses of outer space, and 
liaison with the United Nations Committee on Space Research (COSPAR).  
INCOSPAR consisted of eminent scientists, who advised the Indian government 
on the promotion of research and exploration of space and its utilization for peaceful 
purposes both nationally and internationally. The initial group that orchestrated 
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INCOSPAR were scientists who participated in the IGY:  Vikram Sarabhai was from 
PRL, Vainu Bappu was the Director of Astrophysical Observatory, M.G.K. Menon was 
the Dean, physics faculty at TIFR, A.P. Mitra was the Assistant Director, NPL, New 
Delhi. P.R. Pisharoty was the Director of Coloba Observatory, Indian Meteorological 
Department, Coloba, Bomaby, K.R. Ramanathan, Director, Physical Research 
Laboratory, P.J. Rodgers, Director General Overseas Communications Service, Bombay. 
INCOSPAR truly became an umbrella organization for all space related activities.  “All 
the members of this committee are well and favorably known in the US” said Ernest C. 
Watson, Scientific Attaché at the American Embassy in New Delhi.
94
 
While the INCOSPAR was being constituted the UN Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space (UNCPUOS) had passed a resolution recommending and sponsoring 
the creation and use of sounding rocket launching facilities especially in the equatorial 
regions in the southern hemisphere. Taking the cue from the UN, a possible site in 
Southern India was discussed by the Indian scientists along with NASA. To help in the 
identification, NASA forwarded volumes of the Wallops Island handbooks, and Frutkin 
communicated to Bhabha his willingness to host Indian representatives at Wallops for 
additional discussions and/or to send NASA representatives to India for “possible 
assistance there in problems relating to site selection and instrumentation.”
95
  
Frutkin noted in 1963 that the “true potential of sounding rockets as a scientific 
tool can be realized only if many vertical profiles are obtained –in a wide range of 
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localities and epochs – with correlation of the results.  International cooperation is 
obviously an essential ingredient for sounding rocket work.”
96
 Cooperative launchings of 
sounding rockets took place in many countries with shared responsibility from the host 
countries –mainly ground instrumentation and data analysis.
97
  
Sarabhai saw the importance of sounding rockets for upper atmospheric studies 
but also recognized the importance of ground facilities 
In the field of study of our environment, one of the most important areas is the 
ionosphere which ranges from about 40 kilometers to about 200 kilometers, an 
area which is not accessible to balloons and which is below the operational 
altitudes at which satellites can operate. It is this area which is most importantly 
covered with sounding rockets. As one knows very well, sounding rockets can 
only perform if ground facilities and basic back-up are available. The study of this 
region in the equatorial areas is one of the major gaps in the study of our 
environment today. And so, as far as India is concerned with the facilities that 
have grown up, we have fantastic opportunities in the years to come to understand 
many complex phenomena involving the interaction of the ionosphere with the 
geomagnetic field, problems of the neutral and the ionized atmosphere and the 
interaction of these two. These subjects are of importance not only for the 
understanding of radio propagation, but also from the point of view of 
meteorology and basic problems of energy and momentum transport into the 
lower atmosphere where climate is made.98  
A joint scientific experiment to explore the equatorial electro-jet
99
 and upper 
atmosphere
100
 winds from the geomagnetic equator were incorporated in a Memorandum 
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of Understanding (MoU) between the NASA and India’s Department of Atomic Energy 
on 11 October, 1962.
101
 Also, at the bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 
(NEA/SAO), T. Eliot Weil, from the State Department stated that “NEA/SAO believes 
that it is politically desirable to have cooperative arrangements with India in the field of 
space science research provided such arrangements do not require exchange of classified 
information or material. Moreover, Indian scientists are well qualified to participate in 
space science and other advanced research. Such cooperative arrangements will help 
maximize the orientation of these scientists toward the US and away from the Soviets in 
the advanced application of science.”
102
  
Under the agreement, NASA provided nine Nike Apache sounding rockets, 
launcher, trailer mounted telemetry receiving station, trailer mounted DOVAP tracking 
system, a trailer mounted MPS-19 radar with 016 computer and 70 KVA diesel 
generators, a Judi-Dart launcher insert, K-24 cameras for vapor cloud photography, 
tracing and telemetry equipment and ground instrumentation on a loan basis.
103
 Before 
the rocket launch could happen, a site has to be chosen near the geomagnetic equator in 
India.  
                                                                                                                                                 
of a rocket magnetometer designed to determine the geographic location, height and intensity of the 
electro-jet during the period when the eleven year cycle of solar activity was near its minimum. The 
magnetometer permitted the observation of changes in the vertical structure of the electro-jet at different 
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Arnold Frutkin was willing to offer expert advice on site selection if Sarabhai 
wished NASA received a letter on July 12, 1962 from Sarabhai requesting that a 
representative come to India for final selection of the proposed sounding rocket launch 
site.
104
 The directions for choosing the right place came from NASA. Robert L. Krieger, 
Director of Wallops Station gave directions for choosing a site -- accessibility of the site 
to persons who are visiting the land through land, air, and sea communications, adequate 
telecommunication facilities, residential accommodation for the permanent staff near the 
launch site and also for visiting scientists.   
Existing literature only highlights the role played by the Indian pioneers in the 
selection of this site.  However, United States State Department papers show the active 
participation of scientists from NASA who sent volumes of materials and personnel for 
selecting a site.
105
 Along with the hard labor of Eknath V. Chitnis, MIT graduate and 
Secretary of INCOSPAR, who was put in charge of choosing a site, one can see the 
active participation of scientists R.G. Bivin, Jr., (Office of International Programs) Robert 
Duffy, and Lawrence Cahill of University of New Hampshire (in affiliation with NASA 




Between July 16 and August of 1962 E.V. Chitnis  and others made an extensive 
survey of the land on the Kerala coast for a suitable location in the neighborhood of 
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major towns -- Cochin, Allepy, Quilon, Trivandrum, or Cape Comorin (now 
Kanyakumari). These are the places that were visited: Allillathura, Perumathura, Thumba 
Punathura, and Varkala. After this initial survey, the final meeting took place at PRL. 
Bivins, Cahill, R.T. Duffy, K.R. Ramanathan, V.A. Sarabhai, P.D. Bhavsar, EV Chitnis 
narrowed the choice down to Thumba.
107
 However, Thumba was a compromise location. 
Actually, the magnetic equator passes through a place called Quilon, 32 kilometers away 
from Thumba but owing to safety issues and the number of people to be relocated, 
experts from NASA and India after surveying the Kerala coast upto Kanyakumari, the 




A few miles away from the town of Trivandrum is a place called Thumba. The 
place in Malayalam denotes a foot shaped white flower measuring a couple of 
centimeters. The herbaceous plant Leuca Indica belonging to the family Lepidaceae is 
ubiquitous in the Kerala. This flower is most coveted during the Onam festival, 
celebrated all around the state, for floral formation (athapoo). What was once a quiet 
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coastal fishing village was transformed in the early nineteen sixties into an international 




56’E) close to the magnetic 
equator (0
○ 
24’S) was chosen by a team of experts for launching sounding rockets to 
undertake geophysical investigations, particularly those dealing with the interaction of 
neutral and charged particles in earth’s magnetic field.   
The importance of the geomagnetic equator for geophysical studies was earlier 
noted by the British.  Through close collaboration with Rama Verma, the Raja of 
Travancore, John Coldecott, an astronomer and a commercial agent to the Travancore 
Government, built an observatory in Trivandrum in 1837. The observatory was equipped 
with a “transit instrument by Dollond, two mural circles, and equatorial, altitude and 
azimuth, and magnetic and meteorological instruments.”  Coldecott was succeeded by 
Spershneider and then by John Allan Broun who was the director of the observatory from 
1852-1865. It was Broun who made “hourly magnetic observations simultaneously at 
three different stations, relative especially to the diurnal variation of magnetic 
declination.” Sarabhai after the establishment of TERLS said “it is now more than a 
hundred years since the British scientist Allan Broun, with the Indian assistants, made his 
important contribution to geomagnetism diurnal variations of the magnetic declination at 
Trivandrum near the magnetic equator one can safely predict that with the 
commencement of the space activities at Thumba during November 1963 many new and 
important scientific discoveries will once again originate from research in this area.” 
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Kerala is a new name given to the princely state of Travancore state. And it is 
radioactive , by that I mean, it has rich deposits of Monazite ore from which Thorium 
could be extracted. Experts from Britain, Canada, France and US often visited this place 
for shipping the ore to their respective countries. Communism and monazite deposits and 
the need to challenge the Soviets with the openness of their space endeavors prompted 
the US and Indian experts to narrow down on Thumba. The choice of place was not 
geographically determined, as often mentioned in the literature on the Indian space 
program, but geopolitics also played a part.  
Once the site was selected, detailed planning started for establishing a launching 
station. For civil constructions, an engineer from the Department of Atomic Energy, R.D. 
John was chosen by C.M. Goveas, Chief Engineer, Atomic Energy Establishment, for the 
task. Goveas was impressed with John’s work in the building of irrigation dams and 
construction of buildings in the Madras Engineering Service. “As the job seemed to be 
new, interesting and challenging, I agreed,” said John. Chitnis who would accompany 
John to Thumba, explained the project in detail, and handed him a “one page project 
report” with all the tasks (launch pad work, telemetry and DOVAP pads, substation and 
Block house) to be completed with a budget of 15 lakhs of rupees. On 14
th
 January 1963, 
while waiting at the Bombay airport to catch a flight to Trivandrum, Sarabhai briefed 
John and Chitnis about the importance of the project and he requested John to finish the 
project in “shortest possible time.” This was John’s first meeting with Sarabhai, “his 
simplicity, casual dress and crisp language appealed to me greatly. I developed an instant 
regard for him,” said John. 
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At Thumba, the land acquisition went smoothly. John had good access to Kerala 
government officials; the Chief Secretary, Finance Secretary provided all the help they 
could for swiftly establishing the facility. The total land area of 550 acres was inhabited 
by fisher folk belonging to catholic Christians and central to the village was a St. Mary 
Magdelene Church (which was later used as a shed for rocket assembly). With the help of 
District collector Madhavan Nair, and with the financial assistance from DAE, State 
Government and funding from the catholic bishop the people at Thumba were relocated 
to “Pallithura.” The “Thumba Project”, as it was called then, also provided jobs for the 
unemployed youth of Kerala. By February 1963, John had all the glitches cleared and 
was ready to begin the construction work. While Thumba was being made ready a team 
of Indian scientists were sent to Wallops (see below), and they provided more details on 
the construction of a sounding rocket facility (based on the facility at Wallops). All of the 






Figure 5: Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching Station (TERLS) 
Source: NASA.  
 
Site selection was just the first step. Beyond this there are various technological 
hurdles in establishing a sounding rocket range for launching and retrieving data from the 
sounding rocket payload. To ease the difficulties the MoU between NASA and 
INCOSPAR included a provision for the recruitment of a small group of young men 
affiliated with INCOSPAR to visit NASA for training at the Goddard Space Flight 
Centre, and at the Wallops Island facility, where they would learn about building and 
launching sounding rockets. This whole arrangement was in accordance with Frutkin’s 
guidelines for international cooperation and there was no exchange of funds. India paid 
for the travel and subsistence of its trainees. The training was only in assembling 





these rockets, tracking the flight of the rockets, receiving data radioed down during flight 
and collecting other scientific information.  Initially, eight Indian representatives 
appointed by INCOSPAR were trained at NASA field centers for approximately six 
months in preparation for operations at the Thumba Range.  
 
 
Figure 6. NASA Wallops Station, June 7, 1963 – INCOSPAR Trainees examine a K-24 
Camera.  This camera was used for photographing sodium vapor cloud experiments. Left 
to right: B. Ramakrishna Rao, A.S. Prakasa Rao, Pramod Kale, R. Aravamudan, H.G.S 







Pramod Purushotam Kale was one of those handpicked by Sarabhai and sent to 
NASA facilities for training in sounding rocket assembly and launch. I had the 
opportunity to meet him at his residence in Pune on January 2009. Pramod Kale was born 
in Pune and did most of his early education in Ahmedabad and in Baroda (now Vadodra). 
He completed his B.Sc from Ferguson College, Pune and while pursuing his Masters in 
Electronics he talked to Vikram Sarabhai and joined the Physical Research Laboratory to 
get practical training. It was here that he would begin his early work on tracking explorer 
satellites through the microlock station that NASA donated. After his Masters training he 
joined PRL in 1962. He vividly remembers the contributions made by PRL during IGY 
and how PRL was become a Mecca for cosmic ray and upper atmosphere research and a 
space hub within the Department of Atomic Energy.  
In the month of January, 1963 he visited the Sounding Rocket Division of 
Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) which was then located at Beltsville industrial 
complex. It was here he learnt about rocket launching, payload assembly, range safety, 
tracking the rockets using Doppler velocity and angle tracking. His chosen area of 
expertise was in the “Range Timing System.” On their return in July 1963, the team 
would set up the sounding rocket range in Thumba. Subsequently, there was a constant 







Figure 7. November 5, 1963: Indian and Pakistan nationals loading Judi-Dart into launcher. This is a part of 
their training in launching meterological rockets in connection with the IIOE. Left to Right: D. Eashwardas, 
Indian Trainee and Salim Mehmud, Pakistan trainee. (Source: NASA)  
 
Nike Apache Rocket launch - November 21, 1963   
The first rocket launch from TERLS was a historic moment. Even today the date 
is marked as the launch date of India’s space program. Kale recalls the first launch as a 
great success and a lot of planning went toward achieving the feat. The entire sounding 
rocket system was loaned by NASA and the payload was provided by the French national 
space agency, the Centre National D’Etudes Spatiales, through J.E. Blamont. The 
objective was to launch a Nike Apache sounding rocket two minutes after sunset , 
photographing the sodium vapor release in the twilight sky using special cameras donated 





simultaneously from Cape Comorin, Palayamcottah, Kodaikanal and Kottayam.
111
 The 
purpose of releasing the payload was to get detailed knowledge of the “wind system 
above 80 km of the earth’s atmosphere.” Though recordings were done at different 
latitudes no data was collected on the geomagnetic equator so the scientists found the 
new location at Thumba to be conducive for the study of  “hydrodynamically and 
hydromagnetically controlled motions in the equatorial thermosphere, which will 








Figure 8. Geographical location of camera sites and launch sites 
113
 
I have always wondered why NASA did not provide the payload and why the 
Indians were asked to seek help from Blamont of France? All published sources on the 
maiden launch of Nike Apache never questioned how or why the French were involved. 
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The reason, apparently, was that India did not have enough foreign exchange to get the 
payload from NASA. The MoU for the November launch was drafted in the Spring of 
1962 and at that time the nascent Indian space establishment did not have the 
infrastructure to assemble a payload, so Sarabhai sought help from NASA. Arnold 
Frutkin, because of NASA guidelines, requested Sarabhai to get help from Jacques 
Blamont of France for the payload.
114
 P.D. Bhavsar of PRL along with Blamont worked 
on the payload to be fixed on the Nike Apache rocket. The foreign exchange problem 
also became a hurdle for Sarabhai to pay subsistence for the trainees in the US. So he 
broached the subject with Frutkin and asked whether a “reciprocal funding agreement” 
would be possible – which is, INCOSPAR will pay NASA personnel visiting India at US 
per-diem rates, and NASA would pay for Indian personnel at Indian per-diem rates. 
NASA agreed to the “reciprocal funding agreement”
115
  
The Rocket Launch  
The mood was tense at Thumba that evening. Homi Bhbaha was at the block 
house at TERLS asking many questions to the engineers about the sounding rocket 
launch. Vikram Sarabhai was not at the launch site. He was at the nearby beach along 
with Governor of Kerala and other government representatives and dignitaries to view 
modernity displayed by the orange trail of sodium vapor. Arnold Frutkin was at the 
launch site along with Ed Bissel, NASA head office, Robert Conrad, Jacques Blamont, 
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Richard Barnes, J.F. Bedigner of the Geophysical Corporation of America, Howard 
Galloway, engineer at GSFC and Indian scientists.
116
 
Precisely at 6:23 pm, the rocket streaked into tropical space and released the 
payload at an altitude of more than eighty kilometers. There was excitement and 
jubilation in Kerala and the neighboring state of Tamil Nadu.  Seeing the launch Bhabha 
made the comment “In reality NASA launched our space programme”
117
 and Sarabhai 
remarked, “with the firing of a rocket, for the first time in India, on November 21 from 
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Figure 9. Photogrpah of sodium vapor cloud taken 500 seconds after the rocket launching, Palayamkottai, 




What began as a “bilateral Indo-American launching facility” at TERLS evolved 
into an international facility, a productive site where different countries, in spite of their 
political differences, could join together for promoting the peaceful uses of outer space. 
The main scientific motivation for Frutkin to cooperate in a sounding rocket program was 
the perceived benefit of getting scientific data of the tropical atmosphere.  He also 
believed that it would “particularly welcome Soviet participation, which might lift some 
of the veil of secrecy from Soviet space activities.”
120  Apart from the United States, the 
Soviet Union and France also gave hardware for the establishment of TERLS. Under a 
collaborative agreement with the Centre National d' Etudes Spatiales of France, TERLS 
received Centaur sounding rockets for experiments to measure upper atmosphere winds, a 
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Centaur launcher, Bourdereau Camera, and Cotal LB radar for tracking the rockets. This 
instrument enabled the automatic tracking of rockets in flight up to a range of 300 km, 
and provided the accurate polar coordinates in the form of analogue signals. Equipment 
for measuring the temperature of the sodium cloud, and a ground console for a TMA 
rocket payload was also provided. The Soviet Union through the Hydrometrological 
Services (HMS) donated a Mi-4 range recovery helicopter, a shaking table for preflight 
tests and a Minsk-II electronic computer.
121
  
Historically viewed, NASA took the initial steps to make the sounding rocket 
range into an international one under UN auspices. Arnold Frutkin approached Vikram 
Sarabhai to offer TERLS to international participants and to seek UN sponsorship. A 
resolution was later introduced by the United States into the Technical Subcommittee of 
the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space for UN sponsorship 
of sounding rocket ranges in “scientifically critical locations,” and to encourage other 
countries to use the facility.
122
 COSPAR was also looking for the creation of an 
equatorial sounding rocket launching facility for two major international programs - the 
International Indian Ocean Expedition (1962-1967) and the International Quiet Sun Year 
(1964-65); India offered the sounding rocket range for international use for peaceful 
space research. 
123
 Sarabhai decided to open the facility and told Frutkin that “you will be 
glad to learn that India has decided to extend an invitation for the location of a U.N. 
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equatorial launching facility in India, on the lines of the recommendations made at the 
Geneva meetings of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the U.N Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.”
124
 R. Shroff, Deputy Secretary, Department of 
Atomic Energy, Government of India said that “if the United Nations accepts the offer, it 
is our intention that the launching facility to be set up in collaboration with NASA should 




Figure 10. The Indian launch crew mates the Apache rocket to the Nike booster in preparation of a 
launch from Euqatorial Sounding Rocket Range at Thumba, India, located near the Geomagnetic 
Equator. The rocket was launched cooperatively by NASA and INCOSPAR, and reached an 
altitude of 104.5 miles. The payload comprised of a magnetometer and a Langmuir Probe, to 
determine the altitude and intensity of electric current systems in the ionosphere. (Courtesy, 
NASA)   
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 In January 1964, a team of scientists appointed by the UN committee made an 
inspection visit to TERLS to determine its compliance with the condition of sponsorship. 
The team concluded that TERLS met the requirements for an international sounding 
rocket facility which had been set forth by the Committee, and recommended UN 
sponsorship for TERLS. TERLS received UN sponsorship in 1965. Vikram Sarabhai 
years later mentioned that “the sponsorship of TERLS by UN is not simply formal; it 
constituted an umbrella under which above 105 rocket experiments were conducted by 
various nations like France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, USA and USSR, jointly 
with India as an example of active co-operation in space research.”
126
 So it is  clear that 
the push for making TERLS international as stated above came both from NASA and 
from the nascent space team at INCOSPAR. Since India’s independence, the UN was 
seen as a node for negotiating international collaborative activities. Some of the sounding 
rockets that were launched during this period were: Nike Apache, Centaure, M 100, Skua 
Patrol, Boosted Arcas, Dragon and Judi Dart.
127
 
After the UN sponsorship an International Advisory Panel was formed by 
selecting two representatives from India, the United States, USSR and France to continue 
operations. This aspect is direct evidence that points to Sarabhai’s interest in international 
cooperation. The formal dedication of TERLS to the UN occurred on 2
nd
 February 1968 
with the presence of various dignitaries including Arnold Frutkin, Leonard Jaffe, Director 
of Space Applications programs, Office of Space Science and Applications.  The meeting 
was presided by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.   
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The Limits of US Cooperation  
The sounding rockets provided by NASA during the early sixties were “low-end” 
declassified scientific instruments. When NASA wanted to provide advanced sounding 
rockets the State Department expressed strong reservations. The case of the transfer of 
Arcas sounding rockets for the International Indian Ocean Experiment (IIOE) throws 
light on the sensitiveness of donating advanced sounding rockets. IIOE involved 
multinational sounding rocket experiments at various points in the Indian Ocean region 
for “intensive and coherent investigation of an ocean atmosphere regimen.” NASA 
wanted to organize this joint experiment in cooperation with the National Academy of 
Science, the U.S. Weather Bureau and the American Coordinator for Metrology in the 
IIOE. As a multinational effort NASA wanted India and Pakistan to participate and 
NASA was willing to provide Arcas sounding rockets, the rocket suitable for IIOE, to 
India.  Problems soon emerged.  The Atlantic Research Corporation manufactured the 
Arcas rockets for the Navy and they classified the technology as “confidential.” 
Providing these rockets to Pakistan did not cause any problem because, as we pointed out 
earlier, Pakistan was a preferred ally of the U.S., and a diplomatic framework was in 
place to enable the transfer with appropriate guarantees. But there was no such 
framework for dealing with India -- and Frutkin felt that it would be “awkward to 
conduct an Indian Ocean program without the participation of India.” He cited the visit of 
Prime Minister Nehru to the U.S. in the fall of 1962 and specifically mentioned the joint 
statement issued by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Nehru that indicated that 
space cooperation was among the areas of US/India relationships that were discussed. He 






Figure 11. Arnold Frutkin seated behind Indira Gandhi  Source- The Hindu  
 
either by “declassification of Arcas or by provision of the classified Arcas under suitable 
waivers and guarantees.”
128
When TERLS became operational with the launching of 
foreign sounding rockets Vikram Sarabhai actively sought to advance the field by 
nurturing the development of space technology in India incrementally. Needless to say, 
without external assistance and training it would have been extremely difficult for India 
to have managed to build a sounding rocket program at this early stage. In the early 
1960s, when rockets had attained the capability of launching satellites, Sarabhai was still 
developing small sounding rockets. This effort has to be understood within his larger 
picture of developing a nucleus of capable scientists and technologists around the 
essentials of rocketry, which would eventually help India if a path was taken to 
indigenize launch vehicles. Sarabhai noted that “when a nation succeeds in setting up a 
scientific program with sounding rockets, it develops the nucleus of a new culture where 
a large group of persons in diverse activities learns to work together for the 
accomplishment of a single objective.”
129
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For charting a course on the indigenous production of sounding rockets, India first 
started to produce a stable sounding rocket under license. The natural choice was to 
approach NASA for technology transfer of a sounding rocket. However, NASA’s 
guidelines for cooperation allowed no room for technology transfer or license production. 
The Arcas sounding rocket case, discussed earlier, further pointed to the sensitivity of the 
issue when it came to dealing with India. With no help from NASA, India relied on 
France. The French firm Sud-Aviation signed a licensing agreement with the Department 
of Atomic Energy for manufacture by India of two stage Centaur rockets --frames, 
propellant and electronic instrumentation -- at the DAE establishment at Trombay.  
After licensed production the road toward the fully indigenous production of 
sounding rockets and complementary subsystems – scientific payloads, instrumentation, 
telemetry and ground systems -- was started. As a result of this conscious attempt, 
Thumba during the early sixties witnessed the transnational traffic of experts – scientists, 
technologists and engineers; and the mushrooming of new firms, facilities and 
institutions. After TERLS was established Sarabhai and the nascent space establishment 
contacted the Kerala state to extend the facility. In the year 1965, 40 acres land was 
procured on Veli Hill for establishing a Space Science Technology Center (SSTC), 
additional land was procured in Valiamala in Kerala and Mahendragiri in Tamil Nadu.  
At Veli Hill the SSTC laboratories, workshop and offices, hostels, administrative 
buildings, were constructed. Sarabhai also recruited Indian engineers and scientists from 
the USA, France and Germany who were either pursuing their degrees or invovlved in 
space related research activity, Chief among them are Y.J. Rao, A.E. Muthunayagam, 





newly formed SSTC. (See chapter 3). For the indigenous production of rockets and 
complementary systems the following facilities were started at SSTC: Rocket Propellant 
Plant (RPP),1969; Rocket Fabrication Facility (RFP), 1971 and Propellant Fuel Complex 
(PFC). The indigenous production of sounding rockets was gradually scaled up to a 
satellite launch vehicle. When planning began for building a four stage satellite launch 
vehicle, a launch complex called Sriharikota Range (SHAR) – Latitude, 13 degree 47’N, 
longitude 80 degrees 15’ E),  was built on the eastern sea coast, in the state of Andhra 
Pradesh. Y.J. Rao, after his initial assignment as the Project Director of the SLV-3 rocket, 
was posted by Satish Dhawan to develop the SHAR range. Being a native of Andhra 
Pradesh himself, his language abilities and organizing capabilities were critical for his 
appointment to head the planning of SHAR. He slowly transformed the isolated village 
inhabited by Yandi tribes into a high tech enterprise (Chapter 3 details the establishment 
of SHAR and the contributions of Y.J. Rao). At SHAR a number of facilities were built, 
the important ones being the Solid Propellant Space Booster Plant (SPROB), and the 
Static Test Evaluation Complex (STEX) for testing rocket stages manufactured at 
SPROB,  as well as tracking and telemetry equipment. 
Parallel skills were also acquired in satellite technology. A step in the direction of 
participating in the evolving global satellite communications system was taken through 
the establishment of the Experimental Satellite Communication Earth Station (ESCES) 
by INCOSPAR in Ahmedabad with assistance from the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) through the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) – the 
executive agency of the project. The equipment came from National Electronics 





participated in the Application Technology Satellite (ATS-2) Test Plan.  ESCES was also 
foreseen by officials at NASA, the UN, and INCOSPAR as a node for training scientists 
and engineers from several developing countries in the field of satellite communication 
and related technologies.
130
 With the growing potential of application satellites, a 
dedicated Space Applications Center (SAC) was established in Ahmadabad, and it 
housed the following facilities – ESCES, Satellite Communications system division 
(SCSD), Remote Sensing and Meteorological Applications Division  (RSMAD), 
Electronics Systems Division, (ESD), Microwave Division (MID) and Audiovisual 
Instructional Division (AVID). When Sarabhai became the head of India’s Atomic 
Energy Commission, after the tragic death of Homi J. Bhabha in an air crash over Mont 
Blanc in 1966, he was himself thinking of how best to use nuclear power for development 
needs.
 
 By associating itself with the tenets of modernization the nascent space group was 
able to convince the Indian Government of the potential of the space program for socio-
economic benefits and thereby extract financial support for their efforts. 
Also, in August 1968, for the first time a concrete effort was made by the United 
Nations to host an international conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space in Vienna. Leading scientists from around the world attended the conference 
and reported about the activities carried out during the first decade of the space age and 
the plans for the future. For many developing countries in Latin America and in the Asian 
region, the “space age dawned at Vienna.”
131
 Founding fathers of many developing 
countries’ space programs saw the immense promise of space science and technologies 
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for socio-economic development. Sarabhai was the Scientific Chairman at the conference 
and in his presentation he talked of the “totality about the process of development which 
involves not only advanced technology and hardware but imaginative planning of supply 
and consumption centers, of social organization and management, to leapfrog from a state 
of backwardness and poverty.”
132
 It was also here at Vienna that, for the first time, the 
benefits of remote sensing were first discussed.  
The task of beginning a remote sensing program in India was first given to Raman 
Pisharoty. He created an awareness regarding this technology among politicians, science 
administrators and others. He led a team of scientists to the USA where remote sensing 
was being applied to agriculture, forestry, hydrology, oceanography, geology etc. Soon 
after his return, Pisharoty organized the first successful mission of coconut wilt-root 
disease eradication by remote sensing techniques using Soviet aircraft and US equipment 
– Hasselblad cameras donated by NASA.
133
 Today he is regarded as father of remote 
sensing in India. Pisharoty’s history also shows the transnational connection that 
facilitated scientific exchanges in the remote sensing field. He was born in February 
1909, and received his basic education at Victoria College, Palghat (1925-27) and St. 
Jospeh’s College, Trichinopoly (1927-31). He received the B.A. Honors degree in 1931 
and the MA degree in 1936 from Madras University. While employed as a Lecturer in 
Physics at Madras he spent several holidays as a vacation worker at the IISC at Bangalore 
under the guidance of C.V. Raman. In 1952, Pisharoty was sent to the US by the 
Government of India under a Technical Cooperation Mission (TCM) grant. After visiting 
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the US weather Bureau offices in Washington D.C. Los Angeles, New Orleans and the 
Hurricane Forecast Center at Miami, he  undertook post-graduate work in meteorology at 
the University of California, Los Angeles, under Professor J. Bjerknes. He was awarded 
an MA degree in 1953 and a PhD in 1954 by UCLA. He has to his credit forty six papers. 
His scientific papers are in the fields of microscopy, ultrasonics, elasticity, X-rays, 
dynamic meteorology, climatology, synoptic meteorology, weather forecasting, 
geomagnetism seismology and oceanography. 
134
 
Soon after the Vienna conference, a small restructuring of the space program 
happened. A separate Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), still affiliated with 
DAE, was formed on 15 August 1969 (coinciding with India’s Independence Day). 
Though a separate body, PRL, Ahmadabad still acted as the nerve center of ISRO. By 
this time several other institutional developments had been initiated by Sarabhai and a 
concrete ten-year plan for future nuclear and space activities was brought out, entitled the 
Profile for the Decade (1970-1980). This forty-odd page booklet was produced by the 
Department of Atomic Energy –mainly Sarabhai and his cohorts. The profile stated that 
‘the principal objectives of the space program in India are to develop indigenous 
competence for designing and building sophisticated hardware involved in space 
technology including rockets and satellites for scientific research and practical 
applications, the use of these systems for providing point-to-point communication and a 
national television hook-up through a direct broadcast synchronous satellite, and the 
applications of satellites for meteorology and for remote sensing of earth resources.’
135
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the space research and development, the prolife provides for the building of satellites, 
flight guidance systems for rockets, on board miniaturized computers and high 
performance missile tracking radar units at Thumba; and making tests at Sriharikota with 
Rohini and Menaka rockets.  
Vikram Sarabhai passed away suddenly on December 31, 1971 during his routine 
visit to Thumba. In January 1972, as an interim measure, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi 
appointed, Mambilli Kalathil Govind Kumar Menon, physicist at TIFR, as the Chairman 
of the space program. The search for a suitable leader began and two names were 
considered, says Ashok Parthasarathy, who was the Special Assistant, Science and 
Technology to Indira Gandhi between 1970-75. Rao Valluri, the director of National 
Aeronautical Laboratory, CSIR was one candidate; the other was Satish Dhawan, 
Aeronautical Engineer, who received his PhD from California Institute of Technology 
(Caltech), Pasadena. Dhawan was chosen because of his familiarity with the space 
establishment and also because he had been a member of the Atomic Energy Commission 
since 1968. When the choice was made by Indira Gandhi, Dhawan was at Caltech on a 
sabbatical. After his return to Bangalore, he sent a detailed letter to Indira Gandhi about 
his vision for the space program of India – his ideas of what India should pursue. The 
“remarkable letter” outlined a clear vision for the basic infrastructure required, 
application satellites both communication and remote sensing and launch vehicles. He 
concluded the letter by saying that “if what he had sketched out in the letter was the kind 
of long term program the government visualized for the country, he would be honored to 
head the program.” The Prime Minister gave a green signal and after extensive 





restructured in May 1972. A Space Commission (SC) and a separate Department of 
Space (DOS) were established. The space commission was composed of P.N. Haskar, 
strategist and policy planner in Gandhi’s cabinet; T.S. Swaminathan, government official; 
M.G.K. Menon, Physicist TIFR; Brahm Prakash, Director of Metallurgy Group in 
Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) and I.G. Patel (Secretary, Economic Affairs, 
Ministry of Finance). SC and DOS took the formal reins of coordinating all the space 
activities in India. Dhawan, after taking the leadership of the space program after 
Sarabhai’s demise, asked the Space Commission to review Sarabhai’s profile from the 
“viewpoint of appropriateness, technical feasibility, time schedules, and costs.” He 
appointed Brahm Prakash, who just retired from BARC as the director of metallurgy to 
head VSSC. Prakash, received his D.Sc in metallurgy from Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. Cosmic Ray physicist Yash Pal, who also received his PhD from MIT, was 
made director of SAC and geophysicist Devendra Lal, would head PRL. Lal was 
extensively involved in researching on the moon rocks donated by NASA in 1971. The 
whole leadership “worked as a close-knit team” for launching India into space.
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The restructuring of the space program and revised goals pointed more toward the 
direction of space applications. Space sciences received less importance in Dhawan’s 
overall program. In a seminar held between August 7-12, 1972, on space research and 
applications he noted that  
…In the general pool of scientific knowledge, in a sense, Space Sciences and Astronomy 
are not really new to our culture. We need to reaffirm this in a modern sense by our 
activity….the group on space sciences have projected over a decade the launching of four 
satellites, two in each area. It is not necessary to discuss, at this stage, the merits of the 
experiments that have been suggested….the important question one has to ask is what is 
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the minimal level which will keep the scientists abreast with developments elsewhere 
without excessively depleting our budget? This is one way of putting the question. On the 
other hand, if there are a variety of other good reasons for launching satellites and which 
can be justified in terms of public support, surely one can carry science piggy-back on 
these. What I am suggesting is that if the vehicles are in any case to be developed and 
satellite technology established in the country, it is not as if one is going to launch on an 




All the space related activity carried out in and around Thumba was brought under a new 
center called the Vikram Sarabhai Space Center (VSSC) in 1972 and the center was 
placed under a Director. All activities in and around PRL were brought under the Space 
Application Center (SAC) in Ahmadabad. PRL which is the nerve center of all space 
activities, became a unit under DOS. As per Dhawan’s request, the headquarters was 
shifted from Ahmedabad to Bangalore. An ISRO council was formed to become the 
“symbolic link as well as the forum for participative management between the 




The period between 1962-1972 was crucial for developing an institutional and 
technological base for space research in India. The growth and establishment of a 
domestic space program, and collaborative relationships with organizations as well as 
scientists and technologists in foreign lands, was due to the active interest shown by India 
in the field of space sciences. NASA helped the scientific elite to create bases for 
sounding rockets and develop institutions along the way to shaping a space program that 
was geared toward the development needs of the country as defined by Sarabhai. As far 
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as technological collaboration was concerned, United States assistance during the early 
stages of India’s rocket program was limited to the donation of sounding rockets and the 
loaning of launchers; there was never a case of sharing the details of producing the 
sounding rockets locally. Homi Bhabha’s request for more advanced rockets in 1965 for 
testing and possible technology transfer was not favored by the US. The denial of 
technology transfer partly explains the choice made by India to combine their own 
resources with help from other countries mainly, France, Germany and the Soviet Union 
to begin a launch vehicle program. By the time of Sarabhai’s sudden demise, the Profile 
for the Decade was accepted by the Government of India, and his vision was carried 
further. Within a decade, incremental progress was made towards meteorological, remote 
sensing and communication satellites that was directed toward India’s socio economic 
needs. His famous quote “there is no ambiguity of purpose” became the leitmotif for 





Table  2: Sounding Rocket Launches from TERLS (1963-1970) 
 
S.No Type of Rocket  Total No. of Rockets launched from 21 November. 
63 to 31
st
 March 1970  
1 Dragon 1 
2 Nike Apache* 36 
3 Centaure – I  10 
4 Centaure II-A 2 
5 Judi-Dart* 36 
6 Boosted Arcas –1* 6 
7 Skua-1 10 
8 Skua II (T) 1 
9 Nike – Tomahawk* 3 
10 Test Rocket (2.7”) 29 
11 Rohini- 75 15  
12 Rohini -75 Test Rocket 22 
13 Rohini two –stage 1 
14 Menaka I  13 
15 Rohini 100 13 
16 Rohini 125 2 
17 Fibreglass Rocket  5 
 Total  205  
 
 






The Political and Technological Trajectory of India’s First Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV): 
Transnational Networks and Indigenous Efforts. 
 
India’s quest for a launch vehicle dates back to the early sixties when Homi 
Bhabha talked about a credible nuclear deterrent and Vikram Sarabhai wanted both to 
build application satellites (remote sensing, meteorology, and communication satellites) 
and to have the capability to launch them. But a vehicle that could carry a sizeable 
‘payload’ materialized only after several years by incremental development beginning 
with sounding rockets and establishing facilities, institutions and an instrumental 
rationality for building a space program in a poor country along the way. As described 
earlier, the initial stages of India’s space program were dominated by space science 
research. Research using sounding rockets supplied by different countries was used for 
extracting data through a diversity of experiments.  Indigenous attempts to manufacture 
sounding rockets, as a step toward building satellite launch vehicles, were taken up a few 
years after establishing TERLS in 1962 (see chapter 2).  
Soon after the Chinese nuclear test of 1964, the nascent space establishment in 
India negotiated with the United States for “scientific or technological spectaculars” in 
order to regain prestige in the comity of nations in the Afro-Asian region. Bhabha and 
Sarabhai approached NASA and asked the agency to transfer launch vehicle technology 
to loft a small satellite to low earth orbit. While NASA and the United States State 
Department were willing to consider loaning the most sophisticated, yet to be built, 
geosynchronous satellite technology for developmental television, a low configuration 





arms of the United States Government were divided over whether to help India with a 
rocket or not. Owing to geopolitical reasons and India’s status as a developing country, 
expert assistance or technology was never transferred from the U.S. leaving the nascent 
space establishment to develop a launcher “indigenously.”   
The dilemma the United States faced in sharing launch vehicle technology was 
not unique to India; similar concerns were aired and stringent hurdles were imposed 
when selective European nations formed the European Launcher Development 
Organization (ELDO) to collectively build a three stage launcher called Europa.
139
 Japan 
also faced a lot of hurdles initially when their space establishment sought assistance from 
the United States to build their N1 rocket based on Delta rocket technology, though here 
owing to political reasons limited technology was shared, with stringent controls.
140
 
When the United States was not forthcoming to help with the launch vehicle, India 
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sought help from other countries – France, West Germany and also Japan. Close 
interaction that was forged with France during the launch vehicle development was 
sustained and the two countries undertook many collaborative endeavors. West Germany 
also helped India with crucial subsystems like guidance and control, and launch vehicle 
simulation studies. Expert advice was sought from Japan and many Indian scientists and 
engineers also visited Japanese space facilities for training. The transnational network 
that was formed in the development of the SLV-3 throws light on an important fact 
unexplored in space history -- “Periphery – Periphery” collaboration rather than 
“Metropolis – Periphery” which had been the normal pattern of science and technology 
relations since the scientific revolution.  
Existing literature on the evolution of launch vehicles generally traces the 
beginnings of the development of an Indian launch vehicle to 1968. However, as this 
story will illustrate, Vikram Sarabhai and Homi Bhabha discussed the possibility of 
cooperating with NASA in building a launching vehicle already in the mid-sixties, as one 
of several possible prestigious endeavors to regain prestige after the 16 October, 1964 
Chinese nuclear test. The discussions centered on procuring the technology for the 
American all-solid four stage Scout rocket. Commonly called the “poor man’s rocket,” it 
was capable of launching satellites weighing close to 100 pounds in low earth orbit. 
Though initial discussions did not bear any fruit, the possibility of transferring launch 
vehicle technology or critical systems was not closed completely, however. NASA, not to 
alienate the Indian scientific elite after a close collaboration on various scientific and 
technological projects, had to maintain a fine balance in order to maintain the cooperative 





extensively at various times for close to ten years by different actors in the State 
Department, the Department of Defense and NASA along with their Indian counterparts. 
A spectrum of options ranging from outright denial to full cooperation was discussed. 
The geopolitical situation during the 1970s, however, did not augur well for renewed 
interactions between NASA and India. Positive cooperative endeavors began to wane 
under the vicissitudes of political relations between United States and India during the 
1970s. The Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, Sarabhai’s death in December 1971, and the 
Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) by India in 1974 all worked against close cooperation 
between NASA and India. United States’ relations with India in space cooperation in this 
broader political context were relatively static, and only the collaborative endeavors 
agreed on in the late 1960s had any momentum.  
In the light of the alienation with the United States the-then Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi sought increased friendship with the Soviet Union. Two historic treaties were 
signed that led to the successful launch of three Indian satellites (Aryabhatta, Bhaskara I, 
II) by the Soviet Union.
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 Space cooperation further bloomed when Air-Force pilot 
Rakesh Sharma became the first Indian cosmonaut to be sent to space on a Soviet rocket 
in April 1984.  To salvage some publicity the United States, through NASA, offered a 
similar position for two ISRO engineers, N.C. Bhat and P. Radhakrishnan, on its space 
shuttle as payload specialists for deploying the Indian Satellite, INSAT 1-C that was 
being built by Ford Aerospace to conduct vector control experiments. What would have 
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been a pinnacle of US-India cooperation in space was never achieved due to the 
Challenger disaster in January 1986 and the grounding of shuttle operations for the next 
three years. 
In the event India pushed ahead and built its own, ‘indigenous’ all solid stage 
Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV-3) modeled on Scout (see below). On 18 July, 1980 it 
placed a 35-kg Rohini (RS- D1)
142
 satellite in low-earth orbit, so becoming the sixth 
nation to accomplish this feat.
 
Just as the Pokhran-I nuclear test in May 1974, exhibited 
the visibility of India’s nuclear program, the successful launch of the Rohini satellite (the 
indigenous sounding rocket was also given the same name) made the space program 
visible. The launch attracted global attention. The United States State Department 
expressed grave concern. The tense situation was only exacerbated when the Defense 
Department of India, seeing the successful satellite launch, enrolled Abdul Kalam, the 
project manager of SLV-3, to rejuvenate their ailing missile program. Kalam joined the 
Defense Research Development Organization (DRDO) and he orchestrated the Integrated 
Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP) in 1983 that led to the organized 
research and development of guided missiles for different strategic military needs. Chief 
among those missiles was an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) Agni which 
was built using the experience gained in building SLV-3. Agni was capable of carrying 
war heads close to 1000 kg with the potential to reach targets deep inside China. Kalam’s 
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appointment with DRDO and his development of IGMDP distressed the U.S. State 
Department and NASA. 
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To weave this chapter’s narrative I mostly relied on material in the United States 
National Archives II, College Park, Md, and the NASA Historical Reference Collection, 
Washington D.C. From the Indian side, after much negotiation, I was able to get access to 
three internal SLV project reports that were brought out during the early seventies. I also 
got access to Countdown, another internal publication by Vikram Sarabhai Space Center 
VSSC.
144
 Providential interviews with some of the key project leaders and personal 
documents shared by them greatly assisted me in filling important gaps in the evolution 
of SLV-3.  
SLV-3 and Scout  
Since SLV-3 was modeled after SCOUT, two views have dominated the 
historiography of its development: indigenous development and technological diffusion. 
The first viewpoint was expressed by scientists and engineers who orchestrated the SLV-
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3 program. The second viewpoint comes from Western policy analysts who have denied -
- albeit without any documentary evidence -- that there was any indigenous contribution 
and basically state that SLV-3 was built using the technological “blueprints” freely given 
by NASA.
145
 This interpretation of freely given “blue prints” was treated as an 
established fact by various scholars who have not clearly understood NASA’s strict 
policy on sharing launch vehicle technology.
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A recent interview with Arnold Frutkin captures the dilemma that NASA and the 
State Department faced when it came to sharing launch vehicle technology.  
India came to us very early on in the mid-sixties asking for help in developing a 
booster, a small booster, something like the SCOUT.  There was a tremendous 
debate within government as to whether to help them or not.  Of course, it was 
slanted by the fear that India would be using it as a [….]delivery vehicle for a 
weapon.  At the time, I was all for working with India on a SCOUT.  I thought in 
the long run India would have what it wanted by way of a delivery vehicle or a 
space vehicle, and either they would have it with our goodwill and friendship or 
they would have it over our dead bodies, and that was precisely what I thought at 
the time. But there was great division within government and there was argument 
over how long it would take India to do it on its own.  Some people thought it 
would be very soon and some thought it would take more, but it took a lot longer 
to get to a vehicle able to deliver payload to orbit. But I think I was right in the 
long run.  I mean, that’s arguable.  I don’t mean I’m proven right, I think I’m 
right, that India resented our not working with them, and there was a long period 
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of very poor relations with India, not just because of that, many other reasons.  
But I think that all could have been sidestepped by working with India to arrive at 




In the light of their reticence and the general cooperative endeavors NASA had 
nurtured in India -- inclined towards scientific and socio-economic purposes -- it is 
difficult to say whether NASA offered Scout “blue prints” to the Indians. However, the 
declassified documents at NARA and NASA and the oral histories clearly tips the 
balance toward what Gopal Raj asserted in his book Reach for the Stars on the history of 
India’s launch vehicles, i.e. that SLV-3 was built using freely available unclassified 
reports and that the incremental development of sounding rockets paved the way for 
developing SLV-3 after a span of fifteen years.  
Though SLV-3 resembled Scout in its morphology, the subsystems and the fuel 
assembly showed marked difference from Scout architecture. Complementing Raj’s 
work, this section revisits the early history of the origins, aspirations and debates about 
India’s launch vehicle and looks at the role played by the United States, through NASA, 
whose fingerprint is evident during the formative years.  
My story also brings to light how the Indian scientists and engineers courted 
different companies and institutions in the US for learning technology.  It was only after 
the United States denied access to technology that the Indian’s sought help from other 
countries. This is probably due to the extensive networks Sarabhai initiated during the 
early years of space cooperation and also because many scientists and engineers who 
worked for the Indian atomic and space program received higher education in the United 
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States. Relations with Soviet Union on the other hand was limited to defense purchases 
(weapons and supersonic aircraft). The State Department papers also indicated the 
preference of scientists/engineers for receiving help from the United States. A message 
from the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi to the State Department in 1973 remarked that the  
U.S.S.R does not appear to be nearly so forthcoming as the Government of 
India would like…..undoubtedly the Government of India gets most of its foreign 
weapons assistance from the USSR. Science Attaché, however, has met no Indian 
technologist very enthusiastic about cooperation with the Russians. Some have 
indicated that visits to Russia are pleasant socially, but they are restricted in 
scientific content. Admittedly, Indian discussions with US officials would be 
somewhat skewed, but Indian scientists appear to get much more from and to 
prefer to work with the Americans and others in the West. So far there appears to 
be more talk than substance to science and technology cooperation with 




The possibility of aiding India with Scout technology appears on two occasions in 
my sources: soon after the Chinese nuclear test on October1964 and again after China’s 
first launch of a satellite on April 1970. What follows is a chronological narrative to 
highlight the dilemma faced by a plethora of actors in different departments and agencies 
when it came to space cooperation in the field of launch vehicles. Before getting under 
way, what is the Scout rocket?  
SCOUT 
The first time I encountered a Scout rocket was at the Smithsonian National Air 
and Space Museum in Washington D.C. in 2007 while working on a NASA project 
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looking at “NASA’s International Relations.” Later, I had ample opportunity to see the 
artifact more closely when I was awarded a one year resident Guggenheim Fellowship 
(2010-11) for completing my dissertation at NASM.  The rocket would cross my eye 
every time when I walked to get some food inside the museum. When I glance at Scout, it 
always reminds me of SLV-3 and the nascent Indian space establishment in Thumba, a 
place very familiar to me.  
The Solid Controlled Orbital Utility Test (SCOUT) system, was an all solid four 
stage rocket capable of launching a satellite weighing 385 pounds into a 500 mile low 
earth orbit. It was one of the most widely used launch vehicles for lofting scientific 
satellites both for the United States and also for many foreign nations. It’s known for its 
“simplicity, productivity and reliability.” The designers built the rocket by integrating 
solid fuel rocket motors derived from ballistic missiles: “the first stage motor was a 
combination of the Jupiter Senior and the Navy Polaris; the second stage came from the 
Army Sergeant; and the third and fourth stage motors were designed by Langley 
engineers who adapted a version of the Navy Vanguard.” It had a simple open loop 
guidance system – the trajectory was predetermined.  
149
 
Debating the Transfer of Scout Technology to India  
As indicated earlier, soon after the Chinese nuclear test in 1964, Bhabha and 
Sarabhai made several visits to the U.S. requesting advanced boosters that could be used 
to launch satellites. In February 1965 Robert F. Packard from the Office of International 
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Scientific Affairs, in anticipation of Bhabha’s visit, sent a memorandum to Frutkin asking 
for the “cost, timing and dependence upon foreign assistance” for India to extend its 
space program to satellite activities and the modalities of U.S. cooperation in this arena. 
This memo, coming soon after the Chinese nuclear test, sought possible routes for India 
to regain regional influence using space endeavors, rather than taking the nuclear path. 
Packard’s question to Frutkin was narrowed down to four possible ways of launching a 
satellite made in India, successively involving a greater intimacy of Indian engineers  
themselves with launcher technology (see the below table ) 
Table 3: Options for launching a satellite for India  
Origin of launcher Location of Launch Launch assistance 
Foreign Abroad Foreign 
Foreign In India Foreign 
Foreign In India Indian 
Indian In India Indian 
 
Frutkin responded in detail to the queries and did not think that India could do 
much in the short-term. Regarding the time-frame, he pointed out that even if India made 
fundamental progress in major areas in the development of a booster within five years, 
U.S., Japanese and French experience suggested that India could not complete a total  
(emphasis in the original) booster system in this time, nor within seven or eight years, 
without significant U.S. assistance. Alternately, if the U.S. agreed to cooperate, it would 
be only “partially an indigenous development” and the whole process would “involve 





India’s prestige in the subcontinent using space technology. Comparing the Indian case 
with France and Japan he noted that the Japanese had been working on solid propellant 
technology for close to ten years with a fairly large industrial base without any concrete 
results.  Similarly, the French had been working for at least six or seven years toward 
building a satellite launch vehicle without reaching their objective (France launched 
Diamant just a few months after Frutkin made this comment- see below). Frutkin noted 
that India might also have difficulty with respect to several systems that go with the 
launcher -- telemetry, command, guidance, test, and check out systems. He categorically 
stated that such an extensive program would “preempt all of the known Indian 
competence in the necessary areas for a period of years roughly related to the period of 
time used by France and Japan.”  If the United States were to speed up the “Indian 
National” booster program, the time required could be reduced substantially. Scout 
guidance, for example, was not classified and could very likely be made available to 
India under existing policy (this system is essentially an attitude reference system with 
limited value in U.S. terms for strategic purposes).
150
 Nevertheless, substantial numbers 




Frutkin made a detailed analysis of the cost factor for India to develop a launch 
vehicle and also a satellite. He projected the overall cost to India to be $ 55-65 million -- 
$ 45 million for building a launcher and another $11- 15 million for launch facilities; the 
time frame was 7-10 years. Since this equipment and instrumentation was “peculiar” to 
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the launch vehicle it had to be purchased from an American manufacturer or constructed 
in close collaboration with them.  He pointed out that Thumba was small and not a 
conducive location for satellite launching, so he favored a launch site on the East coast.
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It appears in the memo that Sarabhai had already done a cost analysis of a “partially 
independent Indian booster development program for a Scout type vehicle at $ 25 million 
using French and Japanese technology.”
153
  On the question of satellites he stated that it 
would cost around “2-4 million and would take the Indians three years with foreign 
assistance.” If India sought the help of Japan and France “India could probably produce a 
satellite launch vehicle in 8-10 years.”   If U.S. was forthcoming to help, it could be 
reduced to 7-8 years.
 154
 
Frutkin concluded that the assistance required to bring a “total satellite program” 
to fruition would undoubtedly go well beyond established criteria for cooperative 
programs to a degree easily recognized abroad. On the other hand, he suggested that the 
cost and time could be significantly reduced if the Indians were to use a Scout in 
America. If, as in the case of the Italian San Marco project, the arrangement were to be a 
cooperative one between NASA and the Indians, NASA could provide the launch 
vehicles at a cost of about $ 3 million to the U.S. This latter alternative assumed that the 
project would be of sufficient scientific or political value to America to justify direct U.S. 
involvement and expenditure. 
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By the time of Bhabha’s visit, the State Department and NASA officials had 
already discussed the issue of Scout technology for the Indians. On 21 February, 1965, 
Bhabha asked Frutkin about the cost and time factors for the development of a small 
satellite booster system, to which Frutkin responded that the Scout itself had been 
approved by the Department of State as available in principle under suitable terms and 
conditions for purchase by other countries in connection with scientific research. “The 
transfer of this technology however, is quite a different question as you know. And would 




NASA and Prof. G.B. Pant at the Birla Institute   
The earliest request to the U.S. for assistance with rocketry came from G.B. Pant, 
a scientist based in the Birla Institute of Technology, who expressed a desire for 
assistance in establishing a Department of Rocketry at the university level in India. 
157
 
The request was refused citing the potential strategic military implications.
158
 The United 
States had no security agreement with India under which assurances were given for the 
protection of sensitive classified information. “The Indian government made several 
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requests in the past for classified military equipment and in each case these requests were 
dropped or withdrawn when the U.S. Government indicated that no action could be taken 
without a security determination in accordance with U.S. national disclosure policy.”
159
 
However, in 1964, Professor Pant again approached NASA with the “endorsement” of 
Sarabhai seeking NASA support for the assignment of an American academic expert in 
solid rocket propulsion theory to spend a year initiating a research program at the Birla 
Institute. The U.S. Department of State gave a favorable response and NASA arranged 
with Princeton University to send Maurice Webb to work on the theoretical aspects of 
rocket propulsion. After the completion of Webb’s “tour-of duty” Pant again asked for 
two experts in the field of propulsion and aerodynamics. Seeing the pace at Birla moving 
from theory to praxis with close coordination with Sarabhai’s INCOSPAR proposal for 
building small rockets, Frutkin sent a cautionary confidential memo on 25 August, 1965 
to J. Wallace Joyce, Acting Director, International Scientific and Technology Affairs in 
the Department of State about the risk of supporting such an academic endeavor and also 
about NASA’s position on small rockets and launch vehicles.  Frutkin also informed 
Joyce about Sarabhai’s forthcoming visit to the United States in the Fall of 1965 for 
recruiting fifteen Indian engineers residing in the United States for a solid rocket 
development program to be carried out in India.  
With regards to NASA policy on small rockets, Frutkin stated that, “NASA has so 
far carefully avoided contributing to rocket development program abroad.” Secondly, 
Frutkin stated that progress was being made in India through the license agreement with 
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Sud-Aviation for the production of the French Centaure rocket and through consulting 
assistance from professor Itokawa of Japan. “The development of solid rockets is 
understood to be underway in other Asian countries, including Pakistan and Indonesia. 
Assistance to India in this area would become known and would constitute a precedent 
for assistance to other countries.” Frutkin cautioned that the “US could easily become 
involved in a series of rivalries with tactical and strategic delivery implications.” He 
pointed out that Pant was not “candid” enough to tell of the close relations nurtured 
between INCOSPAR and his Birla Institute of Technology in advancing solid rocket 
development. Frutkin said that while “NASA desires to accommodate the Department’s 
interest [it] is concerned that assistance in the Birla program as now understood might 
compromise NASA’s international space responsibilities, involve NASA in a difficult 
precedent with regard to other countries, and might contribute to nationalistic competition 
with military implications.” 
160
  
After this episode during the mid sixties, archival papers do not indicate any 
further information on the debate about technology transfer in the field of launch 
vehicles. The issue again emerges soon after the Chinese satellite launch in 1970. In the 
intervening period official annual records, brought out by the Department of Atomic 
Energy, indicate that Sarabhai promoted the indigenous production of launch vehicles 
through the incremental development of sounding rockets. This is evident from his 
address at the UN conference in Vienna and the institutional developments directed 
toward the needs of a budding launch vehicle program.
161
  
                                                 
160
 Confidential memorandum, Arnold Frutkin to J. Wallace Joyce, “Support of Birla Institute, India”, 
August 25, 1965, RG 59, box 3140, NARA II. (emphasis mine) 
161





At the United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space in Vienna in 1968 Sarabhai spoke about the importance of an indigenous capability 
and the complex political implications when a country had to depend on another for 
launching its satellites. He said “the military overtones of a launcher development 
program of course complicate the free transmittal of technology involved in these 
applications.”
162
 By 1968 he had already done a cost analysis of building a launch vehicle 
program and the required ground systems, including a launch pad on the eastern sea 




The Chinese launched Long March I (CZ-1) on 24 April, 1970, placing the Dong 
Fang Hong (the East is Red) DFH-1 satellite in low earth orbit. Though launched a few 
months after the Japanese launch of the Osumi satellite in February 1970 using the 
Japanese Lambda rocket, the Chinese launch triggered an outcry in India. The debate in 
India, soon after launch, centered on whether India should develop a nuclear deterrent 
against China and the resultant opinion was highly in favor of one. The then Defense 
Minister Swaran Singh “reaffirmed” before the Indian parliament that he would “review 
the possibilities for an accelerated space program.”
164
 After the Chinese launch Vikram 
Sarabhai visited Washington and sought U.S. cooperation in building an Indian launching 
capability and also on guidance and control technology.  The memo, after detailing the 
situation in India, expressed caution that “US denial would generate serious irritation in 
Indo-US relations, would turn Indians to other suppliers and would inhibit our capacity to 
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monitor (emphasis mine) Indian space research developments, and our ability to 
influence developments toward peaceful rather than military applications.”
165
 
A confidential memo from the American embassy in New Delhi to the Secretary 
of State dated August 1970 highlights the pros and cons of cooperating with India in the 
field of launch vehicles. The pro arguments were that a close cooperation will help to 
“monitor the Indian program” and since India could buy technology and hardware 
elsewhere it would be “preferable for India to be associated with US in this regard.” The 
memo also noted the “commercial opportunity for US exports” if the United States 
assisted India in the supply of “unclassified technology and hardware.”
  166
  However, the 
negative arguments far outweighed the pro arguments for any meaningful cooperation. 
The United States government was aware of the rhetoric of the Indian political elite that 
“only a nuclear equipped India can win a rightful place in counsels of major powers” and 
any assistance could “stimulate advanced rocket development” and enhance the early 
development of “Indian nuclear weapons system.”  The U.S., as one main architect of the 
Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and an opponent of Indian nuclear weapons 
development, would not even indirectly wish to facilitate such an Indian decision. 
Secondly, the memo stated that “India’s overall economic development could be 
imprudently retarded by major expenditures in atomic and rocket fields.” The embassy 
officials were also leery of the Profile for the Decade report brought out by the 
Department of Atomic Energy and saw the space plans as a needless diversion of India’s 
pressing needs into a strategic build up – “Sarabhai’s ambitious program far too 
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expensive given India’s other pressing needs for the GOI to accept it in its entirety.”
167
 
The officials also feared that helping India would also send the wrong signals to China 
and Pakistan concerning American policy on international military applications of 
science and technology.  They saw that if the U.S. provided technology to India and not 
to other interested countries it would have “corrosive effects” on U.S relations elsewhere. 
They feared that a “premature US commitment could inadvertently nudge Government of 
India’s program into direction Indians might later find fruitless, with possible consequent 
recriminations against U.S.”  In light of these facts, the embassy recommended a flexible 
long range policy of selective cooperation and restraint whereby the United States could 
provide India unclassified technology and other types of assistance directed toward 
India’s peaceful economic and social development.
168
  
Anthony C.E. Quainton, Senior Political Officer for India in the State 
Department, discussed the issue of providing launch vehicle assistance with U. Alexis 
Johnson the Under Secretary of State who had extensive experience in sharing of rocket 
technology with Japan. He favored a joint collaboration with the Indians up through the 
Scout level in unclassified technology on propulsion systems without financial support 
and with suitable assurances about peaceful use.  He was aware of the meeting between 
Arnold Frutkin and Sarabhai in Palo Alto, California. With technology out of bounds, 
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Sarabhai appears to have asked Frutkin if he could at least establish academic links and 
that if a few of India’s scientists and engineers could be hosted at select installations.
169
  
By November 1970 we see a determination in India to launch its own satellite 
using indigenous technology. Frukin’s assistant, Dick Barnes wrote that the Indians were 
interested in two different programs using their own launch vehicle for their RS-1 
satellite and the Scout for certain special scientific experiments using a RS-2 satellite. 
NASA estimated they could do this by 1975 or 1976. The RS-2 could be launched within 
about three years of the signature of a U.S.-Indian agreement. Sarabhai may also have 
been interested in a third alternative under which America would launch a Scout from an 
Indian range. This had certain attractions because of the geographical location of the 
Indian range that was preferable to any range in this U.S.  though it was not quite as good 
as the San Marco platform off the coast of Kenya. When the idea of transferring a Scout 
and launching it from an Indian range was floated NASA looked at the alternative 
“somewhat wistfully” because of the possibility that it could in effect deter the Indians 
from developing their own launch capability. 
170
 
On 22 December, 1970, Joseph T. Kendrick sent a proposal to Robert A. Clark of 
Munitions Control (MC) asking him to agree to assist India on similar terms as agreed 
between America and Japan. Clark’s reply indicated that he had no policy objection to 
the substance of the proposal, however, he expressed reservations about sending the 
proposal to U. Alexis Johnson for approval as it had not been discussed  with NASA and 
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the US Department of Defense (DOD). Clark requested Kendrick to forward the proposal 
to them first.  He explained the nature of the arrangement for Japan.  A Technical 
Advisor Group (TAG) was set up consisting of representatives from NASA, DOD and 
State Department to consider each American industry application for the transfer of 
hardware technology to Japan.  He drew attention to the vagueness of the offer to 
cooperate in the development of a limited space program “up to and including the general 
level of Scout Rocket Technology.”  In the U.S. – Japan program the term ‘Thor Delta 
Technology’ had not been specified by either the U.S. or Japan to facilitate case-by-case 
export application processing. In  coming to an agreement with India, it would be helpful 
if the administration’s  agencies, and possibly American industry,  were first to have a 
clear understanding of what was meant by “Scout technology” in each of the areas in 
which American  assistance would be provided. The Office of Munitions Control would 
compile a list of hardware and technology that had been licensed for export to Japan to 
help the DOD and NASA.  Clark said that he knew  “from personal experience that 
Indian officials are aggressive and persistent individuals who might be more likely to cry 
foul whenever they believe correctly or incorrectly that their understandings differ from 
someone else’s understandings.” Thus, wrote Clark, “the USG position on what scout 
technology means should be prepared in advance and not left to chance as has been done 
with the Japanese and Thor-delta technology.” 
171
 
Three years later we find that, though critical elements of launch vehicle 
technology were denied, the declassified State Department papers indicate the approval 
of some “hardware” related to sounding rockets and satellites, which are “unsophisticated 
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in character.”  However, the Indian space program was closely watched for potential 
ballistic missile activities. And the memo indicates that “So far, the Indian program 
appears peaceful in character - as the Indians claim - but it is developing the 
technological capability for a missile system should the Government of India opt for this 
course.”  The memo also stated about how they perceived the Indian space program,  
 
“originally the Indians hoped to launch a satellite in 1974. The time table 
has slipped badly and it is unlikely, they can attain their goal until much later. 
One factor has been the weakened leadership in the space program since the death 
of Sarabhai. Since then atomic energy and space have been separated, into two 
organizations. The new directors lack the dynamism and influence that Dr. 
Sarabhai possessed. Another factor has been India’s economic difficulties which 
have made it harder to get financial resources for the programs such as space 
research and development. In a political/military sense, we have been trying to 
keep a watch on the Indian program to determine whether the Indian’s were trying 
to develop a ballistic missile capability. This could, of course, be used as a 




The last available discussion on the subject was in a confidential memo from 
Sipes to Scisco on 27 June, 1973, requesting the formulation of a departmental position 
on whether it would be in the overall interest of the U.S. to assist India in the 
development of its space program.  The question was prompted because the Office of 
Munitions Control had received a number of requests from U.S. industries for 
Department of State approval to export space hardware and technology for India’s space 
program. The hardware included components like gyros and accelerometers that were 
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essential for the guidance and control of launch vehicles and missiles.
173
 It seemed that 
the Indians sought these components for building an indigenous launch vehicle. Since the 
approval of any of these components and system would establish a precedent, the memo 
sought answers to “whether this would be in the U.S. interest to help India develop its 
space program - satellite and launcher development -- and would such assistance be in 
furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United States. If the 
answer to the above question is yes, then how far, or up to what level should our 
assistance go?” As a comparison, Sipes brought the Japanese case of Thor-Delta 
technology transfer and explained how the Japanese had undertaken to use the launch 
vehicle and satellites developed with U.S. assistance on condition that they would be 
used for peaceful purposes only.  Japan also had to agree not to transfer such articles or 
related technology to third countries without U.S. government consent and to use them 
consistent with Intelsat arrangements. Because the Indian government in April announced 
that it was developing missiles for its services, Sipes said that it was not “prudent to 
permit the release of space hardware and technology” especially gyros and 
accelerometers which were critical for inertial navigation systems.
174
 Within a year India 
conducted its first nuclear test calling it “peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE).” An 
indigenous SLV-3 was attaining maturity.  
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Building from “Scratch”  




India’s first satellite launch vehicle (SLV-3) was an all-solid, four-stage rocket 
that placed the Rohini satellite in near circular orbit. The four stages were planned, 
designed and built at Vikram Sarabhai Space Center (VSSC), at Veli Hills, adjacent to 
TERLS in the state of Kerala. After completion, the stages were moved, assembled, and 
launched from Sriharikota (SHAR), located on the eastern sea coast in the state of 
Andhra Pradesh – about 500 odd miles Northeast of Thumba. The feat was accomplished 
by hundreds of scientists and engineers, with the help of “13 nation institutes, 40 major 
industries and 1000 medium/small scale industries.”
 176
 There were three launches in 
total: SLV-E1 (1979), SLV-E2 (1980) and SLV-D1(1981). The first successful launch on 
18 July 1980 demonstrated the satellite launch capability and it also proved the overall 
functioning of all the major subsystems of the vehicle.
 177
 The following paragraphs 
chronologically narrate the evolution of SLV-3 in India. 
In a recent article space historian Asif Siddiqi has offered new avenues for space 
historians to move beyond nation-centered approaches – “deemphasizing ownership and 
national borders.” Doing so, he believes, would unveil a richer tapestry of transnational 
“knowledge” flows in the evolution of space technology.  Also, rather than being 
transfixed on the nation-state, “one can shift our gaze from nations to communities, from 
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‘identification’ to identities, and from moments to processes.” Taking the cue from 
Siddiqi’s approach I have narrated the efforts taken by a community of scientists, 
engineers/technologists, mostly young and fresh graduates, to actualize Sarabhai’s long 




To recap, Vikram Sarabhai’s long held vision of using space for socio-economic 
development included the development of launch vehicles for domestic Indian needs. To 
achieve that goal, early efforts at indigenous production of sounding rockets using French 
Centaure sounding rockets was taken by a team of engineers at Thumba under Sarabhai’s 
leadership. The objective was to start from scratch and gradually scale up the rocket to 
achieve satellite launching capability. However, the geopolitical situation in South Asia -- 
only exacerbated by the Chinese nuclear test of 1964, and the evolution of Intelsat – an 
American led and maintained communications satellite system which portended a 
complete dependence on the American system for all future communication needs of 
India, -- triggered a more realistic goal of getting technology for a small launcher from 
the United States initially and building domestic institutions and infrastructure to develop 
higher capability rockets progressively.  
Following behind the scenes negotiations at Foggy Bottom, NASA headquarters, 
and extended meetings at international conferences, Sarabhai made public 
pronouncements of a launch vehicle soon after the UN Conference in Vienna in 1968. 
Concrete efforts followed after the publication of a ten year plan called Profile for the 
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Decade for nuclear and space research (see chapter 2).
179
 In the profile, Sarabhai 
explicitly spoke of the indigenous building of a satellite launch capability for “many 
applications of outer space in the fields of communications, meteorology and remote 
sensing.” He also gave the performance specifications of an all solid four stage satellite 
launch vehicle weighing 20 tons, and capable of launching a satellite weighing 30 kgs in 
a 400km low earth orbit. The profile stated that sensitive instruments, electronics and 
instrumentation, would be flight tested using sounding rockets.  Sarabhai also talked 
about a follow on program, an indigenous launch vehicle to place a 1200 kg satellite in 
geo synchronous orbit to “fully exploit the vast potential arising from the practical 
applications of space science and technology”
180
 
Though the public presentation of SLV-3 was made through the Profile, 
institutional developments and planning started much earlier. To help with the new field 
of advanced rocketry and associated subsystems, Sarabhai began recruiting fresh 
graduates, mainly from United States, for rocket research and development at Thumba 
during the mid nineteen sixties. Among his recruits was a young aeronautical engineer Y. 
J. Rao. The early history of SLV-3 owes a lot to this person. During my field trip to 
Trivandrum, I had the privilege of seeing many of the seminal project reports prepared by 
him on the feasibility and design aspects of the launch vehicle for India. Though an 
important figure, not much information is available on him. I enquired about him from 
the VSSC staff and also Y.J. Rao’s contemporaries but no one knew his whereabouts. By 
                                                 
179
 Ashok Maharaj, interview with E.V. Chitnis, February 2009. Chitnis stated that Sarabhai knew very well 
that a five year plan model adopted by the Indian government would not work for the space and nuclear 
sector because of the long gestation phase in achieving targets hence he opted for a decade plan.   
180
 Atomic Energy Commission, Atomic Energy and Space Research: Profile for the Decade 





sheer luck I was able to meet him recently. What follows is a brief description of Y.J. 




Y.J. Rao was born on 12 August 1930 in the State of Andhra Pradesh, a Telegu 
speaking state in South India. After completing his bachelor’s in Math from Andhra 
University in 1952, he went on to get a post-graduate diploma in Aeronautical 
Engineering from Madras Institute of Technology (MIT), in 1956. Further, he pursued his 
Masters and PhD in Aeronautical Engineering from University of Minnesota, 
Minneapolis, USA in April 1963. I asked him why Minnesota? “it’s because of existing 
networks already established in India, few of my seniors went to Minnesota so I too opted 
for it, but I was clueless about the extreme cold weather. After basking in the hot and 
humid tropical weather in South India, it was both a culture and weather shock for me in 
Minneapolis,” he said. 
182
  
During his graduate training, he worked as Research Engineer in the University 
Aeronautical laboratories, using supersonic and hypersonic wind tunnels. This involved 
testing of rocket and re-entry models in wind tunnels.  From September 1962-August 
1963 he worked as a research associate at University of Alabama Research Institute, in 
Huntsville, Alabama.  Here he worked on re-entry aerodynamics and also participated in 
the design and development of Aeronautical facilities. After his PhD he worked briefly 
on missile control systems and fluids at Systems and Research Laboratory at Honeywell 
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in Minneapolis. His last training in the US was at Ames Research Center, Mofett Field, 
California, where he worked on re-entry aerodynamics. During his stint at California he 
also took an advanced postgraduate course in specialized advance field of high 
temperature gas dynamics at Stanford University.  
While pursuing his training he came across a posting in India News, a widely 
circulated newsletter periodically brought out by the Indian Embassy in Washington 
D.C., about job openings in India in the field of space science and technology. Sarabhai 
personally interviewed him in Washington D.C. on September 3, 1966, and appointed 
him on October 15, 1966, to head the Aerodynamics and Structural Engineer in the 
Rocket Research and Development Group (precursor to SSTC) at TERLS.
183
 Upon 
joining, he became fully involved in the fabrication of sounding rockets – license 
production and indigenous ones. He prepared the Design Study Program and Flight 
Performance of Centaure sounding rocket and also surveyed all sounding rocket 
programs of various COSPAR member-countries. He successfully led the indigenous 
production of a series of indigenous Rohini sounding rockets.
 184
  
Seeing his educational background and training in rocketry, and his efforts toward 
indigenous production of sounding rockets, Sarabhai contacted him in the Spring of 1968, 
for the initial feasibility studies on developing a satellite launch vehicle. With the 
assistance of the electronics engineer Pramod Kale, a vehicle configuration based on four 
stage solid propellant rocket, which would be ideal for Indian conditions, was chosen.
185
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Sarabhai elevated him to be the Project Manager for SLV design. During this time he 
wrote a lot of reports on the SLV along with ISRO engineers.
186
   
By late 1970 the design phase was completed and of six designs Sarabhai chose 
the third, hence the name SLV-3.
187
  Unlike indigenous meteorological sounding rockets 
named after mythical celestial beauties -- Rohini and Menaka, borrowed from Hindu 
scriptures--the first launch vehicle was blandly named SLV. The next one year was spent 
designing the SLV – stage configuration, and by October 1971 the design was completed. 
It was a vehicle measuring 22 meters in length and 17 tons in weight capable of placing a 
30 kg satellite into near-earth orbit. The configuration was very similar to the first 
generation Scout rocket. 
From 19 April to 5 June, 1970, even before the launch range on the eastern coast 
was formalized, he was sent to West Germany, France, England, French Guyana, United 
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Launch Vehicle Development Project) June 1970; Y.J. Rao, Detailed Subsystem Identification (SLV 
Development Project), August 1970; Y.J. Rao,  Design Report of SLV 3 Systems Integration, October 1971; 
Design Report of SLV-3 Flight Dynamics, October 1971; Y.J. Rao, Design Report of SLV-3 Inter-Stages 
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 The number of designs is not clear. “SLV-3 design started in 1970 based on feasibility 
study to configure a four stage launch vehicle which could inject a 30 kg satellite into 
near earth orbit. Sarabhai who was chairman of ISRO formed 11 design projects. On 
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States -- Cape Kennedy, Wallops Station, Houston, Huntsville, Hawaii; Australia, Japan, 
for observing satellite launching stations and to have “technical discussions” with 
engineers and scientists at various space centers regarding the Indian launch vehicle 
program and “connected matters.” Sarabhai said that the touring of the facilities was of 




On December 2, 1971 Sarabhai made Rao  the Project Manager of SLV-3 and 
assigned him the following tasks: to coordinate the development of various sub-systems, 
development of inter-stage structures, freeze specifications and quality control protocols 
in consultation with sub-system project managers, provide support for transport and 
handling, integration of vehicle, conduct flight dynamics and flight testing of SLV-3 as a 
whole, and finally to maintain a centralized documentation center to serve as an 
information node for all projects related to SLV-3. He would also consult with other 
project managers for the choice of subsystems for SLV-3, and the evaluation of all test 
results during the development phase.
189
  
After Satish Dhawan took over as Chairman of ISRO, Rao was assigned as the 
Project Engineer Sriharikota Rocket Launch Complex and Rocket Sled Facility 
(September 1972 to 1976).
 190
  “He was deputed to visit French Guiana, France and US 
from 20
th
 November 1972, to 8
th
 December 1972, to attend the International Conference – 
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Launching Bases at Kourou and to visit various rocket sled facilities in France and US 
and also NASA satellite launching stations. 
191
 
By the time Rao left for the US at the end of 1976, he had close to seventy 
publications to his name and he also did a feasibility study of multistage Ballistic 
Missiles using SLV-3 booster and Rohini Rockets in 1972. Coming soon after the 
restructuring of the Indian space program, and the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, this is  
documentary evidence for the dual purpose of SLV-3. His papers also indicate that he did 
“the calculation of Aerodynamic performance characteristics of advanced missiles for the 
application of defense and orbiting satellites.”
192
  
Though a Scout license production agreement never made its way into India, the 
idea of using a Scout design for India’s first SLV persisted ever since Bhabha and 
Sarabhai contemplated developing a launch vehicle for India.  Being all solid propellant, 
a technology easier than complex liquids, this seemed to be a possible route that Indians 
could attempt and succeed. The reason for the adoption of the Scout design rather than 
the Japanese Lambda or the French Diamant could be because India’s began to think 
about this possibility before the French or the Japanese had successfully launched a 
satellite with a domestic launcher. Several years of negotiation, and the familiarity Indian 
scientists and engineers gained with Scout during their tenure at Wallops Island and other 
NASA facilities, played a key role when India opted for a launch vehicle. Also, 
unclassified project reports from NASA were readily available, and the familiarity that 
scientists had with project reports could have been a valuable plus. Gopal Raj also claims 
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that the Scout model was chosen because “Indians did not then have sufficient experience 
for ab initio design of a launch vehicle.”
193
  
Also, we could interpret the request for Scout from another angle.  In the year 
1962 India was defeated by China in a border war in which India lost some territory in 
the northern region. This coupled with a the Chinese nuclear test in 1964 and Indo-
Pakistan war of 1965 could have triggered Bhabha to acquire the all solid Scout with the 
intention of converting into a ballistic missile if need arose,-- after all Scout itself was an 
assembly of ballistic missile stages (see the description of SCOUT at the beginning of 
this chapter). However, when Scout technology was “out of bounds” Sarabhai could have 
pursued liquid technology from the US, similar to the Japanese case of requesting Delta 
technology. In thousands of pages from the NARA archives or from the Indian 
“archives”/reports, I did not come across any information about Sarabhai seeking liquid 
technology from the US. 
194
 
Though the negotiations on the sharing of Scout technology and critical 
components did not lead to any tangible results, published articles and government 
reports indicate the importation of several minor subsystems and components from the 
United States and Europe that were crucial for the development of SLV-3. With these 
subsystems the engineers and scientists at ISRO incrementally scaled up their sounding 
rockets to higher configurations (see appendix I). As indicated earlier, an agreement was 
signed with Sud Aviation of France to license produce an advanced sounding rocket 
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 Working on Centaure helped in building indigenous Rohini sounding 
rockets, which were advanced further to carry heavier payloads.
196
 Many of the SLV-3 
subsystems including the heat shield and guidance were tested using an RH-560 prior to 
incorporating it in the SLV-3 vehicle.
197
 “During the development of SLV-3, various 
changes were incorporated and the version eventually launched was entirely different 
from the originally conceived one” said M.K. Abdul Majeed, who was the Project 
Engineer, Rocket Systems and Configuration Control for SLV-3.
198
  
After the planning of SLV-3 was completed the recruitment of scientists, 
engineers/technologists started full swing.  Thumba was teeming with scientists and 
engineers during the early seventies. The spectacle of the Apollo moon landings by the 
United States in 1969 enthused graduates to join the space establishment to attempt a 
launch vehicle for India.  Developing solid rocket motors for SLV-3 offered a training 
ground for many engineers and scientists to learn about the essentials of rocketry and 
chemistry behind rocket propellants.  In the process, they also were exposed to the world 
of global politics and how science and technology was used as a tool of foreign policy, 
economics of foreign exchange (forex), etc.   
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During the sixties, as described in the second chapter, the space program in the 
fishing town of Thumba was science driven. Being an international range sponsored by 
the UN, domestic and foreign PhD scientists dominated the landscape talking about 
Langmuir probes, Van Allen belts, equatorial electro jets and discussing esoteric 
calculations on tropical aeronomy in national and international seminars and workshops.  
From the Indian side it was spearheaded mostly by Western trained scientists – Vikram 
Sarabhai, Homi Bhabha, Raman Pisharoty, Praful D. Bhavsar, and others. After Sarabhai 
died in 1971, and with the restructuring of the space program, and a more ‘vigorous’ 
government under Indira Gandhi (she was the Prime Minister from 1966-1977; 1980-
1984), a new breed of “technologists” emerged on the scene to lead the space program in 
the 1970s: Brahm Prakash, Satish Dhawan, Muthunayagam, Y.J. Rao, Kurup and A.P.J. 
Abdul Kalam. All but Kalam received doctoral training abroad, and years later Kalam 




With this new influx of “technologists” the campus was teeming with fresh 
graduates talking about properties of steel, composite propellants, inertial guidance, gas 
dynamics and discussed mundane mechanical calculations for satellite injection and 
specific impulse of solid rocket fuels. Young, fresh Malayalee (State of Kerala), Tamil 
(Tamil Nadu), and Telegu (Andhra Pradesh) speaking, mostly higher caste, engineering 
graduates received training from a handful of western trained technologists.
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 In contrast 
to this, when the SITE was being planned in Ahmedabad, a town near Bombay (now 
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Mumbai) in north of India, it was represented mostly by engineers and scientists residing 
in the North Indian region: Pramod Kale, E.V. Chitnis, Yash Pal, Binod Agrawal, and the 
recruits were mostly from the surrounding regions – Bombay, Pune, and others. In a 
recent book Anderson talks about the cosmopolitan nature of the leadership in main 
scientific and technological institutions:  
Overall the leadership was cosmopolitan: a Mumbai-based Parsi engineer 
was at Atomic Energy in Mumbai (Sethna), a Mumbai – based Kannada physicist 
was at Bhabha Atomic Research Center -- BARC (Ramana), a Bangalore-based 
Malayali-Rajasthani physicist was adviser at Defense in Delhi (Nagchaudhuri). 
Each of them would insist that their provenance, their home districts, and 




However, the cosmopolitanism was only at the leadership level. Underneath this 
cosmopolitan veneer was a workforce that was peculiarly regional.  
The development of subsystems and facility generation commenced in January, 
1973.
 202
 A full scale model was first built to get hands on experience on the size and 
challenging task of assembling, building and integrating various subsystems and making 
the model into a reality. When Satish Dhawan  took over as the Chairman, he made 
Abdul Kalam as the Project Director and asked Y.J. Rao to establish SHAR.  
Avul Pakir Jalaludin Abdul Kalam  
Kalam was born and brought up in a coastal town in the Southern State of Tamil 
Nadu called Rameshwaram, a Hindu pilgrimage center 500 km south of Chennai and 200 
kms from Thumba (where TERLS is located). A Tamil, Muslim
203
, vegetarian, and a life 
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long bachelor he became a key player in India’s space and missile program after the 
death of Sarabhai. After his retirement from government service (ISRO and DRDO) he 
held many advisory positions. The “missile man” was roped in again for a major project 
that would fulfill Homi Bhabha’s long held vision – a nuclear deterrent. He along with 
other nuclear scientists and engineers secretly planned and executed the Pokhran II 
nuclear explosions in May 1998. Owing to Indian domestic politics, he was pushed to 
become the 11
th
 president of India.  Though he achieved an iconic status in India, his 
profile, unlike Sarabhai, is not that of an international one. Only in April 2009, he 
became the first Asian to receive the Hoover Medal, given annually since 1930 by the 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). What follows is a brief prolife of 
his early career.   
  After his schooling at Schwartz in Ramanathapuram he joined St. Josephs 
College, a Jesuit institution in the town of Tiruchirapalli for his Bachelors degree in 
Physics. He developed a fascination for engineering while pursuing his Physics and went 
on to pursue another bachelor training in Engineering at Madras Institute of Technology 
(MIT), in Madras (now Chennai). At MIT he was mentored by Prof. Sponder, Prof. KAV 
Pandalai and Prof. Narasingha Rao. An Austrian immigrant, Sponder taught him 
“technical aerodynamics”; Pandalai taught him “Aero-structure design and analysis” and 
finally Rao “theoretical aerodynamics.” After his studies at MIT he joined Hindustan 
Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in Bangalore and received experience in aircraft engine 
overhauling. His long cherished dream of becoming an air force pilot did not materialize 
and he later joined Directorate of Technical Development and Production (DTD & P) Air 





had chance encounter with MGK Menon, who was heading the Tata Institute of 
Fundamental Research (TIFR) at that time. He was invited to Bombay (now Mumbai) for 
an interview to join INCOSPAR. Vikram Sarabhai (PRL/INCOSPAR); MGK Menon 
(TIFR), Shroff, Deputy Secretary of Atomic Energy Commission, interviewed him and 
he was brought into INCOSPAR. Soon after joining INCOSPAR he was sent along with 
others to NASA to get hands on experience in sounding rocket integration and safety. 
Kalam’s training in the early 1960s spanned three NASA facilities: Langley Research 
Centre (LRC) in Hampton, Virginia; Goddard Space Flight Centre (GSFC) in Greenbelt, 
Maryland; and Wallops Flight Facility at Wallops Island in East Coast, Virginia. In his 
autobiography, Wings of Fire, Kalam recalls seeing a painting, prominently displayed in 
the Wallops reception room, depicting Tipu Sultan’s army fighting the British.
204
  “The 
painting depicted a fact forgotten in Tipu’s own country but commemorated here on the 
other side of the planet.  I was happy to see an Indian glorified by NASA as a hero of 
warfare rocketry.”
205
  Kalam could never have imagined at that time that he would later 
become the next “Tipu” of India to build guided missiles.  His NASA training made 
possible the first sounding rocket launch on 21 November 1963 from the Thumba 
Equatorial Rocket Launch Station (TERLS) in Southern India.  Soon after the launch, 
Kalam noted, “Many individuals with myopic vision questioned the relevance of space 
activities in a newly independent nation which was finding it difficult to feed its 
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population. But neither Prime Minister Nehru nor Professor Sarabhai had any ambiguity 
of purpose: if Indians were to play a meaningful role in the community of nations, they 
must be second to none in the application of advanced technologies to their real-life 
problems.”
206
 At TERLS he provided “interface support” for payloads scientists, 
domestic and international, who came with different kinds of instruments to be lofted on 
sounding rockets and slowly began working on other subsystems and “jettisonable nose 
cones.” Working on nose cones brought him closer to the world of composite materials. 
207
 
Configuration of SLV-3  
The four staged all solid SLV-3 was fueled by composite propellants. The stages 
were designated as S1, S2, S3 and S4. (see below figure), and also for the whole 
configuration of the stages (see appendix 2 and 3).   Work on all four stages started 
simultaneously in Thumba. The lower stages S1 and S2 had specialized steel casing and 
the upper two had casing made up of fiber reinforced plastics (FRP) 
The composite slurry which was directly poured into metal and fiber casings for 
setting had a mixture of ammonium perchlorate (70 percent), aluminum powder (15 
percent), a mixture of other chemicals (5 percent) and a resin, the most important of all, 
that binds all of the substances together (10 percent). Though binders only occupy a small 
portion of the composite they determine the propellant grains’ storability, reliability, 
performance and efficiency. 
208
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Figure 12: Exploded view of SLV-3
209
  
Source: SLV-3 Project Bulletin 
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The casing for the first and second stage was made up of 15 CDV 6 steel (French 
specification standard). It is a high quality steel made with small percentage of 
Manganese, Chromium, and Molybdenum. This steel was most coveted for rocket 
casings because of its excellent material properties: they are high strength; they could be 
easily welded and withstand high temperatures and pressure without cracking. Today 
their use is ubiquitous – in automobiles, aircraft and also in bicycles. The Indian space 
establishment got introduced to 15 CDV6 while license producing Centaure rockets in 
India. The first indigenous French rocket Diamant – A, that launched Asterix on 
November 26, 1965 from Hammaguuir in Algeria, was entirely made of this steel.
210
  
Three engineers who pioneered the indigenous manufacture of solid propellants 
are  Vasant Gowarikar, M.R. Krupp and A.E. Muthunayagam. The following paragraphs 
briefly describe their background and their contributions.
211
  
Gowarikar received his chemical engineering degree in the UK and was also 
trained in tactical missiles at the Summerfield Research Station in Great Britain. It was 
during his time in the UK that he was invited by Sarabhai to join and help Indian space 
efforts. He joined ISRO in 1969 and began working at SSTC in Veli Hills. His 
experience at the new facility was a stark contrast to his training in UK:  
I was the first to shift to Veli Hils (a new facility near Thumba for making 
solid boosters) from the church building (where early work on solid rockets first 
started). …churning the solid propellants in a mixer…..one day Sarabhai dropped 
in my tiny room and was greeted by a snake chasing a rat, an all too familiar sight 
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on Veli Hill in those days! “you would have missed such lively sights in England, 
wouldn’t you? Said he with a big grin, Yes Indeed, I said. …..the conversation 




A.E. Muthunayagam, another key engineer at ISRO, initiated the plan for a Static 
Test Evaluation Complex (STEX) in India to be established at SHAR. Today he is 
considered as the father of liquid propulsion in ISRO. He was the founder director of 
Liquid Propulsion Systems Center (LPSC), headquartered in Valiamala, Kerala. A Tamil 
Christian, born in the town of Nagercoil, 50 km from Thumba. After getting his bachelors 
in mechanical engineering from Madras University in 1960 he joined Indian Institute of 
Science for his Masters. He later moved on to Purdue University, USA to complete his 
PhD in Mechanical Engineering.  He was interviewed by Sarabhai in the Spring of 1966 
and he joined the April 1966 as a Divisional Head of SSTC. At this center he worked on 
all areas of propulsion for both launch vehicles and satellites. He acted as the Director of 
Propulsion Systems Group at VSSC and additionally as the program director of Auxilary 
Propulsion Unit of ISRO.  His early work was on developing solid propulsion technology 
for sounding rockets and was instrumental in the development of the first indigenous 
sounding rocket RH-75 that was first tested in November 1967. He later developed solid 
rocket motors for projects RH-100, RH-125, RH-200, RH-300 and RH560. He also 
contributed to the propulsion systems for all the SLV-3 vehicles. STEX was used for 
testing SLV-3 motors for performance  and other things like vibration, thermal cycling, 
constant acceleration and spin. In the SLV-3 he made signification contributions 
specifically in the area of grain design and interior ballistic analysis, nozzle design and 
development and ignition system for lower stages. He was also responsible for three 
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control systems of SLV-3, namely, SITVC for the first stage, bipropellant RCS for the 
second stage, Mono-propellant RCS for the third stage were designed, developed and 
supplied to SLV-3 by propulsion group under Muthunayagams overall responsibility.
213
  
Shopping for Ideas and Hardware  
Once the decision on propellants was taken, the initial enquires were made with 
the United States, France and Japan for purchasing them directly from vendors.
214
 
Indigenous efforts were taken only when the Indian engineers faced hurdles in getting 
access. Sarabhai personally wrote to Arnold Frutkin of NASA and arranged a visit for 
Kurup, Gowarkiar, and H.G.S. Murthy of TERLS. They visited United States in the Fall 
of 1971.
215
 The purpose was to discuss the availability of propellant plant equipment with 
American suppliers. After visiting NASA installations and seeing American plant 
layouts, they asked for quotations from equipment suppliers which was necessary for 
budget estimates for Indian plant to be constructed at the new range, forty miles north of 
Madras (now Chennai). The team also showed interest in safety features and raw 
materials and final product analytical and evaluation equipment.
216
 The trip was eye 
opener to all of them.  
Gowarikar was instrumental in establishing the Propellant Fuel Complex (PFC) at 
Thumba for scaling up production of polymers before massive industrial production. The 
building of PFC started in 1972. He was also influential in constituting the Solid 
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Propellant Space Booster Plant (SPROB) at Sriharikota. The facility was built using 
mostly indigenous sources.
 217
  SPROB was commissioned in March 1977.  
Kurup, head of the Rocket Propellant Plant (RPP) of TERLS, visited the United 
States in October 1971. During his two week tour he visited Wallops Station, Kennedy 
Space Center, Arnold Engineering, Rocketdyne, Aerojet General and United Technology 
Center, for two weeks in October 1971.
218
  He preferred US components and subsystems 
to those from other countries. During his visit he requested a continuous supply of 
polysulfide and carboxyl terminated polybutadiene from Thiokol Corp, one of the binders 
of the solid fuel propellant. US Munitions Control regulations posed restriction on the 
transfer of this compound leaving Kurup to indigenously produce them at Thumba.
219
  He 
also became one of the key engineers to design and test Rohini 560, which became a 
workhorse for testing various SLV -3 subsystems. RH 560 was 7.6 meters long, 2 stage; 
max diameter 560 cm; capable of launching 80 kilos to 420 km altitude (see below 
figure).  Another team comprising of S. Srinivasan, M.K. Abdul Majeed and J.D.A 
Subramanian, engineers at ISRO, visited various space science and technology centers in 
Japan learning about the “development of Japanese rocket motors, separation and destruct 
systems used for Mu rockets and the facilities existing at NASDA
220
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Figure 13: RH 560 on a launch pad  
After Kalam was appointed as Project Manager of SLV-3, a review of the project 
was undertaken and milestones were listed. How to get the hardware for a launch 
vehicle? For this a team was constituted with Srinivasan as Chairman and V. Manoharan 
as the convener “to decide on material choice, and fabrication route.” Many at the space 
establishment advocated for in house production, meaning that the space establishment 





They were overruled. “We in the project looked beyond SLV-3 and taking into account 
obvious advantages of industry route in terms of productivity, professionalism and 
infrastructure availability, we preferred industry mode. Ultimately it was decided to go 
for industry mode of realization.” A specialist team headed by Kalam held discussions 
with prospective industries and Initially four industries were chosen. The involvement of 
industries in the space program was a visionary decision. The ISRO-Industry partnership 
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Figure: 14.  SLV-3 Work Centers: Many private and governmental industries 






Figure: 15 Utilization of ISRO and external establishment for SLV development. 





For establishing STEX, Muthunayagam visited the US for information and a visit 
to Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL) was arranged by Satish Dhawan. They both visited the JPL 
facility. “but the US took a tough stand on any sort of help in establishing solid motor test 
facilities in India”  The Indians approached the French and a cooperation was initiated 
with  Societe Europeene de Propulsion  (now Snecma moteurs’ rocket engine division). 
For High Altitude Test facilities (HAT) which could stimulate near vacuum conditions, 
ISRO received help from the German space agency (DFVLR). When  an American 
company was prevented from supplying a 16 ton vibration table (shake table), a British 
company stepped in.  
The outer casing of the upper two stages (S3 and S4) are made of composite 
fibers. To gain expertise, Kalam and H.G.S Murthy sent C.R. Sathya, of the Fiber 
Reinforced Plastics Division (FRP), to NASA’s Wallops Island to look at Scout’s upper 
stages in the year 1971. The visit offered him a valuable insight on strength of glass 
fibers. When these fibers are tightly woven in the form of a vessel they could form 
suitable motor cases capable of withstanding high pressure, “the visit opened my eyes” 
says Sathya. 
222
 Also, another engineer P.N. Subramanian, dedicated his life to FRP at 
VSSC. The first seminar on FRP composites inaugurated by C. Achutha Menon, Chief 
Minister of Kerala, in the Presence of Sarabhai gave the necessary confidence to develop 
an FRP casing for the upper stages of satellite launch vehicles. In the meantime C.R. 
Sathya who had taken over as Deputy. Head of FRP division could obtain a cut piece of 
the FRP casing developed by the Aerojet Corporation of USA. This visit provided him 
many clues on how to approach the design of the joints
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fibers. When these fibers are tightly woven in the form of a vessel they could form 
suitable motor cases capable of withstanding high pressure, “the visit opened my eyes” 
says Sathya. 
223
 Also, another engineer P.N. Subramanian, dedicated his life to FRP at 
VSSC. The first seminar on FRP composites inaugurated by C. Achutha Menon, Chief 
Minister of Kerala, in the Presence of Sarabhai gave the necessary confidence to develop 
an FRP casing for the upper stages of satellite launch vehicles. In the meantime C.R. 
Sathya who had taken over as Deputy. Head of FRP division could obtain a cut piece of 
the FRP casing developed by the Aerojet Corporation of USA. This visit provided him 
many clues on how to approach the design of the joints -- most critical in an FRP 
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filament wound casing., the configurations – counters etc, insulation plan and so on.
224
 
(for a closer look at the 4
th
 stage that used FRP, see the image below) 
  
 
Figure 16: Filament Winding Machine for the fourth stage of SLV-3.  
Source: Countdown  
Frutkin remembers seeing a filament winding machine when he visited Thumba 
in the early seventies.  
“When I visited they showed me what they were doing. There was a filament 
spinning technology which is used in the casings of solid rockets and […]they 
were working with that. They’d gotten it from the French. Then there is the 
casting of the solid propellant itself. They have gotten into that. Then I remember 
one of the critical items of technology that they needed in developing the rocket 
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was a shake table. They’re very large structures that I think…are designed to 
simulate the high vibration regimen in the launch phase, and they shake rockets to 
see what they –they have to build to withstand that terrific vibration. They applied 
to get shake tables in this country, and I’m quite positive they were denied, but 
they did get them from somebody else.
225
  
The FRP Division was created in 1971 and Kalam also proposed the setting up of 
Reinforced Plastics Centre (REPLACE). It was commissioned in November 1976.  
 Control and Guidance  
 When rocket takes off from a launch pad, it is subjected to a variety of internal 
stresses due to the thrust from the stage motors and aerodynamic pressures during the 
course of its flight. If there is no internal mechanism to neutralize the ‘disturbances’ and 
maintain the rockets orientation (in scientific terms ‘attitude’) it could deviate from its 
nominal trajectory, and could potentially break up. A control and guidance system (CGS) 
helps the rocket to overcome these disturbances and steers the rocket to a desired target -- 
be it injecting a satellite to a predetermined orbit or to deliver a bomb, conventional or 
nuclear, to a precise radius. The sophistication of the CGS package varies depending on 
the rocket and payload it is carrying. For example, a sounding rocket with an 
experimental payload to study the upper atmosphere is stabilized either by spinning the 
rocket once aloft or by using fins fitted on the rocket frame, or a combination of both. At 
the other extreme, a rocket carrying a communication satellite, weighing a few tons, to be 
placed in a geosynchronous orbit requires a more sophisticated CGS.  
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When Vikram Sarabhai planned a simple launch vehicle during the late sixties, an 
optimum CGS for the rocket was calculated in parallel and a team was created under the 
headship of Suresh Chandra Gupta to take on the technological challenge. S.C. Gupta 
received his doctorate in electrical engineering from University of Pennsylvania, USA, in 
1964 and was personally interviewed by Vikram Sarabhai to join SSTC to lead the 
competence building and indigenization of Control, Guidance and Instrumentation 
system.  However, the basic infrastructure for manufacturing precision parts and 
assembling a CGS package was either rudimentary or non-existent. Initial negotiations 
with the United States for buying the system “off the shelf” did not materialize, “they 
refused to provide even catalogues about their Gyros,” says Gupta. This left the team to 
fabricate and assemble a flight worthy package with help from France and West 
Germany.
226
   
 Internally the CGS package consists of the following subsystems: stage Control 
Power Plants (CPP), On-board Digital Processor (OBP), Inertial Measurement Unit 
(IMU)  and Rate Gyro Package (RGP); all of these subsystems are made of precision 
parts and they have to act in unison to guide the launch vehicle to its desired target. When 
the task of building the CGS indigenously was decided, a Control, Guidance and 
Instrumentation Division (CGI), Aerodynamic Division (ARD) and Structural 
Engineering Division (STR) was established at the Vikram Sarabhai Space Center 
(VSSC). Later a separate ISRO Inertial Systems Unit (IISU) was formed and N. 
Vedachalam was made the first director of the unit with Gupta as the overall head. The 
Atomic Energy Commission offered Rs. 1.25 crore to establish the Precision Instruments 
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Laboratory (PIL) at ISRO to help Gupta’s team. Parts were procured from European 
countries, mainly Switzerland, to equip the new laboratory.  
 Gupta’s team early on decided to fly SLV-3 using the highly complex inertial 
guidance system. However, the plan was dropped owing to the complexity of the 
subsystems and the technological challenges it posed. In its place, a less complicated 
open-loop guidance system that offered a preprogrammed trajectory was chosen.
227
 
Link Between the Space Program and the Defense Establishment 
Viewing the history of India’s space program since the 1960s one can visibly see 
the rhetorical message of ‘space for socio-economic development’ embedded in the 
functioning and the execution of space activities. Conversion of civilian rockets for 
military missiles, though mentioned at times, was never pursued with dedicated interest. 
During the early phase under Sarabhai’s leadership, fearing the denial of technological 
exchange with advanced countries, the civilian program was deliberately kept separate 
from defense related rocketry. 
Cross-fertilization between the Defense Research Development Organization 
(DRDO) formed in 1958, and the civilian space establishment never really attained 
significance until the start of IGMDP. However it would be misleading to say that the 
defense establishment and the civilian space program were independent. With a very 
small pool of scientists and engineers, constant traffic was happening between the 
Department of Atomic Energy, the space, and the defense establishment. In an interview 
by Amrita Shah, Pramod Kale says that “the lines of communication between the two 
were far from closed…we were very clear that space was for peaceful purposes but we 
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had the capability that could help and if the government wanted it, it was there. Defense 
people would come to see us and vice versa. For us it was very open.”
228
  
An early example of cooperation between defense and space is highlighted in 
Abdul Kalam’s autobiography. Kalam worked on Rocket Assisted Take Off  (RATO) for 
military aircraft in the Himalayan region before being assigned for the SLV-3 project. 
Working on RATO brought him closer to the defense establishment and he became a 
member of the Ministry of Defense’s “Missile Panel” along with V.S. Narayanan, 
physicist and an Army general who was given the responsibility of producing an ICBM 
during the 1960s. 
229
  
A space program for exclusive socio-economic benefits however got tipped 
toward a ballistic missile ability owing to geopolitical situation. The reorganization of the 
space program also created a more conducive environment for linking the space program 
toward strategic needs. Sarabhai’s pacifism ended peacefully after his death and Indira 
Gandhi’s “men”
230
 had ample elbow room with State largesse to develop a launch vehicle 
that could carry both a satellite and eventually a nuclear bomb. The increasing collusion 
of technologists was also noted by the then Ambassador to India Patrick Moynihan  
The Indian Government is progressively increasing its control over technology 
and technologists in India….conversely, the technologists are looking for more 
political power. …Most Indian technologists prefer to deal with the USA…. The 
Department of Atomic Energy, Space, and Electronics have Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi as Minister. Reporting to her are three experienced technologists: Homi 
Sethna, Secretary of the GOI for Atomic Energy and Chairman of the Atomic 
Energy Commission, Dr. Satish Dhawan, Secretary of the GOI for Space, and 
                                                 
228
 Shah, Vikram Sarabhai, p. 132.  
229
 Kalam, Wings of Fire, p. 53. 
230
 I call  them Indira’s men because Dhawan, Brahm Prakash, MGK Menon,  had direct link with prime 





Chairman of the Space Commission, MGK Menon, Secretary of the Department 
of Electronics and Chairman of Electronics Commission (also director of TIFR 
Bombay). Although increasing in authority, none of these three yet match the 
deceased Homi Bhabha or Vikram Sarabhai.
231
  
The 1971 Indo-Pakistan war brought a lot of political pressure (see below) on the 
space establishment toward developing a launch vehicle that could be converted to a 
ballistic missile. After the Pokhran nuclear test of 1974, there was increasing momentum 
to create a nuclear deterrent. Interrogating the development of SLV-3, shows us that the 
walls of the space establishment was porous and often there was close interaction 
between the defense and space establishment.  
Satish Dhawan, Chairman of the Indian Space Research Organization, was the 
one chosen to visit the Pokhran I nuclear test site along with Indira Gandhi in December 
of 1974 (see figure 17) 
232
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Figure 17: Satish Dhawan (third from right) behind Indira Gandhi.  
source: Weapons of Peace, Raj Chengappa.  
 
Dhawan made public statements soon after the Pokhran nuclear test that the space 
establishment had the capability to produce an IRBM if the Government gave a go ahead 





by Indira Gandhi.  The presence of Dhawan and the increasing funding the space 
establishment, especially VSSC and SHAR received during the SLV-phase, raises 
puzzling questions about the nature of the dichotomy that has been etched in scholarly 
works on the Indian space program and how it was exhibited publicly -- that the space 
program and the missile program are separate entities. This point was again made by 
Kalam during my interview with him “ defense research in missiles and space programs 
for launch vehicles are separate and space had nothing to do with missile efforts, even 
now.”
233
 (emphasis mine) 
Here is an interesting interview conducted by Subramanian Swamy, a member of 
the parliament belonging to the Jana Sangh political party. The questioning by Swamy, 
shows how informed his party was about rocketry.   
 
Q: Does India produce its own solid propellant?  
 
A: Yes  
 
Q: What is the specific Impulse of this propellant?  
 
A: 240 seconds  
 
Q: Is that enough to Generate 70, 000 lbs of Thrust 
for an IRBM?  
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A: Yes  
 
Q: You have Developed an Inertial Guidance System?  
 
A: Yes, we have, for satellite launching  
 
Q: If you have the propellant of adequate specific 
impulse and the inertial guidance system, you have 
everything for an IRBM?  
 
A: Yes, we do. If the Government desires us to produce 
an IRBM we can.  
Seeing this interview appear in a newspaper, US Ambassador in India Patrick 
Moynihan and his faithful aide David Schneider sent a report to Secretary of State giving 
details about specific impulse and stating that “If the specific impulse is above 230, then 
an IRBM capability is achieved. India has thus attained 10 seconds more than the 
required minimum impulse.”  Embassy also commented, “this is the first reference in 
print that we remember seeing where a military use for India’s peaceful space program 
has been mentioned by a senior Indian official.” 
234
 
Chronologically moving further, in January 1975 M.G.K Menon, cosmic ray 
physicist, director of TIFR, and who became the “raja of electronics” in India was posted 
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as the director of DRDL and DRDO. He appointed a review committee under the 
chairmanship of Brahma Prakash, to emulate the work carried out in the Devil Project (a 





 of Jan 1975 and March was the final meeting.” In the meeting Menon, when the 
talk of terminating Devil and Valiant came up, said, “I tried to tailor the policy to have a 
commonality of technology so that without too much more effort you could produce an 
entire family of missiles with the same basic pieces like a mechano or Lego set from 
which you could build all sorts of things.”
235
 The early idea of an IGMDP is hinted at 
here.   
In the field of guidance packages too, we see close relations between the defense 
establishment and ISRO. The inertial guidance team at VSSC met with a difficult 
problem when producing a highly sensitive component “yaw and outer roll gimbal in 
aluminium alloy.” The team narrowed down a solution and sought help outside VSSC. 
On 2
nd
 September 1976, S. Dhawan contacted Air Marshall S.J. Dastur, the Chairman of 
Hindustan Aeronautics Division, Koraput. On 13
th
 September 1976, Abdul Kalam, who 
was then the Project Director SLV-3, contacted V.S. Arunachalam, Defence 
Metallurgical Research Laboratory (DMRL) highlighting the problems and suggesting 
actions. The ISRO team of Sir M.C. Mittal and Sir George Koshy, together with K. 
Suseelan Nair, R. Jayaraman and I. Raja Rao of MAC foundry and under the able 
guidance of M.K. Madhekar, B.K. Sarkar and M.K. Mukherjee resolved the technical 
issues and developed the investment casting process technology for this flight critical 
component within the required time schedule at HAL, Koraput. “The team also received 
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unstinted support from Arunachalam and his team at DMRL. Kalam, Brahm Prakash, 
Dhawan, and Air Marshal Dastur and senior members from ISRO and HAL witnessed the 
successful demonstration of this technology.” 
236
 
Launch Vehicle Development after SLV -3  
On the civilian side, experience gained in building the SLV-3 was gradually 
increased for heavier rockets. The follow on Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle 
(ASLV), had two strap-on boosters added to the existing SLV-3. ASLV had the 
capability to place a 150 kg satellite in low earth orbit. It was followed by the Polar 
Satellite launch Vehicle (PSLV). PSLV is the work horse that today can launch a satellite 
of almost two tons into low earth orbit. Technological denial and tight controls on 
technology transfer, through the Missile Technology Control Regime, (MTCR), were 
implemented after the successful launch of the Agni missile in 1989. The technology 
controls that were put in place delayed India’s ambitious project to build the 
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Table 4: Evolution of India’s rocket program 
 


















1 1019 7.5 6.85 1 65 5 
Rohini 75 1 1512 7.5 10 1 65 9 




2 2889 10 25.88 4.15 82 58 
Rohini 125  1 1660 12.2 27.88 4 65 11 
Rohini 125 
+ Rohini 75 
2 3172 12.2 37.3 1.1 85 93 
Rohini 125+ 
Rohini 100 





2 3789 12.2 58.8 3.5 85 100 
Indian 
Centaure 
2 5900 30.5 530 57.3 82 136 
Rohini 300  1 4850 31.6 420 40 85 100 
Rohini 560  2 7463 56 1391 100 80 334 
Rohini 
SLV-3 
4 194,440 100 17.337 30 






























 Stage 1000 mm diameter; 10.04 meters 
long; 15 CDV 6 steel body; 8951 kg 
of propellant; 43021 kg of average 
thrust; 50 seconds burning time; and 
10956 kg in weight  
Kurup – RPP used 
the existing facility 
for making Centaure 
and gradually scaled 
the design. PBAN 
was the resin.   
2
nd
 Stage 800 mm diameter; 6.5 meters long; 
15 CDV 6 steel body; 3250 kg of 
propellant; 19888 kg of average 
thrust; 40 seconds burning time; and 
4139 kg, in weight  
RPP. Expansion of 
the existing facility 
was done to 
accommodate the 
SLV-3 requirement  
3
rd
 Stage 800 mm diameter; 2.5 meters long; 
Fiber glass motor body; 1076.8 kg of 
propellant; 6559 kg of average thrust; 
39 sec burning time  and 1284.7 kg 
in weight  






 Stage 650 mm diameter; 1.6 meters long; 
fiber glass motor body; 264 kg of 
propellant, 2123 kg of average thrust; 
31.5 sec burning time and 300 kg in 
weight  
Kalam was incharge 
Heat Shield 800 mm diameter; and 2885 mm 
long. It protects 4
th
 stage and satellite 
from aero dynamic heating.  
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Number of Stages 4  
Stage Motors Solid  
Length of the vehicle 22.8 Meters 
Maximum Diameter 1 meter 
Lift of Weight 17, 100 kg  
Vehicle Capability  
Payload (Satellite) Weight 40 kg  
Orbit 280 km * 560 km (elliptic) 
Satellite life time 100 days (minimum) 
Flight duration before 
injection of satellite 
468.97 second 
Control Systems  
First Stage Aerodynamic Fin Tip Control (FTC )along with Secondary 
Injection Thrust Vector Control (SITVC)  
Second Stage Reaction Control 
Third Stage Reaction Control 
Fourth Stage Spin Stabilized  
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Polyvalent Meanings of Satellite Broadcast in Rural India: NASA and the Satellite 
Instructional Television Experiment (SITE)  
 
 
 The 1970s was a time of global crisis on the political, economic and social fronts. 
On the technological side, however, particularly in relation to everyday life, the decade 
was filled with major breakthroughs beginning with bar codes and ending with the iconic 
Sony Walkman.
240
 For the first time, even poor people living in some developing regions 
came face to face with a technology—direct broadcast television delivered by satellite—
that would alter their lives significantly. Deemed improbable in the early sixties, such 
communications, on a limited basis, became a reality during the mid seventies owing to 
major developments in the transmitting power of satellites. Developing countries could 
now envision bypassing the difficult stages of installing expensive land-based microwave 
networks and develop a satellite-based network that used augmented television sets with 
inexpensive antennas to receive signals directly from satellites. The possibility that 
developing regions might leapfrog into “modernity” through this revolutionary 
technology captured the imagination of technocrats and policy makers.  In their view, this 
new medium offered the opportunity to shape the “habits” of millions of people and 
remove the pool of ignorance that was detrimental to progress. The United States, in 
alliance with other countries, pursued projects in India, Puerto Rico, Brazil and 27 other 
nations, making them laboratories to test the effectiveness of using satellite broadcasting 
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for mass media, and helping engineers to test novel technologies and determine orbit and 
spectrum allocations for future application satellites. Seeing the utility value of the 
satellite for development needs, many developing countries established ground satellite 
terminals for receiving signals and in some countries for a full-fledged National Satellite 
Systems.  
The most spectacular direct broadcasting experiment conducted using the most 
sophisticated satellite of the time ATS-F (which later became ATS-6) was the Satellite 
Instructional Television Experiment (SITE). Close to 2400 Indian villages, reaching a 
total of 2.8 million people a day, in different geographic regions across India received 
instructional television programs directly from this satellite. The agreement for SITE was 
signed between NASA and India’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) on September 
18, 1969. The project was executed from August 1975 to July 1976
 
and received a great 
deal of media attention in the country.  It was touted as a massive experiment in social 
engineering and was hailed by some enthusiasts as the world's largest sociological 
experiment.
241
 The British science writer Arthur C. Clarke called it the “greatest 
communications experiment in history.”
242
  Praise for the intangible benefits of the SITE 
project was perhaps best summarized in a report to the United Nations Committee on 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space:  
SITE can be considered a pace-setter and fore-runner of satellite television 
systems particularly of those meant for development. It is an example of 
technological and psychological emancipation of the developing world. Its most 
important element was the commitment and dedication of all people and 
organizations involved to the one overriding goal of rural development in India. 
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From this follows the crucial role of motivation and cooperation for the success of 
complex and challenging tasks.
243
   
 
The official Indian reaction to SITE was very positive. The immediate visible 
results of the broadcast, as cited by project evaluators in the rural clusters, was improved 
school attendance, increased concern for proper nutrition and an awareness of sanitation 
and personal hygiene as methods of disease prevention. One of the unanticipated benefits 
of the program was the electrification of numerous villages, a prerequisite for television 
reception.
244
 For the Indians, the visual demonstration galvanized public opinion in favor 
of a space program focused on socio-economic needs.  It helped the country gain 
competence in using satellites for mass communication and was a systems management 
lesson for managing Indian National Satellite (INSAT) systems.
245
 SITE played an 
important role in the development of mass media in India. The story also throws light on 
the origins and growth of the electronics industry in India and the proliferation of firms 
that manufactured televisions and associated electronic components, and the 
establishment of television studios for various programs – educational and entertainment.  
These  are the immediate visible manifestation of India’s tryst with this evolving 
medium. The legacy of SITE can still be seen today when one watches educational 
programs sponsored by the University Grants Commission (UGC) that are broadcast on 
national television channels on a regular basis. ISRO’s recent launching of Educational 
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Satellite (EDUSAT) in 2004, a satellite designed exclusively for educational needs, can 
be traced back to the success of the SITE project.  
SITE has not received much scholarly attention, though there are numerous 
reports on different aspects of the SITE project produced by the United Nations, the 
Indian space establishment, NASA and others. The existing literature focuses either on 
the technical aspects of the project -- satellites, ground stations, television sets etc. -- or 
on the organizational and evaluation part focusing on how the project was implemented 
on the ground and its outcome.
246
 The existing narrative takes SITE to be a logical move 
by a developing nation to use satellites to reach the rural masses and shows how NASA 
played a philanthropic role in achieving this aim. Complementing the standard narrative 
this paper contextualizes the SITE project by bringing in the broader currents of the Cold 
War to reveal the motivations and justifications for initiating a satellite project in India 
and exposes the polyvalent meanings it encapsulated when direct broadcasting was 
finally actualized between (August 1975—July 1976).
247
  
 More than a decade went toward planning the SITE program. While Arnold 
Frutkin and Vikram Sarabhai orchestrated the program during the development stages, a 
host of actors both national and international entered the scene to implement the program 
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on the ground.  As the concept of educational television using geostationary satellites 
evolved during the mid sixties along with the immense potential it augured for reaching 
different regions of the globe to spread the gospel of modernization, the United Nations, 
the Ford Foundation, and the United States State Department through the Agency for 
International Development (AID) got involved by providing funds and experts for 
establishing the infrastructure. Technical assistance was also received through an “expert 
contract” from Hughes Aerospace Corporation, through the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU). On the engineering side alone close to 12 to 14 man 
years of technical training was given to Indian scientists and engineers at NASA 
facilities.
248
 From the NASA side the program, apart from Arnold Frutkin, it was 
organized by J.E. Miller – SITE Program Manger, Howard Galloway, Resident 
Representative during SITE operation, both from GSFC, and Leonard Jaffe from NASA 
Headquarters. Key actors on the Indian side who managed different aspects of SITE 
included, E.V. Chitnis, overall Program Manger of SITE; Pramod Kale, scientist engineer 
who became the Project Manager –Electronics and TV hardware for the SITE project; 
Yash Pal – Director of the Space Applications Center (SAC), Ahmedabad; Binod C. 
Agrawal, an anthropologist who did all the sociological evaluation of SITE during and 
after its completion, and P. Krishnamoorthy, software program manger of SITE.  
Through all of their guidance and expert advice the planning for SITE gained momentum 
and the key actors channeled the Indian bureaucracy to create exclusive government 
agencies and units in the field of instructional, educational and commercial television in 
India. Initially located under the Indian Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and 
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unfettered by bureaucratic red tape, the Indian space officials had ample elbow room to 
devise, plan and orchestrate the entire program. Seeing the future of communication to be 
based on satellites, Indira Gandhi, Minister for Information and Broadcasting (MIB) in 
Lal Bahadhur Sashtri’s cabinet and later as the Prime Minister of India supported 
developing communication networks for reaching the rural people of India. 
249
  
Geosynchronous Orbits and Geopolitics 
Arthur C. Clarke, the father of the modern concept of satellite communications, 
first conceptualized the idea of a geosynchronous satellite for broadcasting purposes in a 
trade journal in 1945.
250
 In the geosynchronous orbit the satellite matches the Earth's 24 
hour rotation, in short, for a viewer in earth it appears stationary 24/7. By the early 1960s 
American communication satellites like ECHO, TELSTAR, and RELAY were developed 
to transmit communications to different parts of the world.
251
 The technological, cultural 
and political possibilities offered by these satellites prompted the U.S. military, 
Government, and private corporations to develop communications satellites to expand 
America’s global outreach.  The aim was to create a “single global system” benefiting the 
entire world but also serving the Cold War interests of the United States.
252
  However, a 
huge technological gulf existed between Clarke’s prediction and the successful 
implementation of a geosynchronous satellite for communication purposes. AT&T, the 
American telecommunication giant, which pioneered early research activity on passive 
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and active satellites leaned toward low earth orbiting (LEO) communication satellite 
systems  because of the technological glitches associated with geosynchronous satellites. 
Even during the early 1960s, scientists estimated the weight of the satellite to be of the 
order of 9 tons.
 253
 A RAND report indicated that “radiated power, weight and boost 
requirements […] except for the cases of the very low altitude and very small coverage 
are well beyond man’s current technical achievements.” 
254
 Hughes Aerospace, based in 
California, was the only private corporation that was positive about establishing a global 
system based on geosynchronous satellite. In spite of the growing speculation regarding 
the technological feasibility of a geostationary satellite, the Kennedy Administration 
clearly saw the potential of using geostationary communication satellites to win the hearts 
and minds of millions of people living in different geographic regions of the globe. 
Technologically a system based on geosynchronous satellites did not demand expensive 
ground stations like the one demanded by a network of low earth orbiting satellites. This 
opened the opportunity for many developed and developing countries to participate in the 
evolving global system by investing initially in ground stations and moving up to create 
their own domestic satellite systems.  
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The Indian government showed interest early on when the United States was 
planning a “single global system.” Situated strategically in the middle of Asia, the 
subcontinent offered a lot of advantages to connect other Afro-Asian regions through 
communication links. Vikram Sarabhai and V. Pail, Chief Engineer of the Indian 
Overseas Telecom service discussed the subject early on with NASA officials. NASA 
expressed willingness to offer Indian participation in future Relay and Comsat projects on 
the basis of full Government of India (GOI) funding of ground station and other 
equipment. Sarabhai and Pai discussed the matter further and planned to purchase the 
necessary ground station equipment costing $ 700, 000.
255
  
In early 1963, a space science symposium was organized in Ahmadabad.  Homi 
Bhabha along with Vikram Sarabhai and E.V. Chitins focused attention on satellite 
communication as an up-coming important field. The main intention was to create 
manpower, to train people locally who would be able to take over when practical results 
fructified. Even though the whole concept was still rather hazy, India joined INTELSAT-
the international  body established to manage a global telecommunications satellite 
system.
256
 The efforts Indian officials were putting into this new and emerging field of 
satellite communication is a visible indication of India’s aspirations for leadership in the 
Afro-Asian region.                                                                                                                                       
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Extensive discussions about using a highly sophisticated broadcast satellite in 
India appeared in the midst of these developments in the mid 1960s. The proposal gained 
momentum soon after the Chinese nuclear test on October 16, 1964, at Lop Nur in the 
Xingiang province. NASA officials suggested this project to the United States State 
Department as a possible alternative to a similar nuclear test by India.  It was hoped that 
India could appropriate this geosynchronous technology to regain its lost prestige in the 
community of developing nation-states in the wake of the Chinese test. For the State 
Department, broadcasting using a geosynchronous satellite figured as one of the 
strategies to keep India from following China toward a similar test and to channel scarce 
economic resources toward modernizing a traditional society.  For Vikram Sarabhai and 
others in the Indian space agency this was an opportune moment to actualize the long 
held vision of technologically leapfrogging the nation using satellites for reaching the 
rural masses.  The geo-political situation created the milieu for NASA to initiate a 
proposal and test the feasibility of using a geosynchronous satellite for mass 
communication in a developing country with the additional motive that the project would 
sell satellites and launches if its feasibility was proven.  
The Chinese Nuclear Program and U.S. Response to the Imminent Test    
Communist China’s nuclear ambitions and its growing popularity among Afro-
Asian countries in the 1950s and 60s exerted constant pressure on the United States to 
seek alternatives that could minimize the Chinese influence in the Asian region. Citing 
India as the world's largest democracy, U.S. officials hoped to establish that nation as a 





counterweight to the Communist model in the Peoples Republic of China, PRC.
257
 In 
general, there was a pervasive notion that India was a great laboratory that would 
demonstrate that liberalism and democracy were the way to go, rather than the Chinese 
model.  Chester Bowles, the American Ambassador to India made this argument early on 
in the 1950s.  U.S. officials were cognizant that a nuclear test by the Chinese 
Communists would alter the status of India, as a democratic leader, in the region. The 
ensuing paragraphs capture the fears expressed by the United States State Department 
over a communist state in the Asian region going nuclear and the preventive 
countermeasures that were contemplated.  
Pride and fear have been the dominant factors for nation states to acquire nuclear 
weapons.
258
 This is very evident in the Chinese case where Chairman Mao, who once 
remarked that nuclear weapons were paper tigers, acquired one with Soviet help to deal 
with perceived external threats.
259
 During 1961, while analysts at the CIA and the other 
intelligence agencies tried to determine exactly what progress China had made toward an 
atomic capability, other arms of the administration began to explore the implications of 
such an eventuality, and what the U.S. might do to lessen or eliminate its impact.   
Suggestions from officials in the State Department that the U.S. should assist India to 
‘beat Communist China to the punch’ by helping their nuclear weapons program were 
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immediately vetoed by Secretary of State Dean Rusk who objected that such a step  
“would start us down a jungle path from which I see no exit.”
260
 
 Things began to change in the fall of 1964 when it became apparent that the 
detonation of a Chinese nuclear device was imminent. Though India was cognizant of the 
developments on the Chinese side, it came as a shock to the nation when China 
conducted the test on October 16, 1964.  Seeing the situation the United States began to 
take steps to identify actions that it might undertake jointly with India in the fields of 
science and technology that could offset the damage of such a detonation to “Indian 
prestige and self confidence.”  These objectives were consonant with paragraph D6 of 
National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM 355 – Indian Nuclear Weapons 
Problem), which directs, “A special study should be made of more specific steps, 




US authorities reported that a survey of world opinion, soon after the test, showed 
that Communist China’s nuclear test was unwelcome. The test was strongly condemned 
in Japan, India, and even the Communist Press of Europe. In Africa, as in other regions, 
there was concern that China would use its nuclear capacity to browbeat India, Japan and 
others into submission.  There was also fear that Soviet influence in South East Asia 
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Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadhur Shastri declared the test to be a shock and 
danger to world peace. Many political parties in India strongly criticized the test and 
feared that it could cause instability in the region. Two days after the Chinese test, Nath 
Pai, leader of the Samyukta Socialist Party, told a press conference that India should 
actively consider acquiring a nuclear deterrent of its own. According to the daily Indian 
Express, Nath Pai urged corrective measures to enable the country to regain its lost 
prestige among nations.
263
 M.R. Masani, the general secretary of the Swatantra political 
party, argued that China's acquisition of the bomb posed not a military threat but rather a 
psychological and a political one.
264
  
The following are the editorial comments by different national newspapers on the 
nuclear test by China. The Statesman newspaper of New Delhi, commenting on Red 
China’s statement that it would not be the first country to use the nuclear bomb, said ‘it is 
likely to prove cold comfort to the people of India who have had first hand experience of 
Chinese duplicity and treachery.’ The Hindustan Times front paged President Johnson’s 
statement that the U.S. was ready to respond to any calls from the non communist 
countries of Asia for help against threats of aggression, thus offering them assurance in 
the face of China’s emergence as a nuclear power.
265
  
Soon after the test, Indian Ambassador Chester Bowles invited Jerome Wiesner to 
India to have discussions with the Indian authorities and survey possible areas of 
scientific and technological cooperation so as to ‘restore the international prestige of 
                                                 
263
 “Nath Pai Wants to Produce the Bomb,” Indian Express (October 19, 1964), cited in George Perkovich, 
India's Nuclear Bomb, p. 66.  
264
 Ibid.  
265
 These were a collection of clippings found in United States Information Agency “Research and 
Reference Service, foreign Media reaction to Communist China’s Nuclear Device, October 18, 1964, NSF 





Indian science to its former level and assist in its further increase.’ Wiesner  agreed to 
visit in India in January 1965 along with J. Wallace Joyce, who was the acting Director, 
International Scientific and Technological affairs, Department of State. Before the visit a 
list of possible proposals was formulated in consultation with the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC) and NASA. Possible areas of cooperation were narrowed down to: 
nuclear energy, space and general science.
266
   
Proposal for a Broadcasting Satellite  
 In line with the cooperative space and space-related projects that were initially 
planned as prestige projects, a proposal for a satellite broadcasting initiative originated in 
a letter by NASA administrator James E Webb to U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs in May 1966. In the letter Webb suggested new avenues for 
U.S.-Indian collaboration in the practical application of space. The proposal included 
several other suggestions:  1) A technical experiment in direct broadcasting, 2) a pilot 
project in the social impact of direct broadcasting, 3) A stimulus to Indian industrial 
electronics, 4) an attack upon the food and population problems of India. In the memo 
Webb stated that the U.S. would build and position a synchronous satellite near India in 
such a way that broadcasts from it could be received over the major part of the Indian 
subcontinent. He went on to point out that India, for its part, could use its nascent 
electronics capability now focused at the atomic energy center at Trombay to develop 
improved television receivers.  These could be established in perhaps a thousand rural 
population centers. Webb was positive about taking the initiative with the Indian 
                                                 
266
 Secret memorandum, J. Wallace Joyce to Raymond A. Hare, 10 October 1966, “Science and Technical 





government and viewed the satellite broadcast project to offer India some visibility and 
influence in Asia:  
India could learn from the study new technological and management approaches 
to education and to the uses of informational media to weld together a nation-
state. The U.S. would, in turn, learn more about the Indians and their most 
pressing problems. Should the project come to fruition, then important additional 
benefits would flow. India would, in its own initiative and with its own resources, 
begin the accelerated development of modern electronic industry. This 
bootstrapping operation would materially raise India's technological base and 
contribute thereby to the development of other, similar industries. Some Indian 
energy might also be diverted from concern with nuclear weapons development, 
the more so perhaps as the success of the experiment contributed to India's 
prestige in Asia. The posture of the U.S. would also be improved through a 
generous demonstration of its willingness to share the benefit of advanced space 
technology with underdeveloped nations. Even should it prove infeasible in the 
end, both we and the Indians could not fail to have profited by the intimacy of our 
cooperation in a joint technological venture.
267
  
Indian Requests for a ‘Spectacular’  
 After the Chinese test, Vikram Sarabhai and Homi Bhabha made periodic visits to 
the United States to negotiate cooperative projects designed to boost India’s scientific 
capability. In select meetings held in Washington D.C. Bahbha expressed the dilemma 
India faced regarding what to do to counteract the “noise” (a term used  by Bhabha) of 
Communist China’s nuclear explosion. He explained that India needed to make some 
dramatic peaceful achievement to offset the attraction gained by China among Africans 
and Asians. He reexamined India’s accomplishments in the area of nuclear energy and 
contrasted them with those of China. India could quite easily have achieved China’s 
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capability; however Bhabha noted that the Chinese were greatly indebted to the U.S.S.R. 
for help on their weapon program. Bhabha explained that if India went all out, it could 
produce a nuclear device in eighteen months; with a U.S. blueprint it could do the job in 
six months.
268
 Bhabha expressed the view that “if India was to maintain its prestige 
relative to the Chinese in the field of science and technology two things should be done: 
(1) ways must be found for it to demonstrate to other Asian and African countries India’s 
scientific achievements, (2) a greater awareness of Chinese indebtedness to the Soviet 
Union for its nuclear achievements must be created.”
269  
 Bhabha also met with NASA Administrator James E. Webb, Deputy 
Administrator Hugh Dryden, and with Arnold Frutkin. During the meeting Bhabha 
swiftly moved away from the option of a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) to 
discussing the possibility of India developing a satellite orbiting capability. Bhabha stated 
that if India undertook such a project, it would wish to launch from India and do the 
largest part of the job itself.  Hearing this from Bhabha, NASA presented estimates of 
cost, technology and time requirements, all of which suggested this was not a project well 
adapted to achieve Indian objectives. NASA also pointed out that by the time India 
orbited a satellite, several other nations would likely have progressed so far in this field 
that India’s accomplishment would appear relatively insignificant. Webb's line of thought 
differed with that of Bhabha; he said that a major effort should be made to select projects 
which would have a meaningful impact on Indian technology and industrial growth, not 
spectaculars which would drain resources to no useful social effect. 
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  During his meeting with Glenn Seaborg, Chairman of the US Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC) he alluded to other glamorous projects like the development of a 
nuclear maritime propulsion system. The AEC agreed this might be good prestige project 
which was worth further study.  Other ideas put forward concerned plutonium and 
thorium recycling, and Indian cooperation with the U.S. in fast-breeder research.  Bhabha 
raised the issue of plowshare, the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful construction 
purposes, and expressed interest in U.S. devices that could  perform such tasks as 
deepening the channel between Ceylon and India and strengthening the Hoogly river.  
During technical discussion both at NASA and the AEC Bhabha maintained that in order 
to offset the lead gained by Communist China through the detonation of a nuclear device 
Indians must effectively demonstrate their scientific accomplishments in peaceful uses. 
Bhabha saw this as long term task which Indians must take on largely themselves, with a 
minimum of visible external assistance. At various time during discussions he restated 
India’s determination to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.  
 Sarabhai who headed the Indian Committee on Space Research (INCOSPAR) 
also made a visit to the United States seeking scientific and technological aid in the area 
of space. Sarabhai viewed science and technology only as tools for socio-economic 
development and not for strategic needs. In his lectures that he gave at select institutions 
in America he made remarks regarding his personal philosophical approach to the 
economic development of India. Essentially, his approach derived from the assumption 
that if the gap between rich nations and poor nations like India was ever to be narrowed, 
the poor nations would have to try to leap frog directly to applications of advanced 





industrial collaboration emphasized self reliance and self sufficiency:  “we do not wish to 
acquire black boxes from abroad but to grow a national capability.”
270
 He saw high 
technologies like nuclear power and space as crucial to modernity. Sarabhai added that 
there was some pressure within India to build a nuclear bomb, and to deflect this pressure 
India needed to do something else to demonstrate an advanced scientific capability.
271
  
James Webb’s proposal of educational television complemented the initiatives 
taken by Sarabhai and his team to harness the new medium for reaching the untold 
masses. In the society for International Development at Delhi in 1968 he said “for the 
rapid and sustained growth of developing countries, the urgent need to disseminate 
information to the masses is obvious.”  When direct broadcasting using satellites was 
visualized as a possibility Sarabhai began to imagine a national satellite system to 
provide a better way of life to the inhabitants of more than half a million Indian villages. 
He wanted to harness this cost-effective technology so as to bypass the expensive 
conventional methods of using towers and microwaves to beam programs in the vast sub-
continent. He hoped that, thanks to the research and development activities of the space 
program, television would be available to 80 percent of India's population within ten 
years. This project was of special significance because by providing entertainment and 
instruction of high quality, it would be possible to bring about a qualitative improvement 
in the richness of rural life.
272
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Figure 18: Artist conception of direct broadcast instructional television.   
Source: NASA  
The U.S. administration viewed direct-broadcast television using advanced 
satellites as a step toward enhancing India’s scientific and technological base. It offered 
the State Department twin benefits: a benign technological tool to offset Communist 
China’s influence, and a technology that would help to bring literacy and development to 
the rural population. This was perfectly in line with what the communication scholars and 
media experts were promoting in the late 1950s, the idea that television and other media 
of mass communication would help toward national development. Influential works by 





efficacy on Walt Rostow’s influential The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non 
Communist Manifesto, became key texts for government leaders to promote mass media 
in their respective countries.
273
  In the book Rostow stressed that the economic and 
technological development achieved by the Western nations were the result of increased 
media use. If the developing countries could follow the path of modernization initiated by 
the West, they would leapfrog centuries of inaction and underdevelopment and catch up 
with the modernized West.
274
 Walt Rostow who later became the national security 
adviser to Lyndon Johnson, was himself interested in putting “television sets in the thatch 




The political value of communication satellites was also emphasized by Arthur C. 
Clark:  
Living as I do in the Far East, I am constantly reminded of the struggle between 
the Western World and the USSR for the uncommitted millions of Asia. The 
printed word plays only a small part in this battle for the minds of the largely 
illiterate population and even radio is limited in range and impact. But when line 
of sight TV transmission becomes possible through satellites directly overhead, 
the propaganda effect may be decisive…the impact upon the peoples of Asia and 
Africa may be overwhelming. It may well determine whether Russian or English 
is the main language of the future. The TV satellite is mightier than the ICBM; 
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India was particularly appropriate for a satellite experiment in the direct 
broadcasting of TV. First, there was no existing TV distribution network which could be 
utilized by conventional means. The population was distributed relatively homogeneously 
throughout the subcontinent rather than concentrated in a few large cities easily reached 
by conventional TV, and there was a high level of Indian government support for this 
kind of experiment. This contrasted with the United States where an established 
conventional TV system already covered most of the country. It also contrasted with 
other developing countries, for instance Brazil. There, a substantial portion of the 
population was concentrated in coastal cities, all of which already possessed TV 
networks, while only the scattered inland population lacked TV. So, India stood apart as 
an ideal laboratory for testing the technology. Wallace Joyce, in the International 
Scientific and Technological Affairs of the State Department, particularly liked Webb’s 
proposed use of the American television broadcast satellite to service community 
receivers built in India.  It had the potential for India to exert “regional leadership” in 
space-related educational TV for development purposes in the surrounding Asian and 
other modernizing regions. 
277
 
For Frutkin, the instructional television project was a constructive step forward in 
cooperation between one of the world’s superpowers and a progressive, neutral, 
developing nation. “For other developing countries, it should serve on a non cost basis to 
                                                 
276





 session,  p. 32.  
277
 Memorandum, Wallace Joyce to Hare, October 10, 1966, “Scientific and Technical Cooperation with 
India, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66, folder SCI- Science and Technology, box 3108, 





test the values, the feasibility, and the requirements of a multi-purpose tool which could 
be critical to accelerating their progress in an increasingly technological world.”
278
There 
is “some measure of generalization, hyperbole, and technological misconception” when it 
came to direct broadcasting of television, remarked Frutkin.   In order to realistically 
consider the problems and technological hurdles associated with direct broadcasting he 
sought an “actual experience with the medium.” The experiment represented a “rarely 




The Indian space experts too were interested in exploring the potentialities of TV 
as a means of mass communication in a developing country. NASA provided an 
opportunity for this kind of experiment. In 1967, only Delhi, the capital city of India had 
television transmission services. The Indian broadcast planners organized under the 
Ministry of Information and Public Broadcasting (MIPB) wanted to extend the television 
services by first focusing on the cities and gradually extending it to rural villages through 
transmitters. Seeing the cities to be already “information rich” through various other 
media, Vikram Sarabhai, in contrast to the broadcast agency – which blamed the space 
agency for unnecessarily encroaching on their domain -- wanted the villages to receive 
the high technology first. In June 1967 Sarabhai sent a team to NASA to study the 
prospects of using a satellite over a conventional transmission links.  After looking at 
various options, the visitors focused in on a “hybrid system for rebroadcast stations for 
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high population areas, and a satellite for interconnection and transmission to low-
population density areas.”  The interaction between NASA, Indian actors and the 
business corporations in America planted the seed for the Indian National Satellite 
(INSAT) that was developed and launched during the early eighties.
 280
   
To test the efficiency of such a massive system for the entire Indian population 
officials at NASA and the State Department conceptualized a limited one year SITE 
project using the ATS -6 satellite. The SITE project was not without domestic resistance, 
however.   Different arms of the Indian government raised objections. The Finance 
Ministry viewed the satellite route to be expensive and questioned why the potential of 
radio has not been harnessed for reaching the rural masses. Rural administrators stated 
that satellite television would “raise villager aspirations” which they not be able to meet. 
The ultra high frequency used by the geosynchronous satellite would interfere in their 
normal operations, so the Defense Department was against it. Economists questioned the 
financial investment in satellite TV when primary schools and other development 
projects needed  the resources. To reach a consensus among different agencies Sarabhai 
set up an ad hoc National Satellite Telecommunications Committee (NASCOM) in 1968 
for the approval of SITE. After much deliberation  the Cabinet approved the SITE project 
in February 1969. 
281
 To this it should be also added that “Sarabhai […] put personal 
reputation on the line in persuading Mrs. Gandhi, to use the satellite approach”
282
 
An agreement was signed between NASA and ISRO in the Fall of 1969 wherein 
NASA agreed to pay for the construction of the satellite, its launch, and its operation for 
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one year.   NASA provided the space segment while ISRO took charge of the ground 
segment and programs. NASA helped ISRO to a certain extent by offering training 
facilities to its engineers at different NASA facilities and by helping in the procurement 
of critical components when these were urgently required at short notice. Numerous 
ISRO-NASA meetings held in India and America helped in sorting out interface 
problems and in acquainting each other with the progress of the SITE project. While 
preparing for this project joint studies were also done by ISRO engineers with NASA and 
private corporations like Hughes Aircraft, and General Electric for configuring the 
systems for the Indian National Satellite (INSAT).  In 1970, ISRO engineers undertook a 
study at Lincoln Labs at MIT for spacecraft studies of INSAT. Sarabhai planned INSAT 
as a follow on after the SITE experiment.
283
 
Krishi Darshan (Agriculture TV Program)  
 
In order to plan the for the year long SITE project, the INCOSPAR with the help 
of the Indian Agricultural Research Institute, All India Radio, and the Delhi 
Administration undertook an experimental pilot project to telecast biweekly twenty 
minute agricultural programs called, Krishi Darshan, around Delhi (it was commonly 
called the Delhi Project).  
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Figure 19: Krishi Darshan   
Source: NASA  
The project was undertaken to understand the social and organizational and 
managerial problems before TV could be used on a wide scale as a lever for 
development.
284
  The project was conducted literally as an experiment with control 
groups, and experimental group and statistical analysis was done on the effectiveness of 
using television programs to impart rural education. For evaluation purposes the 
INCOSPAR roped in the experts from Department of Adult Education of the National 
Center for Educational Research and Training (NCERT). A similar experiment using 
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radio was undertaken in the early sixties but owing to the proliferation of transistors an 
effective method of imparting literacy through a community mode did not materialize. A 
visual medium was felt more important to impart education. In an entertaining way two 
agriculturalists wearing traditional clothes shared the importance of weedicide, pesticide, 
use of fertilizer, high yielding varieties of wheat, with the village audience. To capture 
the audience, the twenty minute programs were interlaced with folk music and dance. It 
was not lecture driven. “Clarity, credibility and practicability” was the main goal of these 
programs.  The project was started on, 26
th
 January 1967 (The Indian Republic Day). The 
transmitter in Delhi had the range of 23 miles. Eighty villages were chosen based on 
electrification and the television was imported by a commercial dealer with an one year 
guarantee.  “Teleclubs” or discussion groups were coordinated by the planners of this 
project.  Television sets were placed in rural villages around Delhi to test “software 
development, receiver maintenance, and audience information utilization.”
285
  Arnold 
Frutkin and Richard Barnes witnessed the programs one evening in a village outside New 
Delhi. And they saw how programs were well received by the audience.
286
 
SITE the Hardware 
How to reach the backbone of Indian society -- 568,000 linguistically and 
culturally heterogeneous Indian villages, with educational television? This was the 
central question that plagued the planners since the early 1960s long before the signing of 
the MoU between India and NASA in 1969. Studies on various technological 
combinations were done by RAND Corporation, academic institutions, NASA, industrial 
organizations, the Indian Department of Atomic Energy, and also at a scientific meeting 
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organized by the United Nations.
 287
 In the end, to suit the Indian requirements, the space 
officials in India along with international experts selectively appropriated a unique 
“hybrid system” for executing SITE. This system utilized a synchronous satellite 
providing the broad-band communication link for re-diffusion from ground stations in 
areas where the density of sets was large, and direct broadcast receivers where the density 
of sets was low.
288
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Figure 20: ATS-6 support network.   
Source: NASA  
The operation and execution of the experiment was dependent on a network of 
complex technological systems. Occupying the central node in the whole network was 
the ATS-6. It functioned as a relay station for receiving and sending signals originating in 
India; in other words it acted as a channel of communication between the transmitter and 
the receiver. The re-transmitted signals from ATS-6 were received on the ground by earth 
stations and Direct Reception Systems (DRS).  The United States provided the satellite 
while the full responsibility for the ground segment – earth stations, DRS and television 








After the success of the Synchronous Communication (Syncom) series of 
satellites beginning in 1963, the Early Bird satellite (Intelsat I) was launched in 1965 and, 
for the first time, it proved that communication from a geosynchronous orbit was indeed 
possible. What followed was a series of satellite feasibility demonstrations using NASA’s 
ATS satellites (1, 3 and 5). They were designed to carry out technological, 
meteorological, scientific and communications research. The last of the series was ATS 
6. It was designed and manufactured by the Fairchild Corporation for NASA. The 
spacecraft carried fifteen scientific experiments in the field of communication, 
meteorology and spacecraft stabilization.
289
 Launched by a Titan III C rocket on 30 May, 
1974, the satellite was placed in a geostationary orbit to beam educational, medical and 
cultural programs to different regions across globe.  
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Figure 21: ATS 6 Satellite before launch.  
Source: NASA  
The sophistication comes from the satellites’ ability to radiate enough power 
through its thirty foot diameter antenna, with a pointing accuracy of 1/10
th
 of a degree of 
arc in all three axes (with an advanced attitude control system), to rebroadcast received 
signals/programs directly to small ground stations or directly to augmented television sets 
over a large area – a foot print of 1000 miles long and 300 miles wide. In general it 
served as a powerful rebroadcasting station, akin to those found terrestrially, in space. 
The two high power signal transmitters were powered by onboard semi-cylindrical solar 





using its onboard thrusters to conduct space based experiments in any region of the globe. 
The stability factor is important for conducting various technological and scientific 
experiments. The SITE was made possible when all of these objectives were achieved.
290
  
Before moving the satellite to broadcast educational programs in India, the 
satellite was used to perform a variety of health and education television experiments in 
the Appalachian area, the Rocky Mountain Region and Northwest U.S. including 
Alaska.
291
 After completion of the SITE experiment in India, the satellite demonstrated 
practical applications to 27 different developing countries under a project named 
AIDSAT.  It was a demonstration project jointly orchestrated by the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (AID) of the U.S. State Department and NASA. Finally, 
before the satellite was de-orbited in 1979, the International Christian Broadcasters, 
Clearwater, Florida used the ATS 6 to telecast instructional programs to Puerto Rico and 
the Virgin Islands. 
292
  
Earth Stations  
The earth stations and the DRS formed the ground segment of the network. The 
earth stations help in transmitting signals to the satellite and the satellite receives these 
signals, amplifies them and transmits them back to earth where they are received by 
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custom made television sets that are suitably tuned. Four earth stations, located in 
Ahmadabad, Delhi, Amristar and Nagpur were utilized for the SITE project.  
 
Figure 22: Earth Stations for SITE  
Source: UNESCO 
The Experimental Satellite Communication Earth Station (ESCES) located at 
Space Applications Center in Ahmedabad, was the central earth station that transmitted 
the bulk of the SITE programs to be delivered via ATS-6 to the village clusters.  ESCES 







 For the SITE program ESCES was upgraded to meet the technical 
requirements for transmitting the signals to ATS-6.  
The earth station at Delhi, a much simpler one compared to ESCES, was also 
upgraded for SITE experimentation. A 10 meter parabolic antenna at Delhi was used for 
telecasting national programs and also served as a backup facility if the central station in 
Ahmadabad were to face any technical glitches. The availability of studio facilities, 
created by All India Radio, for news broadcast and other national programs 
(Independence day program, Republic Day Parade, children’s program) was also one of 
the rationales for having another earth station in Delhi. The third earth station was located 
in central India in Nagpur. It housed the ‘monopulse beacon’ instrument.  The ATS-6 
satellite had the capability of ‘homing in’ to a beacon station located to keep the satellite 
accurately oriented if its internal pointing systems failed. This was one of the important 
back up modes to ensure the ongoing functionality of the ATS-6 spacecraft. The required 
hardware for the Nagpur station, 2-watt S band transmitters, antenna and other 
subsystems, was made in India because of bureaucratic problems in importing it.  All the 
earth stations were pre tested by International Telecommunication Union (ITU) experts 
before the broadcasting began. 
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Direct Reception Systems (DRS) 
 
Television sets modified to receive signals directly from the satellite were 
designated as Direct Reception Systems (DRS). They completed the vast network that 
was put in place for SITE. The system had three main units: 3 meter diameter parabolic 
chicken mesh antenna to receive the signals transmitted by the satellite, the front end 
converter (FEC) to transform the signals into a form compatible with a normal television 
receiver, and a modified television receiver. During the signing of the memorandum of 
understanding for SITE in 1969, only ten percent of the Indian villages had electric 
power, and TV manufacturing in India was still in the formative stages.
294
 Massive 
efforts went toward electrifying the villages and the mass production of DRS.  
The development of the DRS exclusively for SITE was started in 1971 at the 
Electronics Systems Division of the Space Applications Center in Ahmadabad with 
collaboration from NASA. The prototype of the frontend converter and Chicken mesh 
antenna was then transferred to Electronics Corporation of India (ECIL) located in the 
city of Hyderabad in the State of Andhra Pradesh. To facilitate transfer of ‘know-how’ 
and to expedite production, some ISRO engineers from the Space Application Center 
who had developed these units were posted to ECIL.
295
  The television monitor itself was 
basically a commercial model slightly modified for community viewing and rural use.  
“Seven hundred of the 2400 sets were ‘ruggedized’ by using higher quality components, 
as a part of an ‘experiment-within-an-experiment’ to investigate the tradeoffs between 
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initial cost and maintenance cost.”
296
 From the beginning, the Indian government took the 
position that it wanted to assume the maximum amount of control and responsibility for 
the design, production and operation of the system. One reason that 860 mhz (ultra high 
frequency) was selected for transmission from the satellite was that the electronics 
required for its reception could be designed and produced in India.
297
 Every unit of the 
DRS – FEC, antennas and modified television sets was tested in India and the United 
States during the course of its development.
298
 A final testing of the DRS was conducted 
with the ATS-6 in orbit in 1974 by Pramod Kale and his team at SAC Ahmedabad.
299
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Figure 23: Left – Chicken mesh antenna. Right – People watching SITE program.  






Figure 24: Complete DRS system.  
Chicken mesh antenna and television for receiving the television signals directly from the 
ATS-6 satellite. Source: The Hindu – Photo Library.
300
   
 
The fully assembled Direct Reception Systems were deployed in selected villages 
and the districts of six states viz. Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, 
Orissa and Rajasthan. The villages were selected according to the criteria laid down by 
the Planning Commission of India. The criteria included availability of electricity, public 
buildings,  
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Fig. 25: ATS-6 coverage in India  
 Source: UNESCO*  
low population etc. To carry out an organized effort of deployment, operation and 
maintenance of these television sets, maintenance sub-centers and a central cluster 
headquarters were established in each State. These cluster headquarters acted as nodes for 
the distribution and maintenance of the community reception system.  First to be installed 






In July 1975, while it was being shifted eastward along the equator for the SITE 
mission, the ATS-6 tracked the docked Apollo and Soyuz spacecraft as they orbited the 
Earth in the Joint U.S./U.S.S.R. manned space mission. It also relayed live television 
from these spacecraft to the Earth, thus becoming the first satellite to perform such a 
feat.
301
  After this it was positioned at 35, 900 kilometers over east Africa and controlled 
from the Goddard Space Flight Center through a ground station in Spain. Since the down  
link SITE frequency of 860 MHz could interfere with terrestrial services in Europe,  its 
antenna  was pointed eastward toward India and away from Europe, thus avoiding 
interference with European surface broadcasts.  
Technological Component: The Software 
 
Software, the term we currently associate with computer programming language 
was generically used for all television programs to be beamed by the satellite during 
experimentation. The main aim of these programs was to bring attitudinal change and 
development not entertainment. Producing such programs was harder than the building of 
hardware. Custom made programs for enriching rural life were developed by program 
managers and producers with help of national and international experts. However, the 
task of producing such ‘software’ and having them ready to reach target audience when 
the ATS-6 was available, posed a series of challenges because the infrastructure was 
either nonexistent or poor and the producers had no clue how to create television 
programs, especially “sociological” programs for community viewing. In this realm 
seasoned producers became amateurs. Further, the technological and bureaucratic hurdles 
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that experts encountered led to the creations of new organizations, government 
departments, and studios to manage the software side of SITE.  
The iconic All India Radio (AIR) took the initial responsibility of producing 
programs for SITE. Having established the system for broadcasting radio programs in 
India since the 1930s, the space officials saw it as a natural fit for taking the mission of 
producing program content for SITE. The task involved the production of 1400 hours of 
programs to be transmitted morning and evening by the satellite.
302
 AIR took the initial 
steps and established three production centers early on in Cuttak, Hyderabad and Delhi 
for the purpose of producing educational programs for different linguistic groups. 
However, the initial enthusiasm shown by AIR soon waned and the Indian space officials 
had a difficult relationship with AIR during program production. They found the 
organization to be highly bureaucratic and very conservative in its approach toward 
program production. Programs for SITE demanded creativity which the space officials 
doubted AIR could deliver, “the tendency to look upon television as radio with picture 
added on seems to be persistent,” noted Pramod Kale.
303
 Seeing the state of affairs, the 
space officials, recommended some changes in the structure of AIR that would make it 
better equipped to cope with the communication explosion. In order to prevent the 
formation of a “monopolistic system” where a handful of experts produced programs, 
Vikram Sarabhai “desired a more innovative approach of having independent producers 
and programmers producing programs for the system.” He had in mind something akin to 
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INTELSAT which does not take responsibility for producing the program content but 
only owned, regulated, and managed the mass communication system. 
304
 
Because of the friction with the AIR, a separate organization called Doordarshan 
(a Hindi word meaning distant vision), initiated partly by ISRO, was given the 
responsibility of program production. Doordarshan formed separate committees to assist 
program production relating to agriculture, health and family planning.  These 
committees were helped by institutions like the agricultural universities, teachers training 
colleges and Indian Council of Agricultural Research and many international experts.
305
 
Other departments and agencies like the Film Division, the NCERT under the 
Department of Education, along with independent producers, contributed to making film 
material for the software content of the SITE project. A research and evaluation cell was 
also established in Ahmedabad and leading social scientists were consulted during the 
program production phase, pre testing, and the actual SITE transmission phase.  
The major themes chosen for program production – agricultural improvement, 
family planning, national cohesion/integration, and literacy --- reflected the maladies of 
any developing nation state during the sixties and seventies. Though the program content 
was left to the Indians, the themes were jointly chosen and orchestrated by national and 
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international experts mostly emanating from the United States.
306
 The collaborative 
venture is clear when Sarabhai “accepted confidential Ford Foundation/Delhi offer to 
draft broad outlines of master plan for software programming, production, evaluation and 
training.”
307
 The choice of family planning as one of the key programs was planned by 
Frank Wilder, Ford Foundation Consultant in Mass Communications to the Department 
of Family Planning, Government of India.
308
 During the sixties the rising population was 
seen as a constant threat to the development of India. Recorded evidence of the 
possibility of using a satellite for these purposes appears in a report by Wilder who feared 
that the increasing population of India could “throttle and destroy” the emerging nation 
state. Among all the world’s nations seeking to control their burgeoning populations, 
India faces the largest and most difficult task,” he said, adding that “on India’s ability to 
achieve that performance level may well rest the economic, political and social fate of all 
of Asia, if not of the world.” The theme of national cohesion was equally stressed by 
Wilbur Schramm’s who saw it as the first and foremost step in modernization. Schramm 
was a close friend of Sarabhai and E.V. Chitnis, and he frequented ISRO’s Space 
Application Center during the planning stages of SITE. 
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Director of Information for the U.S. Department of Agriculture, who became Ford 
foundation consultant on the Agriculture District Program in India, was a major supporter 
for the use of television programs aimed at farmers. 
310
 Sarabhai’s views on science 
education and literacy was itself shaped by educational program designer Axel Horn.
311
 
Arnold Frutkin introduced the two, and they met for the first time in New York City in 
1965 for breakfast. This meeting was just a prelude. Horn visited Ahmedabad in 
November 1966 along with his wife for guiding the Community Science Center, an 
outgrowth of the Nehru Foundation for Development which was started by Sarabhai.
312
  
Before the programs were aired some of them were pre-tested in different village 
clusters with varying styles of presentation – straight talk documentary, drama, folk 
ballad, etc., to see the audience reception of these programs and what would be the best 
methodology. Since primary education was given first priority a lot of programs were 
produced for imparting knowledge related to science. Science was taught basically by 
taking common every day things available in a rural village, for example a local village 
pond was chosen to impart the properties of water, floating and sinking, waves, pollution, 
soil erosion, disease etc, The village postman’s bicycle was taken as the starting point to 
discuss air pressure, air pumps, the principal of the wheel, valves springs etc; values of 
nutrition by taking the kitchen garden as the starting point.  
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Figure 26: SITE in action.  
Source: NASA  
SITE broadcasts began on August 1, 1975. The broadcast regularly reached over 
2300 villages. Their size varied from 600 to 3,000 people, with an average of 1, 200 
inhabitants. Thus, about 2.8 million people had daily access to SITE programming.
313
 
Many dignitaries from different countries visited India and viewed the SITE set up and 
experienced programs in rural clusters.
314
 A DRS system was placed at the residence of 
                                                 
313
 Clifford Block, et.al., “A Case Study of India’s Satellite Instructional Television Project (SITE),” 
Agency for International Development (AID) Report (January 1977),  p. 3 
314
 Notable personnel were, C. De Jager, President, COSPAR (ICSU), Gibson, Director General of 
European Space Agency (ESA) made a visit to five SITE villages in Rajasthan cluster (May, 1976,) NASA 
Administrator James C. Fletcher and Richard Barnes, (April 16-24), Commonwealth Broadcast Association 
(CBA), Prof, Bernard, Counsellor to CNES, France, Prof Carver, Chairman, Scientific and Technical Sub-





Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s, President of India, of Arthur C. Clarke in Colombo, Sri 
Lanka, and also at the US embassy in New Delhi.    
 
 
Figure 27: SITE in a typical village.  
Source: ISRO, Satellite Application Center, Ahmadabad 
 
SITE ended on 31 July, 1976.  Seeing the success of the project the Indian 
officials and policy makers requested an extension of the program for one more year, but 
the request was not granted and the ATS-6 was pulled back over the American region.  
Frutkin, who orchestrated the SITE project for NASA, said that the one year 
experiment proved the possibilities of the use of advanced satellites for mass 
communication. And he clearly knew that it would bring monetary benefits. “We took the 
satellite back. What was the consequence? India contracted with Ford Aerospace for a 
commercial satellite to continue their programs…the point is, this program not only was 
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an educational lift to India and demonstrated what such a satellite could do, but it brought 
money back into the U.S. through commercial contracts for satellites for a number of 
years.”
315
 Years earlier in a House Committee report on the implications of satellite 
communications, he expressed the same view:  “I’m quite confident that by virtue of our 
participation in this experiment, India will look to the U.S. first for the commercial and 
launching assistance it requires for future programs. And I think this is a very important 
product of our relationship.’
316
 The first generation Indian National Satellite (INSAT - 1) 
series, four in total, was built by Ford Aerospace in the U.S.
317
 Three were launched by a 
Delta rocket of the McDonnell Douglas Corporation and by the Shuttle, and one by 
Ariane in the 1980s.
318
   
SITE was regarded by many as a landmark experiment in the rapid upgrading of 
education in a developing country. It became the most innovative and potentially the 
most far reaching effort to apply advanced Western technologies to the traditional 
problems of the developing world. For the first time NASA and ISRO cooperated very 
closely in an effort to determine the feasibility of using experimental communication 
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satellite technology to contribute to the solution of some of India’s major educational and 
development needs. 
319
 For NASA the experiment provided a proof that advanced 
technology could play a major part in solving the problems of less developed countries. It 
was seen as an important expression of U.S. policy to make the benefits of its space 
technology directly available to other peoples and also a valuable test of the technology 
and social mechanisms of community broadcasting. Seeing Indian states to be 
linguistically divided, the U.S. State Department hoped that the experiment offered India 
an important and useful domestic tool in the interests of national cohesion.  The 
experiment also stimulated a domestic television manufacturing enterprise in India with 
important managerial, economic and technological implications. It provided information 





Frutkin was emphatic about the value of SITE for other developing countries 
“The Indian experiment is, of course, of prime significance for developing countries, 
those which have not been able to reach large segments of their population, those which 
have overriding social problems which might be ameliorated through communication and 
education and particularly those where visual techniques could help to bypass prevalent 
illiteracy.”
321
 The SITE experiment played a crucial role for India too. The results of the 
year-long SITE project were evaluated carefully by the Indian government. The data 
played a major role in determining whether India should continue to develop her own 
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communication satellite program (INSAT) or fall back on the use of more traditional, 
terrestrial forms of mass communication in order to transmit educational programs to the 
populace.
322 
However, though a satellite based communication network won, direct 
transmission to augmented television sets for rural clusters was determined “next to 
impossible in terms of both the electronic hardware and TV software components.” 
INSAT, rather than being unique to offer direct transmission, was designed to relay 
programs to ground based television transmitters which then amplified and redistributed 




The SITE project represented an important experimental step in the development 
of a national communications system and of the underlying technological, managerial, 
and social supporting elements. Following the proposal made by India, Brazil too 
initiated a proposal for a quite different educational broadcast experiment utilizing the 
ATS-6 spacecraft.
324
 The project was intended to serve as the development prototype of a 
system that would broadcast television and radio instructional material to the entire 
country through a government-owned geostationary satellite.
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 In 1976 Indonesia 
became the first country in the developing world to have its own satellite system – The 
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My story of SITE has tried to contextualize the origin, development and 
completion of the satellite instructional television experiment in India. What appears to 
be a technological collaboration in satellite mass communication between agencies – 
NASA and ISRO -- was in fact layered with politics.  SITE was a technology that was 
thick with meaning and that encapsulated polyvalent agendas. Viewing the story from the 
American side, U.S. State Department promoted SITE as a prestigious project to offset 
the first Chinese nuclear test, thereby attempting, unsuccessfully, to prevent India from 
following suit.
327
  It was also an important statement that U.S. space technology could 
directly benefit other people, especially in developing countries. NASA’s motivations 
were somewhat different.   The officials and engineers offered SITE as a prototype to test 
the effectiveness of satellites for direct to home broadcasting and also to determine orbit 
and spectrum allocations for application satellites like ATS. In the process of this 
experimentation/simulation a nation-state, India, became a laboratory that could be 
copied in other ‘third world’ countries seeking ‘development.’  For India, SITE showed 
that a high technology could be used for socio-economic development.  It became one 
justification for building a space program in a poor country--- the question became ‘not 
whether India could afford a space program but can it afford not to have one’?
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Recently postcolonial scholars have offered nuanced understanding of 
modernization projects in the lesser developed countries. “The Northern development 
agencies justified by appeals to humanitarianism their plans to bring the so-called 
underdeveloped societies up to the standard of living of the industrialized North, thereby 
ending the poverty which was seen as a consequence of the traditionalism of Southern 
societies.”
329
 From its beginnings, development was conceptualized as achievable only 
through the transfer to the South of Northern scientific rationality and technical expertise 
and the associated democratic political forms. ‘Modernization’ through science and 
technology is not new to the Indian subcontinent. In more than two centuries of British 
occupation  India witnessed a huge incursion of technologies - railways, telegraph, 
telephone, radio, plastics, printing presses for ‘development’ and extraction.
330
 The 
geosynchronous satellite in post-colonial India can be seen as an extension of the 
terrestrial technologies that the British used to civilize/modernize a traditional society. In 
this case the U.S. replaced the erstwhile imperial power to bring order, control and 
‘modernization’ to the newly decolonized states through digital images using satellite 
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Through the case studies of four technological systems – optical tracking of 
satellites, sounding rockets, instructional television through a geosynchronous satellite, 
and a launch vehicle, I have attempted to tell the story of the origins and development of 
the Indian space program during the formative and critical years (1955-1976). 
Institutionalized, in different geographic regions of India – Naini Tal, Thumba, 
Ahmadabad, Sriharikota, -- these systems  got embedded in the broader political, 
economic, and social life of India and formed nodes around which existing and new 
scientific and technological communities were formed. This organic, highly networked 
community in turn negotiated, appropriated, and incrementally developed a space 
program to suit the socioeconomic and strategic demands of a new nation state. During 
the two decades of its development one could visibly see the shifting priorities of the 
space program shaped both by the compulsions and desires of the new elite to modernize 
India and the vicissitudes of global Cold War. With the scepter of communism 
encroaching the newly decolonized states, the United States, felt the need to extend its 
arms into India to spread liberal democratic and capitalist ideals. Beginning in the early 
nineteen fifties, ‘modernizers’ – from private foundations, educational institutions, a suit 
of agencies, US State Departments Agency for International Development (AID), and 
others reasoned that if India developed along capitalist lines, then communism would be 
kept at bay and the rapid economic growth would develop India and offer a visible model 
for other developing nations – mainly the decolonized Afro-Asian states. In a geopolitical 
climate where India embraced a ‘non-alignment’ policy, the United States levered its 





this context a repertoire of technologies in the domains of – nuclear, space, molecular 
biology, agricultural improvement, oceanography, electronics, etc -- were used to engage 
with disparate elite groups for the common cause of modernizing India and prevent the 
elites from being attracted to the Soviet camp.  However, the technology flow was highly 
restricted and license production or technology transfer was never entertained. In such a 
climate of various technology controls and the emerging geopolitical situation there was a 
fuller determination among the native elite to embrace the ethos of self-reliance. If 
building infrastructure was the dominant leitmotiv of the fifties and sixties, national 
security and strengthening of indigenous firms were the dominant leitmotivs of the 
seventies. In the mid-fifties a space program was non-existent in India.  Two decades 
later, by 1975, India had gone nuclear and the space program was acquiring the 
technological maturity to build rockets for civilian and military applications and satellites 
for earth observation and communication purposes. The transformation, both in scientific 
and technological, was ushered by the emergence of a new elite, mostly western trained, 
who formed wide networks, both domestic and international, for establishing a space 
program.  The transformation was also seen on the political and on the ideological front. 
Having been involved in three wars in the subcontinent the Nehruvian approach to 
foreign policy of mutual coexistence was changed to a more aggressive global player 
with regional hegemony under Indira Gandhi, all bent toward making India a powerful 
center of south Asian politics. Ideologically, Non-aligned movement lost its relevance 
when India openly forged relations with Soviet Union for technology aid - especially in 





A new elite -- breed of engineers and technologists, came of age during the 
evolution of the India’s space program. The core Indian experts who orchestrated the 
program received extensive training from prestigious institutions and at NASA facilities. 
Many who earned their PhD’s in the US, were invited by Vikram Sarabhai to initiate and 
head core facilities and help toward coordinating and building a vast infrastructure to 
develop a space program in India. Their training in select US facilities and the broader 
networks that were established facilitated frequent visits to gather knowledge – in the 
form of reports, workshops, conferences, and personnel exchanges. It is striking that 
while the pioneers of the Indian program were educated in Britain under colonial rule, the 
new, post-independence generation mostly received their education and some training in 
the United States. The case studies dealt with in the dissertation also reveals some 
mundane aspects of how technology and knowledge circulation happens -- how visas 
were granted, per-diems paid, flight plans made, how technology moves etc. Also by 
selectively opening the American facilities for scientists and technologists it created 
“taste or desire” for the Indians to return to America. India today indigenously 
manufactures highly sophisticated remote sensing and communication satellites; 
however, important components and subsystems are manufactured mostly by US 
business corporations. In some areas, the knowledge flow was highly restricted. The case 
of negotiating the procurement of Scout launch vehicle highlighted the intricate 
mechanism of transfer when it comes to dual use technology. The United States 
government through the Office of Munitions Control (OMC) handled export license 
applications on a case by case basis and generally rocket technology and related 





Space science programs started in India as a cooperative scientific endeavor with 
the spotting of artificial satellites, chasing elusive cosmic rays, and mapping high altitude 
winds. The data gathering mission that began during IGY was gradually extended to 
sounding rocket missions in coastal Thumba in the early 1960s. Thumba became a nodal 
point for attracting world renowned scientists and the establishment of TERLS put India 
on the space map of the world. The U.S. State Department used NASA as a tool of 
foreign policy to engage with the nascent space establishment and to lure the experts to 
get training at select NASA field centers for fostering scientific and technological 
collaboration. This was one way of aligning Indian scientists with American colleagues 
and practices, and also to know about Soviet programs.   It also helped them to work with 
the other international scientific communities that were collaborating at Thumba. The 
process involved the willing consent of the Indian national elite – almost all western 
trained scientists – Vikram Sarabhai, Vainu Bappu, Homi Bhabha, E.V. Chitnis, and 
others. They sought to master the evolving new frontier of space science and technology, 
which the elites viewed as prestigious endeavors – it gave visibility for the new nation 
state and helped to project leadership in the comity of newly decolonized states in the 
Afro-Asian nations.  The native elite were particularly attracted to American overtures in 
space science and technology. They were impressed by NASA’s commitment to 
openness and sharing, albeit in a limited way, of technology and data, and the willingness 
to provide expertise. This was sought after by the native elite as foundational for building 
their own capabilities. In the early sixties India experimented with sounding rockets 
donated by other countries but by mid sixties India incrementally acquired the 





of a fleet of indigenous sounding rockets for gathering atmospheric data and space 
sciences inside ISRO attained maturity to handle complex scientific missions. Recently, 
Chandrayaan I (Moon craft) --  a scientific moon mission, was launched by India on its 
indigenous rockets in the year 2008. The space craft carried two NASA-built instruments 
on its maiden voyage to the moon.  It was a proud moment for both countries, and a 
fitting tribute to NASA’s contribution to a space program that it helped to found with the 
Indian scientific and engineering elite in the early 1960s. 
The early thrust on space science slowly gave way to space applications. In a poor 
country with starving millions a space science program had to be justified for government 
largesse. Here is where the genius of scientist and technocrat Vikiram Sarabhai comes 
into play. He successfully tweaked esoteric missions as obligatory passage points that 
every developing country had to go through – mainly to create viable institutions and the 
building of infrastructure. This argument ensured him state support and patronage from 
private foundations. In a climate of increasing internal domestic constraints – over 
population, famine, illiteracy etc, the space science program gets a lesser priority over 
space application projects. In the larger framework of ‘modernization for development’ 
already entrenched in the new nation state, the nascent space team selectively 
appropriated the tenets of modernization into their evolving space program and 
progressively advocated high-technology as a vehicle to develop India. The use of space 
technology for winning the hearts and minds of people in developing regions thrilled the 
US State Department and NASA. The United States wanted to channel the technology 
flow to augment the nascent space program to yield societal benefits and to secure future 





generation communication satellite and also paid for launches. Engagement during SITE 
and remote sensing experiments selectively tied the Indian space establishment with the 
business enterprises of the United States. Rural television was an outgrowth of this and it 
culminated in the SITE project. The “digital revolution” in India today has moorings in 
the SITE experiment.  Proliferation of firms in the electronics industry to manufacture 
television sets and concurrent hardware clearly played a major part in the growth of 
electronics. Levering the focus on agricultural improvement (Green Revolution) new 
facilities were created for the development of remote sensing -- a “plough in the sky.”  
What started as an aerial mission using Hasselblad cameras matured into a remote 
sensing satellite program within ISRO.  After the successful launching of Bhaskara I and 
II experimental low earth orbiting satellites in 1979 and 1981, India today has twelve 
remote sensing satellites under the Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) satellite system, making 
it the largest constellation of remote sensing satellites in the world.  
While space application was given a major thrust, India had other parallel 
priorities as well. The internal geopolitical situation of having lost a war with China 
(1962), and the Indo-Pakistan war (1965), and having to face a nuclear China, made a 
nuclear deterrent increasingly attractive. While planning a program using application 
satellites, Sarabhai recruited a stream of western trained technologists mostly from 
United States, to kick start an indigenous rocket program. The flow of technology now 
shifts from the United States to those who were willing to cooperate with India. France 
becomes a key partner in this mission, assisted by Japan and Germany. Locked in the 
cold war, where the Soviet Union and the USA were attempting to maintain their 





resources by constantly forming networks. This tension gets manifested in how the Indian 
space program evolves. In this state of affairs United States and India become partners in 
an uneasy tango where the arms cooperated but not the legs. When India’s own wishes 
were not compatible with what America had to offer, India quickly switches partners – 
Soviet Union, France, Germany, and others to augment a space program with ballistic 
missile abilities. By the time of Sarabhai’s death India’s space program was heading in a 
direction that alarmed the United States. Inquires into nose cone, solid propellants and 
precision guidance packages in the early 70s clearly indicated India’s ballistic missile 
ambitions and the growing nuclear program only confirmed it.  On the political front the 
Indo-Pakistan war (1971) brought a wedge between US and India. The Foundations, after 
several years of operation in agriculture and population control, were leaving and 
economic aid virtually came to a standstill. The United States had vested interest in India 
during the fifties and sixties. The real estrangement actually happens in the 1970s. While 
the US was slowly withdrawing, the Soviet Union drew closer to India. India’s first 
satellite Aryabhatta – an astronomical satellite, was launched by Soviet Union in 1975 
and also launched two remote sensing satellites – Bhaskara I and II. Close relations were 
also forged with France for the development of liquid fueled rockets. Though France and 
Soviet Union extensively engaged with India after relations cooled with the United 
States’ the native elites preferred working with Americans—as this dissertation shows 
only too well. The policy of non-alignment during global cold war offered the 












Transnational Networks and Knowledge Flows 
The case studies dealt with in the dissertation highlight the circulation of 
knowledge between “metropolis” and “periphery.” Rather than a unidirectional flow, 
where the periphery was always at the receiving end, there is a dynamic feedback of 
knowledge from “periphery” to “center.” India received space related technology and at 
the same time by engaging with India and directing space technology for socio-economic 
benefits, Americans learned about what a space program should be in developing 
countries. It was eye opening for many US experts to the realities of Indian life. 
Undoubtedly Vikram Sarabhai made a profound impact on Arnold Frutkin. He profusely 
cites Vikram Sarabhai’s work in his own book and he too appropriates the modernization 
language. Commenting on the SITE experiment, Frutkin stated that “this would be the 
first experiment in the use of a satellite for widespread educational instruction and the 
results, if successful, would be applicable elsewhere in the less developed world. This 
alone made the project useful to NASA.”
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 A perceptive observation of this kind of 
feedback loop was expounded by Kapil Raj, a historian of science and technology, when 
he says that “instead of a linear, unidirectional model of cross-border knowledge flows, 
the encounter between center and periphery is now seen as a face to face transaction 
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between agents from different polis in which they collaborate in the co-production of 
scientific knowledge according to specific needs, interests and agendas.”
333
 Although 
Raj’s setting is colonial India and the co-production was in the realms of scientific 
knowledge, his observation resonates well with knowledge flow between United States 
and India and vice-versa. 
           
 
Figure 28: International networks and knowledge flows 
Grey – From the United States of America  
Blue – From European countries – UK, France, and Germany and also Japan 
Black – Periphery --  Periphery Collaboration – India with Brazil, Indonesia and African 
countries.  
 
 The transnational flow of knowledge and technology was made possible 
by the elites who either received their education or training in the US or both (see the 
below table). The network established by Vikram Sarabhai and Homi Bhabha was 
continued by other scientists and technologists who spearheaded the space program.  
Though they acted as crucial nodes around which networks were formed, the Indian elite, 
however, were not denied agency. At every stage they selectively appropriated the 
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knowledge and technology for building a space program that addressed core needs of a 
developing nation state.  While the United States played a critical part during the early 
stages of India’s space program, India was simultaneously building relations with Soviet  
Table 7:  Education and Training in the United States  
Name  Education/Training  
Raman Pisharoty Father of Remote Sensing in India  
PhD from UCLA 
US weather Bureau offices in Washington D.C. Los 
Angeles , New Orleans and the Hurricane Forecast 
Center at Miami, 
A.E. Muthunayagam Father of liquid Propulsion in India 
PhD - Purdue. Training at AMES, and other facilities 
Y.J. Rao  Project Manager – SLV 3 (early stages) 
PhD – Minnesota 
Trained at many U.S. facilities 
P.D. Bhavsar Sounding rocket research and establishment of TERLS 
Post-Doc at Minnesota  
Trained at Wallops, AMES 
HGS. Murthy Sounding rocket research and establishment of TERLS  
PhD from Minnesota 
Trained at many NASA facilities  
Vikram Sarabhai Father of the Indian space program 
PhD, Cambridge. Visiting faculty at MIT.  
MGK Menon PhD Bristol, UK . Led the space program after 
Sarabhai’s sudden demise.   
Pramod Kale Trained at GSFC and other NASA facilities. Played 
critical role in the SITE project and INSAT.  
M.R. Kurup  Made many trips to the US for developing solid 
propulsion motors and propellants.  
Vasant Gowarikar  Birmingham University, UK. Made many trips to 
NASA facilities. Worked extensively on the satellite 
launch vehicle.  
Abdul Kalam  Received 6 month training at Wallops, Ames, GSFC. 
He led the launch vehicle program after Y.J. Rao. He 
orchestrated the Integrated Guided Missile 
Development Program (IGMDP).  
Yash Pal  PhD (Physics), from MIT. Played an instrumental role 
in the SITE project.  
Binod c. Agrawal PhD from Minnesota (Anthropology). Was involved in 
SITE project.  
Vainu Bappu  Astronomer  
PhD from Harvard 
S.C. Gupta Father of inertial guidance in India. PhD from 
University of Pennsylvania 
E.V. Chitnis  Invited to join Bruno Rossi’s team at MIT (1958-61).   





Union, Germany, France, Japan, UK, for acquiring technological know-how and 
hardware that were generally denied by the United States. The appropriation of liquid 
technology from France and guidance package from Germany is a case in point.   
Moving beyond the “metropolis – periphery” networks, India’s aspiration to be a 
leader among the developing countries, which was equally promoted by the United States 
during the sixties, led to India becoming a center for training scientist and technologists 
from other developing countries. This is very evident during NASA’s collaboration with 
India wherein  India trained a host of nations in satellite ground stations and the use of 
satellites for educational purposes (see the chapter on SITE). The migration of Indian 
scientists to Brazil for kick starting a meteorological program
334
  and expert advice 
offered to other developing countries in space technology throws light on the “periphery” 
– “periphery” collaboration, hitherto unexplored in space history.  
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